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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THIS REPORT IS A COMPANION to our 2007 
book, From Registration to Recounts: 
The Election Ecosystems of Five 
Midwestern States.1  That book reported 
the results of our 18-month study of the 2006 
election, in which we compared the legal 
frameworks and administrative structures that 
shaped the voting processes in Ohio, Illinois, 
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.  These 
five states were ripe for study then not only 
because they have repeatedly played a pivotal 
role in national politics, but also because each 
of these states has been involved in a variety 
of election administration reform efforts over 
the past decade, and because they are broadly 
representative of the country as whole.  Thus, 
the lessons they offered had application well 
beyond these five states.
Now, even more can be learned.  When From 
Registration to Recounts appeared in 
print in late 2007, the 2008 election cycle was 
already underway.  The 2008 election provided 
an opportunity to monitor how the five states 
continued to adjust their election processes, 
to see how they responded to the thorniest 
problems that arose in 2006, and to revisit 
several of the key observations of the earlier 
study.  The result is this follow-up to the original 
book.  Although our original study analyzed 
nine aspects of election administration, 
this follow-up study focuses on four: (1) 
continuing adjustments to the institutional 
arrangements; (2) voter registration databases, 
(3) convenience voting, and (4) post-election 
processes.  Our conclusions concerning these 
four areas are summarized below, along with 
(5) an identification of several other potential 
topics that seem largely to have faded into the 
background, and (6) the major election reforms 
that the five studied states have adopted since 
2006. 
1.  INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Our original study analyzed the influence of 
different “hard” institutional choices, such 
as whether to administer elections using an 
elected Secretary of State or, instead, a state 
elections board.  (Like the distinction between 
hardware and software, “hard” institutions refer 
to actual administrative structures embodied 
in law, whereas “soft” institutions refer to 
customs, traditions, and other social forms of 
behavior that help to determine how the hard 
institutions operate.)  The study also noted that 
each of the five states was affected by “soft” 
institutions in the form of cultural norms and 
traditional administrative practices.  These 
soft institutions are sufficiently important to 
make or break an elections system, even one 
that is perfect on paper.  In other words, good 
law still depends on good citizens who follow it 
conscientiously.
Hard institutions.  Some changes have 
occurred in hard institutions since our original 
book was published in December of 2007. 
Several states have seen efforts to establish 
or tinker with the use of appointed boards to 
supervise elections at the state level, rather 
than assigning this task to an elected Secretary 
of State.  The most important change along 
these lines occurred in Wisconsin, where the 
responsibilities of the State Elections Board, 
the chief elections authority in the state, 
were transferred to a new entity called the 
Governmental Accountability Board (“GAB”). 
Although this change was prompted mostly over 
concerns regarding campaign ethics abuses, 
rather than election administration, the change 
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is still important to election administration. 
While the old board consisted of eight members 
each appointed by various designated leaders 
in state government, the new board consists of 
six retired state court judges appointed by the 
governor and confirmed by two thirds of the 
state legislature.  
As discussed in the Wisconsin chapter of this 
book, we think the new system is a substantial 
improvement upon something that was already 
a good model.  Local administrators report 
satisfaction with the new board and say that 
they have great respect for its non-partisanship 
and expertise.  The board is entirely composed 
of retired members of Wisconsin’s judiciary, a 
judiciary that, despite some recent concerns on 
this point, at least historically has held a high 
reputation for integrity and nonpartisanship. 
The board has also been praised for its 
outreach efforts by touring the state to discuss 
the concerns of everyday citizens.  The board 
is using the credibility it enjoys to propose 
important changes to improve the state’s 
information technology infrastructure and 
overhaul other administrative areas over the 
next five years.  (As this book goes to press, 
Wisconsin’s board has become caught up in 
the heat of the political moment in that state 
concerning the potential recall of elected 
representatives because of their stances on 
public sector unions.  We suspect that, once 
the dust settles over this particular dispute, 
the nonpartisan institutional arrangement 
of the board will have held up well under 
intense pressure and scrutiny, and will have 
fared much better than any partisan institution 
charged with the same responsibilities.  Still, 
we leave a comprehensive scholarly analysis of 
this episode to future research.)
We applaud these improvements in Wisconsin 
and hope that other states will seriously 
consider similar models, as an independent 
board is the “gold standard” of election 
administration at the state level.  While elected 
Secretaries of State are often conscientious 
public servants who do great good, they are 
ultimately politicians who should not be 
subjected to the inherent conflict of interest 
that comes with supervising the conduct of 
partisan elections.  That conflict of interest is 
eliminated, or at the very least substantially 
mitigated, by turning to an independent board 
of appointed individuals.  And although the 
individual board members themselves may not 
have time to involve themselves in the day-
to-day administration of elections, by having 
a full-time executive director and staff like 
Wisconsin, the board as an institution can be 
just as involved and “hands-on” with regard to 
elections as any Secretary of State.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that one 
test of institutional soundness is how well a state 
can handle a significant post-election dispute. 
While it recently completed an important 
statewide recount for state Supreme Court, 
Wisconsin, like Michigan and Illinois, has not 
been through the crucible of protracted post-
election litigation like that seen in Minnesota 
and Ohio.  Until then, evaluating the elections 
systems of these states requires some amount 
of conjecture.
Soft institutions.  In our previous book, we 
noted that different geographic regions have 
different expectations and attitudes about 
elections.  Some states, including Minnesota 
and Wisconsin, have a reputation as “good 
government” states with a healthy, cooperative 
political climate.  Meanwhile, in Illinois, 
Michigan, and Ohio, election administration 
may sometimes be fought over as more of 
a political spoil, rather than as a neutral 
administrative question.
From Registration to Recounts Revisitedviii
Since the prior study, litigation in both 
Minnesota and Ohio has given us additional 
insight into these two states that we do not have 
for the other three.  In the Coleman v. Franken 
proceedings, Minnesota’s system functioned 
with a great deal of attention to concerns 
about transparency and guarantees against 
partisan bias.  Secretary of State Ritchie, 
the State Canvassing Board, local election 
officials, recount volunteers, the three-judge 
panel, the media, and the Minnesota Supreme 
Court worked together as a team to resolve the 
dispute in a professional way that was relatively 
insulated from partisan bias.
In contrast, in Ohio the political parties 
have come to think of the elections system 
as something they need to try to control, 
and to suspect their opponents of having 
competing aspirations.  Neither Secretary of 
State Jennifer Brunner, a Democrat, nor her 
predecessor, Kenneth Blackwell, a Republican, 
was as successful as Minnesota at avoiding 
unnecessary elections disputes and allegations 
of partisanship.  Ohio also has a mixed image 
with respect to local election administration, 
largely as a result of administrative problems 
that happened in 2004 and 2006 in Franklin 
and Cuyahoga Counties.  Because of these and 
other factors, in Ohio any election contest of 
the magnitude of Coleman v. Franken likely 
would generate a great many accusations of 
partisanship, founded or not.  The public also 
would be more likely to view the outcome as 
unfair.
2.  “MATCHING,” AUTOMATIC VOTER 
REGISTRATION, AND OTHER DATABASE 
ISSUES 
A major election administration story of 
the 2006-2008 period is the evolution of 
the database matching procedure required 
by federal law to verify the information on 
incoming voter registration applications 
against information contained in government 
databases.  Two of the five states in our study, 
Ohio and Wisconsin, were sued over this issue, 
although from slightly different angles.  In 
Ohio, a Republican suit contended that the 
Secretary of State was violating federal law by 
not having a system in place that allowed local 
officials to verify the proper information.2   A 
federal district court initially ordered that 
the Secretary put such a system in place,3 
and an en banc panel of the Sixth Circuit, 
in a 10-9 vote that provides an interesting 
look into how to think about the database 
question, affirmed this order.4  However, in 
the end the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the 
order on procedural grounds.  The Wisconsin 
dispute was similar, and also failed on purely 
procedural grounds.5  Because neither of these 
suits was decided on the merits, significant 
questions remain as to what exactly the Help 
America Vote Act (“HAVA”) of 2002 requires 
in terms of database matching, and we expect 
further litigation in this area.  
On a related registration topic, the five 
Midwestern states in this study are now 
beginning to see a significant push towards new 
registration procedures that will automatically 
register to vote any citizen with a driver’s license 
or state ID, unless that voter opts out of the 
program.  While there is essentially no chance 
that automatic voter registration (“AVR”) will 
be in place before the federal 2012 election, 
Ohio legislators introduced a bill that included 
AVR,6 Wisconsin legislators introduced a bill to 
install AVR in time for 2015,7 and Minnesota 
passed an AVR bill that the governor vetoed.8 
While none of these bills became law and some 
of them fared better in the legislature than 
others, we expect an ongoing push in this area. 
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3.  THE ASCENSION OF CONVENIENCE 
VOTING
The 2008 Presidential election saw the 
continuation of a significant trend towards mail-
in voting and in-person early voting.  The trend 
was most dramatic in Ohio and Illinois, which 
saw large growth in mail-in and in-person early 
voting programs, respectively.  In Ohio, the 
percentage of voters voting absentee increased 
from 10.6% in 2004 to 30.4% in 2008,9 although 
6.8% of that percentage represents absentee 
ballots cast in-person as a form of “early 
voting.”10  It therefore represents tremendous 
growth of a process in which the voter does 
not have to come into personal contact with 
election officials or poll workers at any point in 
the voting and registration process.  Michigan 
also saw large increases in absentee voting, 
which rose from 17.7% in 2004 to a 2008 figure 
of 24.9% of all ballots cast,11 mostly by mail.
 
In Illinois, the situation is very different. 
Traditional mail-in absentee voting has not 
caught on there, largely because the state in 2008 
was still requiring voters to provide an “excuse” 
in order to cast a mail-in ballot. Although the 
Illinois legislature has since changed the law to 
permit absentee voting without an excuse, in 
2008 the focus was on an in-person early voting 
model that came to Illinois in 2005 and was first 
used in a federal election in November of 2006, 
where approximately 8% percent of voters 
chose this method of voting.  The November, 
2008, election, however, was where early voting 
showed its true potential: approximately 25% 
of all voters in the state used early voting.  No 
other state in our study has near that level of 
in-person early voting.
4.  POST-ELECTION PROCESSES
Minnesota’s election contest over its 2008 race 
for U.S. Senate was a high profile case study 
of the state’s post-election processes, including 
the initial election-night count, preliminary 
corrections, the counting of absentee and 
provisional ballots, certification of the initial 
result, and any potential recounts, election 
contests, or other lawsuits.  Careful reflection 
on this contest can teach a number of lessons 
not only for Minnesota, but also broadly 
applicable to other states.  For instance, this 
experience showed the overarching importance 
of structuring the entities that decide post-
election disputes to be fair and free from 
partisanship.  The contest also showed how 
some long-accepted practices need to change 
to reflect new voting patterns, particularly 
rising levels of absentee voting.  It showed 
how officials need to establish ground rules 
ahead of time to distinguish between voting 
errors committed by voters and errors that are 
the fault of poll workers or election officials 
and that therefore should not be used to 
invalidate ballots.  Likewise, all states need to 
establish ground rules for what to do with the 
“commingled ballots problem,” the situation 
where some ballots that should not have been 
eligible to be counted have made it into the 
count and cannot be individually identified for 
removal.
Because the Minnesota example is so 
instructive, we feature Minnesota as the first 
state chapter in this book.  We begin each of 
the other state chapters of this book with an in-
depth hypothetical scenario in which the facts 
of Minnesota 2008 are transplanted to the four 
other states in this study.  Using this technique, 
we attempt to predict the challenges courts and 
administrators might experience in this kind 
of contest, where the closeness of the original 
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tally causes every procedure to be examined 
under a microscope.  Based on our analysis, 
we believe that all four of the non-Minnesota 
states should update at least some of their 
laws to better handle future election contests, 
and that Illinois in particular is in need of a 
major overhaul.  Recommendations for reform 
are discussed in each of the individual state 
chapters, with additional commentary in the 
conclusion of this book.
5.  THE DOGS THAT DIDN’T BARK
The 2007-2008 election season saw a few new 
administrative issues rise to the fore, but it 
also saw some traditional ones fade into the 
background.  One area that had received 
a lot of attention in the past, but received 
relatively little attention in 2008, was voting 
technology.  One exception to this was in Ohio, 
where Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner 
commissioned a “top to bottom” review of 
the state’s voting technology and based on 
that study forced Cuyahoga County, home of 
Cleveland, to abandon its DRE machines for 
optical scanners.  While the move did trigger 
one lawsuit,12 overall, voting machines and 
voting machine security were quiet areas, and 
all five states in our five-state study seem to 
accept their current technology, at least for the 
time being.
Provisional voting was also a relatively quiet 
area, except, again, in Ohio.  The outbreak 
of provisional voting litigation prior to 2006 
mostly concerned whether provisional ballots 
cast in an incorrect precinct were eligible 
to be counted.  Minnesota does not have 
provisional voting, and Wisconsin sees only 
a few hundred provisional ballots cast every 
year, while Michigan lets voters avoid having 
to cast a provisional ballot if they sign an 
affirmation of registration and eligibility. 
In Illinois, the candidacy of Barack Obama 
produced overwhelming Democratic margins 
and seemed to have caused the political parties 
to concentrate their resources on areas other 
than elections litigation.
In Ohio, however, provisional ballots have 
continued to be an issue.  The 2008 election 
resulted in State ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner,13 
a post-election action to determine whether 
provisional ballots with technically incomplete 
or incorrect paperwork should be counted. 
Two other cases came out of the 2010 election. 
In Painter v. Brunner,14 the Ohio Supreme 
Court determined that provisional ballots cast 
in the wrong precinct cannot be counted even 
though poll worker error was what caused them 
to be cast in the wrong precinct.  In Hunter v. 
Hamilton County Board of Elections,15 a related 
case, the Sixth Circuit determined there was 
a likelihood of success on the plaintiff ’s claim 
that a county board of elections violated Bush 
v. Gore-style equal protection rights when it 
considered extrinsic evidence of poll worker 
error in determining whether to count certain 
provisional ballots, but did not consider the 
same level of evidence when determining 
whether to count other provisional ballots 
that were cast under similar though slightly 
different circumstances.  We expect Ohio 
courts to continue struggling with the issue of 
provisional ballots so long as rules for counting 
them remain intricate and they continue to be 
cast in relatively great numbers.
Finally, like provisional balloting, voter ID was 
largely not an issue in the five states of our 
study.  Litigation in Ohio and Michigan16 had 
already clarified most of the voter ID rules, 
and a U.S. Supreme Court case from Indiana 
seems to have discouraged further efforts to 
mount constitutional challenges to such laws. 
Wisconsin, Illinois, and Minnesota do not 
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currently require identification of most voters 
beyond a matching signature, eliminating 
this as an issue for the time being.  However, 
Wisconsin just passed a law that will require 
identification of all voters at the polls in 2012, 
the effects of which remain to be seen, and 
Ohio has seen some discussion of adopting a 
stricter ID requirement.
 
6.  STATUTORY CHANGES SINCE 2007
Legislative deadlock has blocked efforts to 
make more substantial amendments to election 
statutes in Michigan and Ohio through 2010, 
but Minnesota, Illinois, and Wisconsin have 
seen significant changes.  One important 
change occurred in Wisconsin, where in May of 
2011 the governor signed a law that will require 
voters to present ID when casting their ballots. 
The new law applies not only to in-person 
voters, but also to voters casting their ballots 
by mail, who must enclose a copy of their ID 
with their ballots—a stricter procedure than 
that used in most states.  The ID requirement 
will be fully implemented by the 2012 election, 
and voters will have to present a valid driver’s 
license, passport, tribal ID, or naturalization 
papers in order to vote.  Voters who do not 
present the required ID will have to cast 
provisional ballots.  Depending on how many 
people fail to present the required ID, the new 
system could transform Wisconsin from a state 
with virtually no provisional balloting (and no 
conflicts over provisional balloting) to a state 
with a moderate reliance on provisional ballots 
and all their accompanying potential for post-
election complications.
Legislative changes in Minnesota and Illinois 
have been more limited, but still important. 
The Minnesota legislature, having learned many 
lessons from the 2008 Senate contest (and also 
under pressure from the 2009 congressional 
enactment of the Military and Overseas Voter 
Empowerment Act (“MOVE”), passed three 
bills that together move the federal primary 
from September to August, extend the absentee 
voting period from 30 to 46 days before the 
election, flesh out procedures for cleaning the 
voter registration database of bad registrations, 
require provision of a Social Security or other 
identification number to request an absentee 
ballot, require absentee ballots to be counted 
centrally by bipartisan canvassing boards, and 
require that detailed records of ballots be kept 
both in the polling place and in the absentee 
balloting process.  These changes address 
many of the small flaws and potential areas for 
concern revealed by the 2008 election.  
In Illinois, the most important change has 
been the state’s adoption of no excuse absentee 
voting, which will supplement Illinois already-
popular in-person early voting program and 
bring greater convenience to voters.  As 
discussed in the Illinois chapter, the trend 
towards absentee voting has had significant 
administrative consequences in states like 
Ohio, and Illinois will have to adjust some of its 
procedures to fit with its new model.  The other 
major change in Illinois is extending the state’s 
“grace period” registration window, which now 
allows voters to register and cast a ballot in a 
one-stop transaction as late as seven days before 
each election.  While this is a newer program, 
and participation remains low, it is growing, 
and in the future it will be interesting to see 
the consequences of expanded participation.
No large-scale changes have occurred in Ohio 
or Michigan, although significant reforms are 
being discussed in both states as this book 
goes to press.  In Michigan, the newly elected 
Secretary of State has proposed authorizing “no 
excuse” absentee voting for those who present 
photo ID, creating one uniform ballot for in-
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person and absentee voting, and creating a new 
“Election Crimes Unit” to investigate fraud. 
In Ohio, legislative deadlock caused by the two 
houses of Ohio’s legislature being controlled 
by different political parties between 2008 and 
2010 prevented Ohio from adopting reforms 
in the wake of issues (such as problems with 
provisional voting) that emerged in the 2008 
election.  Because one party, the Republicans, 
controlled both houses of the Ohio legislature 
after the 2010 elections, it is anticipated that 
the legislature will soon enact a bill that is 
currently making its way through each house 
in slightly different versions.  This one-sided 
legislative effort, similar to what has occurred 
in other states where Republicans gained 
legislative control after November 2010, has 
been attacked by Democrats and voting rights 
groups as unnecessarily restricting access to 
the franchise.  (Indeed, one of the co-authors 
of this book, Dan Tokaji, testified against the 
pending legislation on this ground.)  It remains 
to be seen whether this new legislation has the 
adverse effect on voter turnout that some have 
predicted; surely, an examination of this issue 
will be on the scholarly agenda after the 2012 
election.
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INTRODUCTION
THIS BOOK IS A FOLLOW-UP to our earlier 
work, From Registration to Recounts: 
The Election Ecosystems of Five 
Midwestern States.1  That book, published in 
2007, was the result of an 18-month study of the 
2006 election, comparing the legal frameworks 
and administrative structures that shaped the 
voting processes in Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, 
Wisconsin, and Minnesota.  As the Introduction 
to the 2007 book observed, these fi ve states 
not only have repeatedly played a pivotal role 
in national politics, but today they also remain 
broadly representative of the country as whole. 
Moreover, between 2000 and 2006 each of these 
states had taken substantial steps to reform their 
system of election administration.  In short, they 
were ripe for study, and the lessons they offered 
had application well beyond these fi ve states.
Today, the lessons that can be learned by 
studying these fi ve states are greater than ever. 
Minnesota experienced the fi rst statewide 
federal election contest since 2000, and the fi rst 
since enactment of the Help America Vote Act 
(“HAVA”) in 2002.  Signifi cant elections litigation 
has also occurred in Ohio and Wisconsin, and 
these confl icts have given greater defi nition 
to processes, like recounts, and concepts, like 
provisional balloting, that before were more 
vaguely understood.  The growth has occurred 
not only because of new court precedents, but 
as all the stakeholders in the elections system 
gained greater experience administering 
elections in a post-HAVA world.  There have 
also been continuing legislative debates over 
election rules such as early voting and voter 
identifi cation.  Nevertheless, the growth process 
is not complete, and as part of our study we 
were able to identify many areas of continuing 
ambiguity that will be likely battlegrounds in 
future confl icts.
The original book limited itself to discussion 
of election administration, which was divided 
into nine key areas: institutional arrangements, 
voter registration and databases, challenges to 
voter eligibility, provisional voting, early and 
absentee voting, voting technology, polling 
place operations, ballot security, and post-
election processes.  Thus, the scope of the prior 
book did not include campaign fi nance issues, 
ballot access, redistricting, and other important 
aspects of any elections system.  This new book 
continues to use that framework, but because 
it is an update it will focus only on the four 
areas that have generated the most material for 
discussion since the prior book: institutional 
arrangements; voter registration and databases; 
what we are now calling “convenience voting,” 
and formerly called “early and absentee voting”; 
and post-election processes.  Readers who want 
to know more about the other fi ve areas in our 
original framework should consult the fi rst book 
for a detailed treatment of these topics.
Another framework retained from our previous 
book is the three core values we believe every 
elections system should promote:  access, 
integrity, and fi nality.  By access, we mean 
that registration and voting should be easy for 
everyone and free from unnecessary burdens. 
Thus, the current trend of more and more 
states making no-excuse mail-in absentee and 
in-person early voting available has increased 
access.  By integrity, we mean not only that 
the result reached is trustworthy, accurate, and 
free of fraud, but also that it is recognized as 
such by the citizens who participated in the 
election.  Because transparency is instrumental 
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in bringing about that recognition, it can be 
considered a part of integrity.  Our third value 
of fi nality means that elections ideally should 
conclude with orderly counting and canvassing 
procedures—and should not require protracted 
litigation to determine the winner.  Where post-
election litigation is necessary, it should proceed 
with dispatch and reach a conclusive result at 
the earliest reasonable time so that the business 
of the government can go forward.
As might be imagined, these values, while 
each essential to a well-functioning election 
system, sometimes confl ict.  For instance, voter 
registration protects the integrity of elections 
by preventing double-voting, but if registration 
procedures include unnecessary steps, then they 
may harm the core value of access.  Because 
of tensions like these, we follow the approach 
of our previous book: we view the elections 
systems of all fi ve states as ecosystems in which 
it is dangerous to tinker with one element 
without considering how it might affect the 
others.  Even where care is taken, unintended 
consequences of changes to the system might 
take years or even decades to become apparent. 
For these reasons, recommendations for reform 
should never be made in haste, or without the 
benefi t of substantial study.  This book treats 
each of the fi ve states separately, before offering 
a set of overarching conclusions.
As was true of the original book, this follow-
up study also was funded by a grant from the 
Joyce Foundation (http://www.joycefdn.org/).  It 
builds upon years of scholarship from its authors 
that includes not only the prior book, but several 
law review articles and symposium papers,2 a 
comprehensive 50-question FAQ for each of our 
states produced in 2006,3 an online interactive 
database of clickable maps that compare 
election laws across the nation,4 and attendance 
at dozens of symposia and conferences.  As with 
our prior book, it also builds upon Election 
Law @ Moritz’s real-time reporting on the 
legal issues surrounding each federal election, 
as well as signifi cant post-election analysis of 
those events in the form of policy pieces on the 
EL@M website.5
But most importantly, this book refl ects the 
wisdom and experience of the many election 
administrators, lawyers, community leaders 
and other stakeholders we interviewed for the 
original book—many of whom we re-interviewed 
for this update—as well as many new sources 
we were not able to interview before.  By 
speaking with stakeholders from many different 
organizations and levels of government, we have 
tried to understand the complexity of how each 
level of the elections system fi ts together with 
all the others.  The sources of these invaluable 
interviews may be found in the Appendix of this 
book.
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THE DRAMATIC STORY of the 2008 election 
contest between Al Franken and Norm Coleman 
for a U.S. Senate seat reinforces the conclusion 
of our previous study that Minnesota’s election 
system is strong and healthy.  Over nearly eight 
months of proceedings, Minnesota’s election 
officials, courts, and others deftly steered the 
case through the counting, recounting, and 
judicial contest phases.  At the conclusion of 
the proceedings, when the Minnesota Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of 
Coleman’s contest suit, Coleman graciously 
conceded the election and closed another 
chapter in Minnesota’s history of well-run 
elections.
Yet the 2008 Minnesota U.S. Senate race also 
stands as a good example of how even the 
best-run elections can be incredibly complex, 
difficult to manage, and imperfect.  Ballot 
security and accounting procedures were not 
always followed.  In some cases ballots were 
lost or temporarily misplaced,1 and there were 
credible allegations that some ballots had 
been double-counted2 or wrongly accepted. 
Approximately 11% of all absentee ballots 
rejected in the initial statewide count were 
later shown to have been wrongly rejected, 
and the recount was marked by significant 
litigation and confusion over the extent to 
which previously rejected absentee ballots 
could be considered during the recount.  Still, 
to focus on these details to the exclusion of all 
the things that went right in 2008 would paint 
an unfair picture.
True to its reputation for good government 
and civic cooperation, since 2008 Minnesota 
has learned from its experience and passed 
important statutory reforms of the recount and 
absentee ballot processes.  It also has amended 
relevant portions of its administrative code. 
The changes do not constitute a major overhaul 
of the system, but are targeted at providing 
greater definition to the recount process and 
better record-keeping and security procedures 
for the handling of ballots in future elections.
This chapter digests the 2008 Minnesota 
Senate race.  It includes a critical evaluation 
of the state’s performance, an update on 
the subsequent election reforms, and some 
suggestions for further improvement.  For even 
more details, see co-author Edward Foley’s 
definitive article,3 as well as Minnesota 
Post journalist Jay Weiner’s book, This Is Not 
Florida.4
THE 2008 MINNESOTA SENATE ELECTION
On the night of November 4, 2008, while most 
of the nation was watching Barack Obama 
win his race to be the next President of the 
United States, Minnesotans could tell that the 
U.S. Senate race between Norm Coleman and 
Al Franken was not yet over.  The unofficial 
election-night count showed Coleman, the 
incumbent, leading by 725 votes out of 2.9 
million votes cast, a tiny margin that would 
require an automatic recount under state law.5 
Of course, the election-night margin began 
changing as soon as administrators began 
reviewing their results, with both candidates 
pushing for adjustments in their favor.  Two days 
into the count, Coleman’s lead had diminished 
to 236 votes, mostly because of the correction of 
errors discovered in three small northern cities.6 
The Coleman campaign responded by calling 
these changes in Franken’s favor “statistically 
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dubious,” prompting the Secretary of State 
to publicly defend the honesty and accuracy 
of the results.7  Perhaps hoping to find some 
evidence of misconduct, Coleman then filed a 
public records request with all administrators 
across the state for all documents regarding the 
initial count and subsequent revisions, as well 
as for records concerning chain of custody and 
security procedures.
For his part, Franken also used public records 
requests to identify absentee voters whose 
ballots had been rejected because of defective 
signatures, and argued to the Hennepin County 
(Minneapolis) Canvassing Board that 461 of 
them should be included in the official count. 
The board rejected the request as premature,8 
and the Coleman campaign responded by 
accusing Franken of trying to “stuff” the 
ballot box.  But Franken then brought a suit 
to force administrators to reveal the identities 
of all voters whose absentee ballots had been 
rejected,9 and began contacting voters to 
investigate whether their ballots should be 
counted.  Before that effort was complete, 
the State Canvassing Board (composed of 
the Secretary of State and four appointees) 
announced the official result of the election: 
Coleman led by just 215 votes.10  The race 
would go to a hand recount.
The recount occurred in a whirl of litigation. 
Sometimes it was collegial, as when the 
campaigns came together to agree on a series 
of chain-of-custody procedures to be used in 
the recount.  More often it was contentious, 
as when the candidates filed two lawsuits11 
concerning the treatment of absentee ballots 
and one concerning whether certain votes 
that may have been double-counted should 
be somehow removed from the count.12  The 
campaigns also lodged thousands of challenges 
to in-person ballots to attempt to influence 
their disposition, but later withdrew most of 
these challenges.
While the manual recount continued, Franken 
filed suit to force officials to include previously 
rejected absentee ballots in the scope of the 
recount,13 which Coleman vigorously opposed. 
The State Canvassing Board had decided at the 
outset of the recount not to reexamine decisions 
about whether to count absentee ballots, but 
only to reexamine votes recorded on ballots that 
had been included in the original count.  While 
the Minnesota Supreme Court, in a divided 
opinion, generally agreed with the Canvassing 
Board’s initial rule, it created an exception 
for any ballots that both candidates agreed 
were entitled to be counted.  Accordingly, the 
State Canvassing Board ordered local officials 
to forward any previously rejected absentee 
ballots that might have been wrongly rejected, 
and received a total of 1,346 such ballots in 
response.  Coleman and Franken agreed that 
933 of the 1,346 forwarded ballots should be 
counted, a decision that Coleman would later 
try to rescind.
In the end, the manual recount of ballots—
excluding the previously rejected absentee 
ballots discussed above—put Franken ahead 
by a mere 49 votes.  Furthermore, the 933 
previously rejected absentee ballots broke in 
Franken’s favor, extending his lead to 225 votes.
Coleman promptly filed his election contest, 
and, as required under Minnesota law, a 
justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court then 
appointed a three-judge panel based in Ramsey 
County to hear it.  Because many issues had 
been resolved through the recount, the three-
judge panel dealt almost exclusively with 
absentee ballot issues.  Particularly, it had 
to define the standard for whether to count 
a very specific subset of the absentee ballots 
that had been rejected in the election-night 
count.  This subset consisted of the 1,343 
ballots that administrators had forwarded to 
the Secretary of State as potentially eligible for 
counting, minus the 933 that the parties had 
already stipulated to count, for a total of 410 
ballots.  The standard the court reached would 
also apply to an additional 4,000 or so absentee 
ballots across the state that Coleman alleged 
were eligible for counting, but had not been 
identified and forwarded as such by counties to 
the Secretary of State.
On February 13, 2009, the trial court issued a 
memorandum clarifying Minnesota’s standard 
for determining whether absentee ballots should 
be counted.  Construing the statutory language 
primarily at issue (subsequently repealed),14 
the three-judge panel created nineteen 
hypothetical absentee ballot scenarios that 
mirrored real ballots where the accompanying 
paperwork had been mostly filled in correctly, 
but not completely.  The panel then ruled that 
ten of the nineteen categories were ineligible 
to be counted and should be set aside.  
This “Friday the 13th order,” as Coleman lawyer 
Ben Ginsberg referred to it,15 caused Coleman 
to protest that the three-judge panel was 
changing a “substantial compliance” standard 
for deciding whether to count absentee ballots 
to a “strict compliance” standard, and that at 
least some absentee ballots in these categories 
had already been accepted by election officials, 
the parties, and the courts under the more 
lenient standard.  Coleman complained 
primarily about some of the 933 absentee 
ballots he had previously consented to count 
before the panel had clarified the counting 
standard, but he also expressed concern about 
some unspecified portion of the approximately 
280,000 absentee ballots that had been cast 
statewide.  
But it was too late.  Coleman had previously 
stipulated that the 933 ballots should be 
counted, and at this stage in the proceedings 
the court was not going to revisit what ballots 
were counted on election night just because 
some unknown number of invalid absentee 
ballots might have accidentally made it into the 
count.  Coleman cited precedent from other 
states and argued that the court had the power 
to randomly remove ballots from precincts 
when ineligible ballots had made it into the 
count, but there was meager precedent in 
Minnesota for this procedure,16 and the court 
rejected it.
In the end, the election contest court counted 
351 of the remaining 1,343 previously rejected 
absentee ballots, changing Franken’s margin of 
victory to 312 votes.  
Coleman appealed to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, raising two primary issues: (1) whether 
in issuing the February 13th order the three-
judge panel had changed the standards for 
determining whether to count absentee 
ballots, and (2) whether, prior to that time, 
election administrators around the state had 
used uniform standards for distinguishing 
between absentee ballots that were eligible to 
be counted and those that were not.  On June 
30, nearly eight months after the election, 
the Court upheld the three-judge panel’s 
determination that Franken won by 312 votes. 
The Court rejected Coleman’s claim that the 
three-judge panel had changed the standard 
for deciding whether to count absentee ballots, 
and concluded that in any event a change in 
the standards for deciding whether to count 
absentee ballots would not violate the right to 
substantive due process upon which Coleman 
had based his claims, unless the change was 
shown to be “patently and fundamentally 
unfair.”17    The Court also rejected Coleman’s 
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equal protection claim, acknowledging that 
while some procedures might have varied 
somewhat across jurisdictions, there was no 
claim or showing of intentional discrimination 
and the level of variation that did exist appeared 
to be mostly due to differences in technology 
and resources across jurisdictions.
One week later, on July 7, 2009, Franken was 
sworn into office.
 
HOW WELL DID MINNESOTA PERFORM?
Overall, Minnesota performed well in resolving 
a statewide election contest in a race with an 
approximately 0% margin of victory out of 
2.9 million ballots cast, although the contest 
could have been resolved more quickly.  The 
final result of 312 votes in favor of Franken 
differed from the first certified count by only 
518 votes, or approximately 0.00018% of the 
total, and both Minnesota’s mandatory post-
election audit and the subsequent hand recount 
showed that the state’s all-optical scan voting 
machines were working accurately.  Although 
the candidates initially challenged some 6,600 
in-person ballots during the hand recount, they 
agreed to drop all but 1,500 of those before the 
State Canvassing Board even had to consider 
them.18  This compares quite favorably to the 
97,000 challenges that occurred in Minnesota’s 
disputed 1962 gubernatorial election, which 
itself was considered a model to be emulated.19 
For a fuller discussion of that contest, see our 
previous book.20
It is also impressive that, although the contest 
exposed various instances of human error, the 
eight months of post-election proceedings 
revealed no evidence or even allegations of 
voter fraud or other intentional misconduct 
aimed at affecting the result.  This is true 
even though in 2008 approximately 542,000 
Minnesotans voted using Election Day 
Registration (“EDR”), which in other states 
has become a target for those who claim that 
EDR is insecure and leaves the door open to 
substantial fraud.  Arguments against EDR 
also overlook the fact that, while EDR may 
not be perfect, it does free states from HAVA’s 
difficult-to-administer and controversial 
provisional balloting requirements.  Thus, 
Minnesota and other EDR states have avoided 
the litigation and likely disenfranchisement 
seen in Ohio and other states that are highly 
dependent on provisional voting.
Overshadowing these policy considerations 
is the degree of nonpartisanship with which 
Minnesota conducted the recount and 
associated lawsuits.  The State Canvassing 
Board, local election officials, the Secretary 
of State, the three-judge panel appointed to 
hear the election contest, and the Minnesota 
Supreme Court demonstrated that they have 
the ability to put party differences aside and 
engage in practical problem-solving to resolve 
post-election disputes.  This problem-solving 
attitude is not primarily attributable to any 
formal legal checks on partisan election 
administration like those that exist in some 
other states.  The Minnesota Secretary of State 
is an elected partisan, the State Canvassing 
Board is appointed by the Secretary with no 
formal check on partisan affiliations, the three-
judge election contest court is appointed by 
the state Supreme Court with no constraints as 
to its partisan composition, and the Minnesota 
Supreme Court is itself an elected body that 
may be as partisan as the voting public allows. 
Nevertheless, all of these actors conducted 
themselves with professionalism, seemed 
to have avoided internal squabbles, and 
throughout the proceedings maintained public 
trust.  Thus, the success of the recount and 
contest proceedings has less to do with formal 
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checks and balances, and more to do with 
Minnesota’s healthy civic culture of treating 
each other fairly and working together for the 
public good.
However, the state has room for improvement. 
One area of particular concern is promoting the 
value of finality:  it took Minnesota nearly eight 
months to determine the winner of its 2008 
U.S. Senate race.  The initial count and recount 
phases of the post-election proceedings cannot 
be blamed for this, because they concluded on 
January 5, well before new Senate members 
were sworn in on January 15.  Rather, some of 
the blame lies with a state law that prohibits 
an official certification of the winner until the 
conclusion of any recount or election contest.21 
Franken challenged this rule both in front 
of the State Canvassing Board and the state 
Supreme Court by asking the state to issue 
a “provisional” election certificate, but his 
arguments were rejected on the grounds that 
they had no statutory basis.  Two solutions to 
this finality issue are discussed below in the 
Suggested Reforms section.
Another area where Minnesota could have 
done better is its handling of rejected absentee 
ballots.  Under Minnesota law that has since 
been changed, determinations of whether to 
count absentee ballots were made by the local 
poll workers in Minnesota’s polling places. 
Under this extreme level of decentralization, 
it is unreasonable to expect every ballot to 
be treated the same way.  Indeed, in the 
U.S. Senate race, about 11%, or 1,284 out 
of the 12,000 absentee ballots rejected 
statewide, were eventually counted after it was 
determined that they had been improperly 
rejected.  These acknowledged errors lent 
credibility to Coleman’s corollary claim that 
some of the approximately 300,000 absentee 
ballots cast statewide had been wrongly 
accepted, although because of legal missteps 
Coleman lost his chance to try to substantiate 
that claim.
Yet the weakest part of the Minnesota process 
was not the variation in the initial decision 
whether to count absentee ballots, but the 
delay and confusion that ensued as the state 
attempted to fix those variations.  Rules 
governing both how those variations should be 
remedied and who was in charge of the process 
were either nonexistent, or not understood 
by many who needed to understand them to 
conduct an orderly process.  For instance, 
the State Canvassing Board initially said 
on November 26 that it would not examine 
rejected absentee ballots at all in the recount 
because that was the province of the election 
contest court.22  Nevertheless, on December 
12 the Board told local administrators that 
they could, if they so desired, reexamine 
rejected absentees and either count them 
or save them in a separate pile for later 
examination.  This change of position created 
confusion in two ways.  First, although the 
decision was intended to remedy variations in 
the application of absentee balloting rules, it 
actually exacerbated the potential for variation 
by having each of Minnesota’s 87 counties 
separately apply a standard that the single 
election contest court could have applied later 
with complete uniformity.  Second, based 
on the advice of their attorneys, many of the 
largest and most sophisticated jurisdictions 
initially refused to participate in this process, 
leading to uneven administration.23  Coleman 
used the ensuing confusion to argue that the 
absentee balloting process was unfair and 
inaccurate.  Whether or not that claim was 
true, it would have been better to preclude 
it from even being made by centralizing the 
process to promote uniformity and creating a 
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single counting location where the candidates 
could observe the treatment of all ballots.
The Minnesota Supreme Court exacerbated the 
confusion in response to Coleman’s lawsuit24 
complaining that the state’s 87 counties were 
not treating absentee ballots uniformly and 
asking the court to order counties to stop 
touching absentee ballots until the election 
contest court could decide how to handle 
them.  Although the court generally agreed 
with Coleman that the counties had no right 
to re-examine the rejected ballots during the 
recount, it created an exception that allowed 
the counties to count ballots that the candidates 
agreed should be counted.  While on its face this 
seems a common-sense way to reduce disputes, 
in fact the exception was administered in a way 
that actually intensified disputes.  Because the 
court failed to specify just how this process 
should be conducted to ensure uniformity 
and transparency, the parties had to develop 
the process on their own and ended up back 
in court on Coleman’s allegation that different 
counties were using different standards 
to decide which ballots to forward for the 
candidates’ review.  This created the possibility 
that some ballots that both candidates would 
have deemed countable would not be counted 
because they were never forwarded and the 
parties were never apprised of their existence. 
The issue became still more confused when the 
three-judge election contest panel issued the 
February 13th order that clarified the statutory 
rules for counting absentee ballots by dividing 
the forwarded ballots into nineteen different 
categories, prompting Coleman to claim the 
court was changing the rules in the middle of 
the game. Although the Minnesota Supreme 
Court would later rule that the trial court’s 
order “closely tracked” the written rules and 
therefore did not constitute a change, the order 
nevertheless provided a clarification of the 
rules that ideally should have occurred much 
earlier in the process.
All of this is not to say that Minnesota handled 
the absentee issue poorly compared to how it 
would have been handled in other states.  In 
fact, even though the process was somewhat 
disorganized and made up largely on the fly, 
Minnesota likely handled the issue much 
better than most other states would have.  It is 
troubling to think how a process like this would 
have played out in Ohio, where three times as 
many absentee ballots ordinarily are cast and 
stakeholders in the elections process may be 
more contentious.
As a final note, it is important to recognize the 
role that experience played in bringing the 2008 
Minnesota Senate race to a felicitous end.  The 
state had conducted a statewide recount just a 
few months before, in the primary election, and 
so recount procedures were fresh in the minds 
of many officials and workers who examined 
ballots.  Furthermore, the Secretary of State 
had predicted prior to the general election that 
the Coleman-Franken race would result in a 
recount, and so began preparing officials for a 
possible recount even before the election.  The 
state benefited from having a chief election 
authority who locals respected and obeyed, and 
a manageable number of election jurisdictions, 
compared for instance with Wisconsin’s 
approximately 1,800 municipal authorities, 
further enhancing uniformity.  
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
The 2008 election suggested several needed 
reforms to Minnesota’s election system, and 
we were pleased to see that in early 2010 
the Minnesota legislature passed many of 
these into law.  Furthermore, the Secretary 
of State has recently made important changes 
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to administrative code sections governing 
absentee ballots and other areas.  In addition 
to these changes, the Democrat-Farmer-Labor 
(“DFL”)-led legislature passed a number of 
reforms later vetoed by Republican Governor 
Tim Pawlenty, including a bill authorizing 
automatic voter registration for all those 
applying for driver’s licenses who do not opt 
out of registration25 (HF 1053) and requiring 
the state to notify felons explicitly when their 
voting rights are removed or restored.  As of 
this writing, a Republican measure requiring 
photo ID for in-person voting is nearing the 
newly elected Democratic Governor Mark 
Dayton’s desk, and is expected to be vetoed as 
well.26
Below in Table One is a brief outline of 
important changes since 2008, which pertain 
primarily to absentee balloting, recordkeeping 
and recount procedures, followed by some 
suggestions for further reform.
Absentee changes.  The legislative changes 
summarized in the preceding outline focus 
primarily on absentee balloting.  Largely in 
response to the federal Military and Overseas 
Voter Empowerment (“MOVE”) Act passed 
by Congress in late 2009, absentee balloting 
in Minnesota will now begin 46, rather than 
30, days before the election.  Completed 
absentee ballots must include an identification 
number, such as a driver’s license or social 
Bill Impact
S.F. No. 2251 • Moves federal primary from September to August to leave more time for uniformed 
and overseas voters to vote.  M.S.A. § 204D.03.
• Extends the period of absentee voting from 30 to 46 days before the election.  M.S.A. 
§ 204B.35.
H.F. 3108 • Fleshes out procedures for cleaning voter registration database by comparing it to 
other databases.  M.S.A. § 201.155 et seq.
• Requires local administrators to forward absentee voting statistics to the Secretary of 
State for compilation.  M.S.A. § 203B.19.
•Requires local administrators and poll workers to keep detailed records of and 
investigate discrepancies in the number of regular and absentee ballots delivered to each 
precinct and the number of duplicate, makeshift, or unused ballots in each precinct at 
the end of election night.  M.S.A. §§ 204B.28, 204C.24.  Limits the scope of recounts to 
protect against accidental double-counting of original and remade ballots.
H.F. 3111 • Requires absentee ballot applicant to provide driver’s license number, state ID 
number, SSN-4, or statement that applicant has none of these.  M.S.A. § 203B.04.
• Requires detailed recordkeeping on absentee ballots requested, sent out, and cast.  
M.S.A. § 203B.065.  Offi cials must keep a record of ballots that are not counted and why. 
Requires that absentee ballot envelopes, though not the ballots themselves, include a bar 
code to facilitate recordkeeping.
• Requires that absentee ballots be canvassed and counted centrally by bipartisan 
absentee ballot boards, rather than in the polling place.  M.S.A. § 203B.121.  Offi cials 
must notify voters if their ballots are rejected.  Prescribes detailed accounting and 
security procedures for absentee ballots after counting.
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security number—a first in Minnesota.  But 
the most important changes deal with who 
counts absentee ballots and the extent to 
which records are kept regarding the counting 
process.  Where Minnesota used to allow 
administrators to count absentee ballots in the 
polling place on election night, the count is 
now centralized under absentee ballot boards 
in each county.  The members of these ballot 
boards, appointed in bipartisan pairs by the 
local election administrator, receive special 
training and have no responsibilities except 
for counting absentee ballots.  Furthermore, 
their location in one central place facilitates 
communication and supervision and should 
result in greater uniformity than was achieved 
in 2008.  A similar centralization process 
seems to have improved operations in other 
jurisdictions outside Minnesota, notably 
Milwaukee.  However, the Minnesota law goes 
further than Milwaukee’s by requiring that 
these absentee ballot boards keep detailed 
records of the number of absentee ballots 
received, counted, and rejected, along with 
the reasons why.  Ballot envelopes, though not 
ballots themselves, will be outfitted with a bar 
code system that facilitates this recordkeeping. 
Furthermore, the recordkeeping requirements 
extend beyond the absentee ballot board 
itself and include detailed chain-of-custody 
procedures at the county and Secretary of State 
level.  These rules will increase the amount of 
information available to courts in the event of 
an election contest and, hopefully, the degree 
of certainty the public can feel in the result 
reached in such contests.
Changes to the scope of recounts.  Minnesota 
also has made small but important changes 
to its recount process.  These changes are a 
response to confusion in 2008 over what kinds 
of questions should be considered in a recount 
rather than a subsequent judicial contest of the 
result.  The new law attempts to limit the scope 
of recounts to include only examination of the 
votes counted on election night, and to exclude 
examination of any ballots, such as initially 
rejected absentee ballots, that were excluded 
from the election night count.  The changes 
also dictate that only original ballots, not 
“remade” ballots of the kind that figured into 
one of Coleman’s allegations, be included in 
the recount, to prevent double-counting.  The 
new law also requires accounting procedures 
for these remade ballots to help administrators 
identify how many of them were created in 
each precinct.
This attempt to separate absentee balloting 
questions from the recount should go a long 
way towards reducing the kind of confusion 
that occurred in the 2008 recount over who 
was responsible for deciding the fate of 
previously rejected absentee ballots.  The ad-
hoc negotiation between the parties, the State 
Canvassing Board, and the Minnesota Supreme 
Court about how to deal with absentee ballots 
only made the job of the election contest court 
more difficult.  The new law provides much-
needed clarity, although creative litigants may 
yet find ways to blur the lines again.  
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER REFORM
1.  Provisional certificates of election.  The 
easiest and most obvious additional reform of 
Minnesota’s election system is to change the 
state statute that prohibits authorities from 
certifying a winner until the completion of an 
election contest.  The current statute appears 
to have been written with disputes over smaller, 
lower profile elections in mind, elections where 
fewer votes are cast and the impact of a delay 
in execution is lower.  However, it is apparent 
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now that statewide elections take much 
longer to resolve and the state can ill afford 
to go without an important officeholder in the 
meantime.  The simple change of permitting 
a provisional election certificate to be issued 
while the election contest goes forward would 
eliminate the risk of this happening.
Since 2008, Minnesota leaders have talked 
seriously about changing the law to allow 
provisional certificates, but ultimately 
no legislation was passed.  And there are 
understandable reasons for not authorizing 
these provisional certificates, at least in some 
circumstances. Provisional certificates can 
confer an air of authority on a candidate, which 
then may be used to portray as a “sore loser” 
any challenger to the result.  At a simpler level, 
it seems that the system whenever reasonable 
should refrain from putting into office, even 
temporarily, any candidate who did not actually 
earn the largest number of votes.
But lawmakers might consider a system in which 
provisional certificates are available for certain 
types of elections, and not others.  Generally 
speaking, provisional certificates might be 
more important in connection with executive 
offices where, unless a provisional certificate is 
issued, no person would be authorized to keep 
the office going.  In legislative and some judicial 
offices, where there are always other legislators 
or judges to carry on the work, provisional 
certificates might still be unavailable. 
2. Expedited election contests.  As an 
alternative or supplement to issuing provisional 
certificates of election, Minnesota might 
consider requiring election contests to end a 
certain number of days after an election.  For 
instance, the legislature might decide that the 
state can go without a U.S. Senator for a month 
or two, but after that point can no longer 
tolerate any further delay.  The deadline might 
vary according to whether a legislative, judicial, 
or executive office was at stake, whether it was 
a statewide office, or other factors.  The risk, 
of course, is that the court might not meet the 
deadline, but on average a firm deadline is 
likely to put positive pressure on the court and 
other parties and make them understand the 
need to act quickly.  This pressure might even 
give candidates an incentive to stick to their 
best arguments and refrain from eating up the 
public’s time with long shot theories that have 
only a trivial likelihood of success.
3. Early in-person voting.  Although 
Minnesota already has a low rate of absentee 
voting (its approximately 10% rate is roughly 
1/3 of the absentee voting that exists in Ohio), 
this rate is still large enough to make absentee 
ballots an easy target for dispute in an election 
contest, as 2008 showed.  In fact, some officials 
we consulted felt that Minnesota’s current 
lack of convenient voting options (no excuse 
absentees or early in-person voting) might be 
causing some voters to use the state’s traditional 
excuse-required absentee voting system despite 
not meeting all of the legal qualifications 
for use.  Regardless of whether that is true, 
Minnesota should consider adopting early in-
person voting to reduce the number of easily 
disputed absentees and provide more voting 
options for Minnesota voters.
4.   A clear, easy-to-follow rule to deal with 
the commingled ballots problem.  One of 
the vaguest areas of Minnesota election law, 
like the law of many other states, is what to 
do when ballots found to be ineligible have 
already been counted and mixed in with eligible 
ballots so that they can no longer be identified. 
Some states, such as Wisconsin, have statutory 
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procedures that guide officials in dealing with 
this “commingled ballots problem” in at least 
some situations.27  Minnesota, however, does 
not, a potentially serious problem.  If the 
Minnesota Senate race had played out slightly 
differently, the election contest court and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court would have had 
little guidance to go by.28  Coleman did make 
the argument that both the remade versions 
and the original versions of some ballots had 
been counted, amounting to double-counting. 
But because the courts were able to dispose of 
this claim on procedural grounds, they never 
had to make a determination of the rule that 
should be used to resolve the commingled 
ballots problem.  The courts might not escape 
this issue next time.
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Nov. 4 Initial count shows Coleman ahead by 725 votes
Nov. 6 Coleman’s lead down to 236 after errors discovered in Lake, Pine, and other counties
Nov. 7 SoS Ritchie announces goal to complete recount by December 19
Nov. 8 Coleman fi les lawsuit in Ramsey County District Court (St. Paul) to block 32 absentee ballots.  Lawsuit 
rejected almost immediately.
Nov. 10 • Local jurisdictions certify their results to state canvassing board
• Coleman submits statewide public records request for initial vote count  records and subsequent 
revisions
Nov. 12 SoS, as member of state canvassing board, appoints remaining 4 members of board
Nov. 13 • Franken fi les suit in Ramsey County District Court (St. Paul) seeking names of rejected absentee 
voters (Franken v. Ramsey County).  Court grants request on November 19.
• Local offi cials watch SoS recount training provided by SoS via the internet
Nov. 17 • Franken begins contacting absentee voters in some counties directly in order to harvest their 
previously rejected ballots
Nov. 18 State Canvassing Board certifi es 215-vote majority for Coleman
Nov. 19 Hand recount of in-person ballots begins statewide
Nov. 26 State Canvassing Board unanimously rejects Franken’s request that the recount include a review of 
rejected absentee ballots
Dec. 5 SoS’s goal date for completion of hand recount.  Most in-person ballots are recounted by this date, with 
the notable exception of challenged ballots.
Dec. 12 • State Canvassing Board decides to count 133 Minneapolis ballots that had been lost prior to recount, 
but that had been recorded on election day
• SoS instructs local administrators to locate any absentee ballots that might have been wrongfully 
rejected, and save them in a “fi fth pile” for examination after the recount
Dec. 15 Coleman sues in the Minnesota Supreme Court, claiming that local election offi cials are not uniformly 
following the SoS’s December 12 order to segregate wrongly rejected absentee ballots for later 
examination (Coleman v. Ritchie).
Dec. 16 • State canvassing board begins consideration of ballots challenged during recount
• Franken sues Olmsted County to force counting of 27 previously rejected absentee ballots (Franken 
v. Olmsted County).  The court says the upcoming election contest should decide the matter.
Dec. 18 Minnesota Supreme Court rules that wrongly rejected absentee ballots cannot be examined as part of 
recount.  However, they may be examined in a later election contest lawsuit.  (Coleman v. Ritchie)
Dec. 19 • Coleman sues in Minnesota Supreme Court to prevent alleged double-counting in the recount of 
about 150 remade ballots (Coleman v. Minnesota State Canvassing Board).  The court denies his 
request on December 25.
• Minnesota Supreme Court issues 3-2 decision requiring offi cials and both campaigns to agree on 
a uniform counting standards for determining whether previously rejected absentee ballots should 
be counted (Coleman v. Ritchie).  Previously rejected absentee ballots that cannot be agreed upon 
cannot be counted until their status has been litigated in the forthcoming election contest.
Dec. 24 Minnesota Supreme Court orders counties to forward all absentee ballots they deem improperly rejected 
to the Secretary of State by January 2.  The counties end up forwarding 1,346 ballots for counting, 933 of 
which are eventually counted by stipulation of the parties.
Dec. 30 State Canvassing Board determines that, excluding any changes that will come from the 1,346 outstanding 
challenged absentee ballots, Franken holds a 49-vote lead
Jan. 1, 
2009
Coleman fi les emergency petition in Minnesota Supreme Court alleging agreed standards for deciding 
whether to count previously rejected absentee ballots are not being followed.  He asks that none of the 
previously rejected absentees be counted until the forthcoming election contest.
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Jan. 3 SoS begins counting 933 previously rejected absentee ballots that both candidates agree should have been 
counted.  At this time, the Minnesota Supreme Court had not yet considered Coleman’s Jan. 1 complaint 
that standard procedures weren’t used in selecting which ballots to forward to the SoS for consideration
Jan. 5 • Minnesota Supreme Court rules that rejected absentee ballots may be reexamined and counted if 
both candidates agree they should be counted.  (Coleman v. Ritchie)
• State Canvassing Board certifi es the result of the recount.  Franken comes out ahead by 225 votes.
Jan. 6 Coleman fi les election contest in Ramsey County District Court (Coleman v. Franken)
Jan. 12 Minnesota Supreme Court justice Alan Page appoints three-judge panel to hear election contest.
Jan. 13 Franken sues Gov. Pawlenty and SoS Ritchie in the Minnesota Supreme Court to force them to issue 
certifi cate of election (Franken v. Pawlenty).  On March 6, the state Supreme Court issues an opinion that 
says there is no basis for issuing such a certifi cate prior to when the true winner has been determined by 
an election contest lawsuit.
Jan. 23 Oral arguments on cross motions for summary judgment
Jan. 26 Election contest trial begins in Ramsey County.
Feb. 3 • Election contest court rules that Coleman may present evidence on some 4,800 absentee ballots that 
Coleman claims should have been counted.
• Parties stipulate that 933 previously rejected absentee ballots were improperly rejected and were 
properly counted in the 
Feb. 10 Election contest court orders both candidates to fi le briefs on whether the court should count nineteen 
different categories of absentee ballots that were previously rejected.
Feb. 13 Election contest court holds that the previous rejection of 12 of the nineteen categories of absentee bal-
lots was correct and that the ballots should not be counted.  Coleman alleges that several absentee ballots 
that fell into these categories had already been counted.  But the court rejects Coleman’s request to 
reconsider the ballots because Coleman had already stipulated that they would be counted.  Coleman also 
withdraws roughly one thousand ballots from consideration, leaving only 3,687 rejected absentees before 
the election contest court.
Feb. 20 Coleman fi les brief arguing that absentee ballots that were not eligible to be counted under the election 
contest court’s February 13 order were, in the original election night count, taken out of their envelopes 
and inseparably commingled with eligible ballots.
Feb. 24 Coleman argues in court that some absentee ballots—ones that had been rejected in the original count 
because the voter also cast a ballot in person—were erroneously counted in the subsequent recount.  Two 
days later, Franken fi les a brief arguing against trying to “uncount” any problematic ballots that might 
have made it into the count.
Mar. 2 Coleman attorney sends letter to three-judge panel citing authority for using random withdrawal as a 
remedy for illegal ballots that have been mixed in to the count, and citing authority for ordering a new 
election when the result cannot be determined.
Apr. 7 Three-judge panel examines and counts 351 previously rejected absentee ballots.  Franken benefi ts more 
than Coleman.
Apr. 13 Three-judge panel resolves contest in favor of Franken.
• 133 ballots missing from Minneapolis since election day will count because there is no evidence of 
fraud or that the ballots should not have been counted on election day.
• Coleman was barred by laches and estoppel from complaining of double-counted remade ballots.
• Court will not county invalid absentee ballots just because some such invalid ballots may have been 
erroneously counted earlier in the process.
Apr. 20 Coleman appeals.
June 30 Minnesota Supreme Court affi rms verdict of three-judge panel.
E
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OHIO’S ELECTION SYSTEM, which our 
original study labeled a “poster child for 
reform,” is unquestionably in better condition 
than it was in late 2006.  Much of the credit 
goes to the good government groups and other 
political players who brought attention to 
important policy issues—sometimes through 
litigation—and persuaded administrators to 
take action to address them.  Some of the credit 
also goes to Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer 
Brunner, who after her election in 2006 took a 
more active role than previous Secretaries, and 
particularly guided Cuyahoga County, the state’s 
most troubled election jurisdiction, through its 
first successful two-year election cycle since 
Congress’s  passage of the Help America Vote 
Act (“HAVA”) in 2002.  Nevertheless, many of 
Secretary Brunner’s reforms were unilateral in 
nature and triggered a bevy of lawsuits from 
both sides of the political aisle.  In addition, 
Ohio’s election ecosystem remains vexed by 
conflicts over voter registration databases and 
absentee balloting, among other concerns. 
Thus, despite substantial improvement, 
Ohio election administration remains highly 
politicized.  The improvement that would come 
from replacing an elected Secretary of State 
with an appointed, non-partisan chief elections 
officer is as great as ever.
The state’s increasing reliance on absentee 
balloting over the past several years deserves 
special attention.  30% of ballots cast in 2008 
were absentee, up from about 10% in 2004; in 
some Ohio counties the figure has approached 
50%.  This shift has important implications, 
as absentee ballots are becoming increasingly 
important targets of election litigation. 
Complicating this picture is the fact that recent 
amendments to Ohio’s absentee balloting laws 
occurred without appropriate corresponding 
changes to other laws that indirectly affect 
absentee balloting, which may no longer mesh 
with the new laws.  Thus, in the lead-up to the 
2008 election, Ohio witnessed many lawsuits 
concerning absentee voting, a trend that is 
likely to continue.
This chapter, like the others in this follow-up 
study, begins with an analysis of vulnerabilities 
in the Ohio election system that would be 
exposed in the event of a major post-election 
contest akin to Minnesota’s 2008 U.S. Senate 
race.  It then goes on to discuss the institution 
of the Ohio Secretary of State’s office, and 
particularly the performance of Secretary 
Brunner.  It concludes with a discussion of the 
rise in absentee balloting.  A separate section 
describes Ohio’s extensive election litigation 
since 2007.
HOW WOULD OHIO HANDLE A HIGH-PROFILE 
ELECTION CONTEST?
If circumstances roughly analogous to those of 
Minnesota’s 2008 U.S. Senate race occurred in 
Ohio, the state likely would not handle them 
nearly as well.  For starters, since 2006 Ohio 
has had a statute that deprives Ohio courts of 
jurisdiction over statutory election contests 
involving federal candidates.  Nevertheless, 
as we noted in our original study,1 a federal 
candidate might attempt to invoke some other 
basis for state court jurisdiction.  Accordingly, 
if the hypothetical contest involved a federal 
office, a threshold problem would be 
determining where and over what issues the 
contest would be fought.
In addition, although Ohio has greatly improved 
its election operations and addressed certain 
types of litigation risks, such as malfunctioning 
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voting machines and long lines at polling 
places, it has not reduced the huge number 
of provisional ballots cast each election—
the system’s greatest weakness, discussed at 
length in our previous book.  In contrast with 
Minnesota and Wisconsin, Ohio does not have 
a mechanism like Election Day Registration 
that can reduce or eliminate the need for 
provisional ballots, and act as a safeguard 
against disenfranchisement of voters who 
registered properly but whose registrations, 
for whatever reason, are not showing up in poll 
books.   Another important weakness is that 
Ohio has significantly increased its reliance 
on absentee ballots.  These ballots, although 
an elegant solution to some administrative 
problems, provide candidates additional 
opportunities to file election contests, as the 
Minnesota experience demonstrated.  While 
disputes over absentee ballots in Minnesota 
helped to keep its U.S. Senate race in legal 
limbo for almost eight months, in Ohio this 
kind of dispute might drag out even longer, and 
its resolution would stand a slimmer chance of 
attaining the same level of public acceptance 
that Minnesota attained.
One form that absentee ballot litigation could 
take would be to challenge voters who had 
not submitted proper requests for absentee 
ballots, as in State ex rel. Myles v. Brunner, a 
case described in greater detail in the absentee 
balloting section below.  However, if Minnesota 
is instructive, challenging whether proper 
requests have been submitted is not the most 
promising avenue of attack.  The requests have 
already been submitted, ballots have been cast 
and counted, and the votes themselves have 
been comingled with numerous valid votes. 
At that point it is difficult to remedy invalid 
absentee ballot requests, aside from throwing 
out the result and holding another election, 
which courts are very reluctant to do.  
For the same reason, litigation questioning 
election night decisions to count absentee 
ballots is also unlikely to succeed.  Again, even 
if ineligible ballots were counted, it is too late 
to correct the error unless it is so sweeping 
as to necessitate calling a new election.  In 
Minnesota, when Coleman tried to argue that 
ineligible ballots were improperly counted, the 
trial court ruled that Coleman was precluded 
from making this argument because he had 
waited too long to raise it.  Yet even if Coleman 
had raised this issue earlier, he probably 
would not have gotten far because the ballots 
were already counted and inseparably mixed 
together so that a court would have difficulty 
remedying the problem.  Ohio courts faced 
with this “commingled ballots” problem would 
be in an even more difficult position than 
Minnesota’s courts, because Minnesota at least 
has a few court precedents to draw upon, while 
Ohio has none.  Under these circumstances, 
the courts would have little recourse, in the 
absence of a truly massive number of ineligible 
ballots that had made it into the count, other 
than to say that no process is perfect and that 
whatever level of error occurred in the process 
would just have to be tolerated.
By process of elimination, this means a 
dispute over Ohio absentee ballots would 
probably focus on the same issue central to the 
Minnesota litigation:  absentee ballots not yet 
counted because they were initially rejected 
on election night.  The contestant would argue 
that these ballots were improperly rejected 
and should still be included in the count, while 
the contestee would argue that the original 
determinations of ineligibility were correct and 
that the ballots should stay out of the count, 
except perhaps in counties where the contestee 
fared particularly well.  The arguments would 
center on section 3509.07 of the Ohio Revised 
Code, an Ohio statute entitled “rejection of 
absentee vote.”  This statute indicates several 
reasons why an absentee ballot should be 
rejected, including, but not limited to: a) the 
accompanying paperwork is “insufficient”; b) 
the signature on the paperwork does not match 
the signature on file; c) the applicant is not 
registered and eligible; or d) the voter failed 
to provide the required identification (driver’s 
license number, SSN-4, or photocopy of a form 
of ID that would be acceptable at the polls).
These rules may seem reasonably clear, but 
they have never been interpreted by a court, 
and it is notable that Ohio’s provisional ballot-
counting rules also seemed reasonably clear 
prior to the State ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner 
litigation described below, which exposed 
significant ambiguity.  Where the provisional 
ballot statutes that gave rise to that litigation 
were overly verbose and complicated, the 
absentee balloting statute may suffer from the 
opposite flaw:  it says ballots should not count 
where the statement is “insufficient,” but does 
nothing to define the meaning of that term.2 
This vagueness leaves courts wide discretion. 
A court might take a strict and formal approach 
to the problem, as in Skaggs, and invalidate 
ballots because, for instance, the voter failed 
to include a block-letter name, even though 
the voter provided a legible signature, proper 
identification, and enough other information 
to allow the Board of Elections to determine 
the voter was registered and eligible.  On the 
other hand, courts might take a less strict and 
formal approach, particularly because absentee 
ballots must come with proper identification 
that might make the court more comfortable 
with counting the ballots.
A separate issue that might be an attractive 
target for litigation is the intersection of 
Ohio’s absentee balloting laws with HAVA’s ID 
requirements.  Specifically, regardless of state 
law, HAVA requires most first-time voters who 
registered by mail to provide an acceptable 
form of ID.3  In Ohio, this requirement is 
moot with respect to in-person voters because 
state voter ID requirements are stricter than 
the federal requirements and any voter who 
complies with the state requirements will 
also satisfy the federal ones.  However, that 
is not true in the case of absentee voting: 
Presentation of a driver’s license number or 
SSN-4 on the absentee ballot paperwork is 
sufficient identification under Ohio law, but 
not under HAVA.  Nevertheless, at least some 
county Boards of Election, including the Board 
in Cuyahoga County,4 are instructing absentee 
voters that it is sufficient identification if they 
just provide their driver’s license or SSN-4 
on their absentee ballot paperwork, which 
simply is not correct.  To satisfy the federal 
requirement, which applies equally to in-
person or absentee voters, voters must present 
an actual document or a copy of a document, 
not just an identification number.
Cultural factors.  A Minnesota-type lawsuit 
would unfold less well in Ohio not only, or 
even mostly, because of “hard” factors like 
ambiguous laws or actual maladministration, 
but also because of “soft” factors such as 
the subjective judgments and intentions of 
individual players in the Ohio elections system. 
Ohio is rife with elections litigation today not 
only because it is a swing state with a history 
of administrative difficulty, but also because 
past election litigation has bred more litigation 
and changed Ohio into a more litigious place. 
Because of this history of elections litigation, it 
is safe to say that in Ohio the two major political 
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parties are more adept at identifying potential 
causes of action, and more likely to actually file 
suit over causes of action they have identified.
Admittedly, much of the elections litigation 
in Ohio has resulted in improvements to the 
day-to-day administration of state elections, 
and on the surface it might seem that having 
a highly skilled set of elections analysts—both 
administrators and attorneys—also would 
enhance, rather than limit, the chances of 
a well-conducted post-elections dispute. 
However, the number of latent problems in the 
Ohio system means that it likely would not stand 
up well to the intense scrutiny of a Minnesota-
type contest.  It is harder to imagine, for 
instance, an Ohio election attorney stipulating 
to many of the facts and legal conclusions that 
Coleman’s team did, which smoothed the way 
for the Minnesota proceedings.  Instead, the 
Ohio culture would be to litigate much more 
aggressively.
Any hope that experience and knowledge 
would help, rather than hinder, a swift and just 
conclusion of an election contest in Ohio also 
overlooks the different ways in which experience 
and knowledge can be used.  Although the 
litigation in Minnesota proceeded with some 
decorum largely because of the state’s moderate 
politics and tradition of bipartisan cooperation, 
in Ohio election administration is something 
of a high-stakes political contest where players 
are looking not only for legal victories but also 
to score political points.  Therefore, instead of 
being future-oriented and focusing on reaching 
a just result, parties to an election contest in 
Ohio might very well focus instead on finger-
pointing or trying to take down whatever 
Secretary of State was in office, no matter 
what the cost, even if it resulted in unfairly 
discrediting large parts of the election system.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Our original study noted that many Ohio 
election administrators and others in the 
election community had been critical of 
leadership of Secretary of State Kenneth 
Blackwell concerning matters of election 
administration during his tenure from 1999 to 
early 2007.  At that time, the new Secretary 
of State, Jennifer Brunner, had begun her 
administration with a more engaged approach, 
but one that risked intensifying what Loyola 
Law School professor Rick Hasen has referred 
to as the “election administration wars” that 
have afflicted Ohio and other states.  Secretary 
Brunner has now completed her term, having 
both made significant improvements to Ohio’s 
election system, yet also failed to reduce – 
and perhaps even increased – the amount of 
controversy surrounding elections.
Significant improvements.  Secretary 
Brunner was indisputably an active Secretary 
of State who brought significant change to the 
system.  She hired a group of administrators 
and computer experts to conduct an extensive 
“top to bottom” review of the state’s voting 
technology and then used the results to push for 
significant change.5   She forced the resignation 
of all four members of the Board of Elections 
of Cuyahoga County, perhaps Ohio’s most 
troubled election jurisdiction, put the county 
on “administrative oversight,” and forced it to 
replace its touchscreen voting machines with 
a paper ballot system.6  Meanwhile, Brunner 
required other touchscreen counties to prepare 
paper ballots that could be used in the event 
of touchscreen failure to keep voting lines 
moving.7  
Secretary Brunner also made significant efforts 
to study and learn from important elections. 
She issued a post-election review of the March 
2008 Presidential primary,8 and after the 
2008 general election held a well-attended 
“Elections Summit” that brought together 
hundreds of administrators, legislators, 
community group leaders, and academics to 
discuss the election and what improvements 
could be made.  An extensive report was issued 
as part of the Summit.  Brunner also settled a 
major, comprehensive elections lawsuit, League 
of Women Voters v. Blackwell9 (which she had 
inherited from her predecessor) on terms that 
appear likely to result in significant 
improvements to the system, once they are 
fully implemented.
Secretary Brunner succeeded in getting 
introduced an important House elections 
bill that would have addressed a number of 
issues with Ohio’s current election statutes if 
it had been passed into law.  The version of 
the bill passed by the House on November 
18, 2009, included many common-sense ideas 
for improving elections.  Chief among these 
was a simplification of Ohio’s labyrinthine 
provisional ballot statute, which the Ohio 
Supreme Court once called a “quagmire of 
intricate and imprecisely stated requirements, 
including internal inconsistencies….”10  The 
new bill would have attempted to make things 
more straightforward by focusing the decision 
of whether to count a provisional ballot on two 
factors:  1) whether the voter was registered 
and eligible and 2) whether the voter provided 
a signature that substantially matches the one 
contained in registration records.  The bill 
would also have modified existing law so that 
provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct 
but in the correct county would count for 
eligible offices.
The bill also would have simplified what types 
of identification are valid at the polls.  Most 
types of state-issued photo ID would continue 
to be valid at the polls.  However, the bill 
eschewed the alternative in current law that 
gives voters who do not have valid photo ID 
the option of providing a military ID, a current 
utility bill, a current bank statement, a current 
government check, a current paycheck, or a 
current government document with the name 
and current address of the voter.  Instead, the 
new bill would not require voters lacking photo 
ID to produce any identifying documents at 
all, but would permit the voter to simply sign 
an affirmation that they are registered and 
eligible.11  As long as the signature provided 
on the affirmation matches the one contained 
in the poll book, the voter would be able to 
cast a regular ballot.  This affidavit system is 
similar to one that has been used in Michigan 
for several years without incident (and only by 
a small number of voters).  It would be easier 
for poll workers to understand than the current 
identification requirements that have had to be 
clarified through repeated litigation.  
Other important parts of the bill included 
revising the face of state driver’s licenses to 
remove internal tracking numbers that voters 
often have mistaken for their driver’s license 
numbers.12  In the past, some voters have 
accidentally provided this tracking number 
rather than their driver’s license number when 
applying for absentee ballots or participating 
in other voting procedures.  Finally, the bill 
included provisions to expand the number 
of early voting locations in each county,13 
provisions to allow for online registration for 
voters with signatures already on file with 
the state motor vehicles department,14 and 
provisions to automatically register to vote all 
individuals who have current driver’s licenses 
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or state IDs on file with the Bureau of Motor 
Vehicles, unless an individual opts out.15  The 
Ohio Senate created a more limited bill that did 
not include the changes to provisional voting 
and voter ID, but ultimately the legislature 
could not find enough agreement to pass any of 
these changes into law.  Still, H.B. 260 provides 
a roadmap to changes that may occur with 
future legislation, changes that, on the whole, 
would have produced improvement.  Some 
election administration changes are likely to 
occur in 2011 under the new leadership of 
Secretary of State Jon Husted, as other election 
reform bills are moving through the legislature.
Criticisms.  Despite the systemic 
improvements she has brought, Secretary 
Brunner has done little to ameliorate Ohio’s 
recent tendency to turn elections into an 
opportunity for squabbling and litigation. 
Brunner, a former judge, was perceived by 
some to be heavy-handed, and alienated some 
local election administrators.  She was also 
extremely unpopular in Republican quarters 
and, like her predecessor, became something 
of a target for political attacks and lawsuits. 
Although that is likely in part because Brunner 
forced the system to improve in important 
ways, it also means that she was unable to 
address, and may even have exacerbated, the 
critical problem of lack of trust in the system 
and its leaders.
A prime example of Secretary Brunner’s 
perceived heavy-handedness is the way she 
dealt with Cuyahoga County, perhaps Ohio’s 
most troubled election jurisdiction, shortly 
after she came into office in 2007.  Prior to her 
arrival, the county had experienced a number 
of recent elections difficulties, including 
problems in the 2006 federal primary election, 
when 20% of polls opened late;16 the 2006 
federal general election, when approximately 
12,000 voters failed to sign in before voting;17 
and, quite disturbingly, when two county 
election officials deliberately mishandled a 
recount, in what was ultimately found to be 
criminal conduct, to try to hide the fact that 
a substantial percentage of the paper voting 
records (“VVPAT’s”) generated by the county’s 
touchscreen voting equipment were damaged 
and unrecountable.18  
When Brunner came into office, she almost 
immediately forced all four members of the 
county’s evenly bipartisan Board of Elections to 
resign and then, just two months before Ohio’s 
March 2008 Presidential primary, pressured 
the new Board to scrap its touchscreen voting 
machines in favor of optical scan equipment 
that she considered more reliable.  This latter 
move was controversial not only because 
the Board had only a few months to adjust 
to the new system and retrain workers, but 
also because ballots cast under the new 
system would not be fed by voters into voting 
machines in the precinct.  Instead, the ballots 
had to be transported by workers to a central 
scanning facility for counting.  The upshot was 
that, unlike the old touchscreen system, the 
new system did not allow voters to learn at the 
polling place at the time of voting if they had 
failed to mark their ballots correctly, giving 
them the opportunity to correct such errors. 
Concerns that this would lead to a number 
of unintentional over-votes and other errors 
prompted the ACLU to sue, unsuccessfully, 
for an injunction to force the county to use 
equipment that would address these concerns.19
Despite these worries, the primary went 
smoothly and before the November general 
election Cuyahoga County was able to move to 
a better system that included error correction. 
However, during the process, Brunner alienated 
some of the local election administrators that 
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a Secretary of State needs working diligently 
with her.  Three of the four Board members 
she forced to resign vowed to fight her efforts 
to remove them, and one of them resigned 
only after Brunner initiated administrative 
proceedings against him, to which he responded 
by bringing an unsuccessful lawsuit against 
her.20  The move to the optical scanning system 
was similarly filled with animosity:  the four 
new members of the County Board deadlocked 
along party lines and only came to a decision 
because Brunner used her statutory power 
to break the tie vote.21  After the deadlocked 
meeting, which Brunner did not attend, one 
Board member and Brunner exchanged public 
expressions of frustration with one another.22
These anecdotes appear to be part of a larger 
pattern of tension between Brunner and 
other players in the Ohio election community. 
Disputes over personnel changes were not 
limited to Cuyahoga County, for example, but 
also included similar disputes concerning a 
Board member in Summit County (Akron) and 
the executive director of the Franklin County 
Board of Elections.23  By being aggressive where 
delicacy might have sufficed, Brunner may have 
prompted local election officials to passively 
or even actively resist her efforts where they 
otherwise might not have.  Furthermore, some 
of the Board removals and other decisions 
angered powerful Republican leaders and may 
have caused some individuals in Republican 
quarters to file lawsuits against Brunner that 
were based more on political animus than legal 
grievance.  In short, Ohio’s statewide election 
administration remains undercut by partisan 
wrangling.
A NEW WORLD OF ABSENTEE VOTING
One of the biggest changes in Ohio election 
administration in the last few years is the 
rise of absentee voting.  Following a national 
trend towards increased voter convenience, in 
2006 Ohio changed its laws to permit voters 
to cast absentee ballots without providing a 
reason.  Under this new regime, many county 
administrators have begun to promote in 
newspapers and other media the idea of absentee 
balloting as the preferred mode of voting.  In 
response, the percentage of Ohio voters using 
this mode increased from approximately 17% in 
November of 2006 to nearly 30% in November 
of 2008,24 and represented almost 45% of the 
vote in some counties (see Table Three below). 
While not all of those ballots were mail-in 
ballots (some of them were absentee ballots 
cast in-person at locations set up by the county 
Boards), these statistics nevertheless represent 
not only a dramatic shift in the time of voting, 
but also a shift to a type of voting that occurs 
largely in the privacy of the home.
This large-scale shift to absentee voting has 
many administrative implications, not all of 
Ohio County 2006 absentee proportions25 2008 absentee proportions26
Cuyahoga (Cleveland) 106,456/469,930 (23%) 273,123/672,750 (41%)
Franklin (Columbus) 103,119/385,863 (27%) 253,686/564,971 (45%)
Hamilton ( Cincinnati)   47,969/296,420 (16%) 111,445/429,267 (26%)
Summit (Akron)   33,165/205,714 (16%)   88,719/280,841 (32%)
Montgomery (Dayton)   23,609/219,153 (11%)   73,061/280,746 (26%)
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them initially apparent, as Ohio and other 
states are now learning.  Absentee voting 
means greater convenience for voters, but it 
also means a greater chance that a particular 
ballot will not count.  In 2008 the percentage 
of Ohio absentee ballots rejected ranged from 
0.7 to 2.6% across counties (see Table Four 
above).  One reason why a ballot might be 
rejected is that the voter failed to execute the 
accompanying paperwork properly, as when the 
voter fails to include a signature in the return 
paperwork, but there has been no systematic 
study to isolate the reasons for rejection and 
their incidence.  
A separate issue is absentee ballots that are 
not rejected entirely, but are partially rejected 
because of residual votes (over- and under-
votes).  While precise data on the residual 
vote rates in the 2006 and 2008 elections also 
is not available, the increasing percentage 
of absentee ballots that are cast without the 
benefit of voting machines that guard against 
residual votes means that the percentage of 
residual votes is probably higher than before.
In addition to these potential lost vote problems, 
absentee balloting in the last few years has 
proven fertile ground for litigation.  This trend 
is likely to continue, for at least four reasons. 
First, like provisional ballots, absentee ballots 
are cast together with various supporting 
documents, usually called affidavits or 
affirmations, that record the steps of the voting 
process and can provide a basis for seeking to 
disqualify individual ballots in court.  This level 
of documentation does not accompany ballots 
cast in polling places.  Second, as noted, the 
number of absentee ballots at stake is greater 
than ever before.  Absentee ballots represent 
about 30% of all ballots cast, while provisional 
ballots, which used to be considered a potential 
goldmine for litigation, represent only about 
3.5%.  For that reason, legal teams in close 
Cast Counted Rejected Reject Rate
Cuyahoga
Absentee 273,123 265,887 7236 0.026
Provisional   28,827   21,417 7410 0.257
Franklin
Absentee 253,686 250,124 3562 0.014
Provisional   28,462   23,318 5144 0.181
Hamilton
Absentee 111,445 108,872 2573 0.023
Provisional   19,530   15,523 4007 0.205
Montgomery
Absentee 73,061 72,562   499 0.007
Summit
Absentee 88,719 87,679   950 0.012
Provisional   8,192   6,667 1525 0.186
TABLE FOUR: ABSENTEE AND PROVISIONAL BALLOT REJECTION RATES 
IN URBAN OHIO COUNTIES
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races are scrutinizing the absentee balloting 
process more than ever and have a greater 
chance to uncover flaws.  Third, some absentee 
ballots are not counted on election night but 
are saved for later disposition, usually because 
of technical defects found in the ballot in the 
original election night count.  In an election 
contest, candidates can go back and re-examine 
administrative determinations that these ballots 
were defective and therefore disqualified from 
the count.  If they find evidence that the ballots 
were rejected for improper reasons, they may 
pick up some votes.  This was part of the legal 
strategy of both candidates at various times in 
Minnesota’s 2008 U.S. Senate contest.
But the fourth and perhaps the biggest reason 
why absentee balloting is an easy target 
for litigation in Ohio is that the statutory 
framework is largely inherited from a time 
when absentee ballots represented only a small 
percentage of the overall vote.  Ohio was shown 
this time and again during the year leading up 
to the 2008 Presidential election, as suit after 
suit was filed to try to control the way absentee 
voting processes were conducted.  Secretary 
Brunner stated her view that many of the 
statutes were outdated when compared with 
the realities of no-excuse absentee voting, and 
saw it as part of her duty to try to fit together 
disparate pieces of statutory language and case 
law that sometimes seemed to conflict with one 
another.  The primary questions seemed to be 
how to fit the state’s absentee voting statutes 
together with HAVA’s database matching 
provisions, and whether a novel program of 
one-stop registration and in-person absentee 
voting during a brief window about one month 
before Election Day, which came to be known 
as Golden Week, was permissible under the 
law.  
The main lawsuit addressing the impact 
on absentee voting of the HAVA matching 
issue was Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner 
(more fully described below), in which Ohio 
Republicans alleged that the Secretary of State 
was not performing a meaningful match of 
the information contained on incoming voter 
registration applications with information 
contained in Social Security Administration 
and state motor vehicle databases.  Republicans 
not only wanted the court to order Brunner to 
conduct matching in a way that Republicans 
found meaningful, they also argued that this 
matching issue had a related implication 
for Golden Week.  The state could not allow 
one-stop registration and voting during this 
period, the Republicans argued, because 
HAVA required that the data contained on 
voter registration applications be matched 
prior to voting. Because the Golden Week 
program allowed no time for the data on the 
registrations to be checked, it violated HAVA 
and could not go forward.  Brunner responded 
that HAVA did not require matching prior to 
putting a voter on the registration rolls, and 
that at any rate a failed match, by itself, should 
not impair a voter’s ability to cast a ballot.27 
In the end, the courts did not decide these 
arguments because the U.S. Supreme Court 
determined the plaintiffs were not sufficiently 
likely to have a right of action to justify letting 
the suit proceed.
A parallel case in the Supreme Court of Ohio, 
State ex. rel. Colvin v. Brunner, explored 
another aspect of the Golden Week voting 
period.  In this suit, a voter claimed that state 
law required all voters to be registered for 
30 days prior to voting, and that the one-stop 
registration and voting contemplated in Golden 
Week could not occur because it violated this 
rule.  Brunner responded that the 30-day 
requirement was intended to apply only to in-
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person voting, and that one-stop registration 
and voting could occur.  The Supreme Court 
of Ohio agreed with Brunner’s interpretation 
and added that even if they had not ultimately 
agreed with it, they would have deferred to 
it because it was reasonable.28  Golden Week 
was allowed to go forward, although in the 
end it turned out that only about 12,800 voters 
statewide used the one-stop registration and 
voting procedure.29  In the November 2010 
election, only 1,610 voters used the Golden 
Week procedure statewide.30
Another instructive case was State ex rel. 
Myles v. Brunner,31 a mandamus action in 
the Supreme Court of Ohio in which a voter 
claimed the Secretary of State violated election 
laws by instructing counties not to honor 
certain requests for absentee ballots that were 
contained on a specific type of application form. 
The form was not one issued by the government 
but was created and distributed by the McCain 
campaign, as is permitted.  The form had a 
legally-required statement that the person 
filling out the form is “a qualified elector and 
would like to receive an Absentee Ballot for the 
November 4, 2008 General Election.”  Next to 
this legally-required statement was a check box 
in which the voter could place a check mark to 
indicate the truth of the statement.  However, 
the form did not come with instructions, and 
some voters inevitably failed to place a check 
mark in the box.  In response to this situation, 
the Secretary of State issued a memorandum to 
county Boards of Election instructing them not 
to honor forms on which the check box was not 
marked because the voter had failed to affirm 
the legally-required statement.  In the end, 
the Supreme Court unanimously determined 
that the Secretary erred and the ballots should 
be issued.32  Although the voter did not place 
a check mark in the box next to the required 
statement, the disputed forms were signed at 
the bottom, and the court reasoned that this 
was sufficient evidence that the voter affirmed 
the required statement.
Absentee voting litigation from the 2008 
election in Ohio also includes Stokes v. 
Brunner,33 an Ohio Supreme Court case in 
which a plaintiff successfully sued to overturn 
a Secretary of State Directive that instructed 
county Boards of Election that they had the 
option to exclude observers from in-person 
absentee voting.
A CONTINUING TREND OF LITIGATION
When Jennifer Brunner became Ohio Secretary 
of State in 2007, many hoped that it would mean 
an end to the constant elections litigation seen 
during the tenure of her predecessor, Kenneth 
Blackwell.  In fact, the number of lawsuits filed 
under Brunner’s tenure was roughly two-thirds 
the number filed under Blackwell’s tenure.34 
However, this strictly quantitative measure 
is misleading because it overlooks the fact 
that many of the suits filed under Blackwell’s 
tenure remained at issue during Brunner’s 
administration, and if they had not been filed 
under Blackwell’s tenure, they very well might 
have been filed against Secretary Brunner. 
Thus, part of the reason why fewer lawsuits 
were filed under Brunner’s tenure is that 
many potential claims were already underway. 
Furthermore, as suggested in the preceding 
section, the new conflicts that arose under 
Brunner’s tenure were just as substantial, and 
threatened to disrupt the smooth functioning 
of elections just as much, as the conflicts 
that arose under Blackwell.  Thus, the trend 
of elections litigation continued unabated 
under Brunner’s leadership, and seems to have 
become a recurring feature of Ohio’s political 
landscape.
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Pre-election litigation.  Litigation filed 
prior to an election can be further divided 
between lawsuits filed far out from the date of 
an election and lawsuits filed on the eve of an 
election.  While lawsuits filed far in advance of 
an election can force important improvements 
in the election system, litigation filed on the 
eve of an election can often be harmful because 
it is too difficult for administrators to adjust 
their operations to obey a court order with so 
little advance warning.  Since the completion 
of our original study of Midwest election 
administration in early 2007, Ohio has seen 
extensive litigation of both kinds.
Perhaps the most important suit filed far in 
advance of the election was League of Women 
Voters v. Blackwell,35 filed in July 2005.  As 
our original study described, this suit attacked 
Ohio’s election on comprehensive grounds, 
alleging among other things that substantial 
numbers of voters who had properly registered 
failed to appear in the voter registration 
database, that administrators failed to mail 
out or mailed out too late absentee ballots to 
voters who had submitted proper requests, 
that the system failed to provide adequate 
notice to voters of their correct polling places, 
failed to provide for a fair distribution of voting 
machines across polling places that created a 
disparate pattern of long lines, failed to provide 
working voting machines to many precincts, 
failed to give poll workers sufficient training 
to allow them to do their jobs, failed to offer 
voters provisional ballots when appropriate, 
and failed to make polling places sufficiently 
accessible.36  
This suit settled in June of 2009.  As part of 
the settlement agreement, the Secretary of 
State agreed to do all of the following37:  1) 
order the issuance of paper ballots at polling 
places in federal elections in the event of long 
lines; 2) determine whether the state could 
feasibly adopt a maximum wait time that voters 
can be expected to wait at the polls; 3) require 
county Boards of Election to submit written 
Election Administration Plans (“EAP’s”) to the 
Secretary 120 days before each federal general 
election (60 days before a federal primary); 4) 
review the EAP’s to ensure that county boards 
are sufficiently prepared and are following 
proper procedures; 4) require the Boards of 
Elections of Ohio’s most populous counties to 
report precinct-level data on various matters 
for review (other counties must provide certain 
data as well, including information on absentee 
and provisional ballots, as well as the cost of 
administration); 5) require county Boards to 
monitor and assess poll worker performance 
on various criteria and retrain or exclude poll 
workers who are not performing; 6) require 
county Boards to train poll workers using 
uniform instruction materials (although the 
Boards may supplement these materials with 
other materials not inconsistent with them); 
7) expand efforts to recruit more poll workers 
from businesses and educational institutions; 
8) collect statistics on why provisional ballots 
were not counted and the drop-off between the 
number of absentee ballots sent out to voters 
and the number returned; 9) send people to 
physically monitor Boards of Elections on 
a periodic basis to ensure their registration 
functions are being performed properly; 10) 
increase monitoring of disability access issues 
to ensure compliance; 11) require a 100% 
audit of all ballots cast in federal elections; 12) 
continue requiring touchscreen polling places 
to be stocked with paper ballots in case of 
breakdowns; 13) develop statewide standards 
for pre-election testing of voting machines; 14) 
develop statewide standards to reduce VVPAT 
failures; 15) establish statewide standards for 
securing voting equipment against electronic 
intrusion and unauthorized physical access.
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This is an important settlement.  Although 
Secretary Brunner had already voluntarily 
implemented many of these practices before 
the settlement, the settlement increases the 
likelihood that future Secretaries of State 
will follow these practices at least through 
2015, when the settlement expires.  Many 
of the settlement terms could go far to 
reduce the ideological debates over election 
administration, where policy decisions are 
discussed in an evidentiary vacuum, by 
increasing the amount of information available 
on local practices, provisional ballots, the 
accuracy of voting equipment, and other 
matters.  The provisions concerning poll 
workers, particularly those requiring tracking 
and evaluation of them on an individual basis, 
may greatly improve the quality of the voter’s 
experience in the polling place.  The voting 
machine provisions could increase machine 
security, make security practices more uniform, 
and give voters increased reason for confidence 
in the accuracy of election results.
Nevertheless, the devil is in the details, and 
some knowledgeable sources we interviewed 
feared that the terms of the settlement might 
be adhered to only half-heartedly and therefore 
make little difference.  The terms, though 
reasonably fleshed out over a seven-page 
agreement, are still sufficiently vague to allow a 
level of compliance that is less than ideal.  The 
requirement that each county Board produce 
an Election Administration Plan, for instance, 
does not define what level of detail must be 
included in these plans, and furthermore leaves 
it up to the Secretary of State, not the court, 
to determine whether the plans constitute 
adequate preparation.  The requirement that 
statistics be collected regarding provisional 
ballots may be helpful, but information 
regarding why provisional ballots are rejected 
is already collected, and the settlement does 
not require the collection of information 
regarding why provisional ballots were issued 
in the first place—a key piece of information, 
the need for which has been acknowledged 
more than once at well-attended Ohio elections 
conferences.  The provisions regarding the 
tracking, evaluation and potential suspension 
of poll workers who are not performing defines 
the criteria on which they should be evaluated, 
but does not set minimum levels that each poll 
worker must attain in these areas in order to be 
judged competent.  In this regime, it would be 
easy for Boards to “go easy” on poll workers and 
continue using them even though their poor 
performance is well documented, especially in 
counties that are trying to cope with an ongoing 
shortage of poll workers.  Therefore, only 
time will tell whether this settlement brings 
real change to Ohio, or whether its promise is 
mostly illusory.
In addition to the League of Women Voters 
lawsuit, other important pre-election litigation 
included a cluster of suits addressing whether 
and how the data contained on incoming voter 
registration applications should be “matched” 
against information contained in federal Social 
Security Administration and state motor 
vehicle databases.  HAVA asks administrators 
to perform this kind of comparison when they 
receive new registration applications, and 
exempts the voter from certain federal voter 
ID requirements if the comparison shows a 
match.  On September 26, 2008, just over 
a month before the November Presidential 
election, the Ohio Republican Party filed  Ohio 
Republican Party v. Brunner,38 a suit claiming 
that the Secretary of State was not allowing 
administrators to perform these matches, and 
asking for a preliminary injunction to require 
her to do so.  During the course of the suit, 
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it was variously claimed in pleadings and in 
the media that the Secretary had turned off 
the matching function of the database, that 
she had not turned it off, that the state did not 
have the technology to perform the matches at 
all, and that the state did have the technology 
to perform the matches but did not have the 
technology to report the results in a way that 
would allow local administrators to perform 
meaningful follow-up.  Because the litigation 
occurred in an expedited fashion and without 
discovery, the court never got to the bottom of 
these factual issues, and to this day they remain 
murky.  
The U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio, however, clearly believed 
that something was not right, as it issued a 
temporary restraining order compelling the 
Secretary to perform the matches and share the 
resulting data with local administrators in a way 
that would allow them to perform meaningful 
follow-up.39  On appeal, an en banc panel of the 
Sixth Circuit agreed, but the entire issue was 
subsequently mooted when the U.S. Supreme 
Court determined that Ohio Republican Party, 
as a private litigant, was not sufficiently likely 
to have a private right of action to justify the 
issuance of a temporary restraining order.
Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner is important 
for a number of reasons.  First, despite 
its ultimate lack of resolution, this lawsuit 
provides important clues to how Ohio courts 
see the registration matching issue.  The Sixth 
Circuit opinion shows that the court believed 
HAVA requires the state to match all incoming 
voter registration applications, identify those 
applications that do not match, and report 
the data in a way that allows administrators 
to review each mismatch and even potentially 
make personal contact with mismatched voters 
to determine whether the mismatch was an 
error—a conclusion that was not necessarily 
required by the statutory language at issue.40 
At the same time, the court stressed that it did 
not view a mismatch as fatal to a registration 
application, and that, without further evidence 
that something is amiss, a mismatched voter 
should be registered and permitted to cast 
a regular ballot just like any other voter. 
Nevertheless, the court clearly indicated that 
a mismatch might be permissibly used as a 
justification for an investigation by county 
administrators into a voter’s qualifications that 
could ultimately result in the voter having to 
cast a provisional ballot that might not count.41 
The lawsuit, together with a number of related 
lawsuits, also had important implications for 
absentee voting, discussed in the absentee 
voting section above.
Other important Ohio pre-election suits 
included Northeast Ohio Coalition for the 
Homeless (“NEOCH”) v. Brunner,42 a suit 
originally filed in October of 2006 against then-
Secretary Blackwell, primarily concerning 
how to apply Ohio’s voter ID statute and the 
standards used to determine the validity of 
provisional ballots.  Most of the issues in that 
suit were settled by agreement between the 
parties upon Brunner’s issuance of Directive 
2008-101, which largely tracked the rules 
reached by the court in the same lawsuit 
prior to the 2006 federal election.43  More 
novel questions concerning the treatment of 
provisional ballots, including the question of 
whether to count ballots when voters had filled 
out the accompanying paperwork incompletely 
or incorrectly, would be determined by post-
election litigation.
Post-election suits.  In close contests, post-
election lawsuits are sometimes necessary to 
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determine the winner, and in Ohio this kind 
of suit is particularly likely to arise because of 
the state’s relatively high rate of provisional 
voting.  The plethora of 2007-2008 Ohio 
election litigation included one post-election 
suit, State ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner,44 that 
potentially could have determined the result 
of a congressional race in Ohio’s 15th District 
between Steve Stivers (R) and Mary Jo Kilroy 
(D).  The original vote count showed Stivers 
ahead by some 594 votes, but at that time 
approximately 27,000 provisional ballots 
remained to be counted in the district.45  Of 
these, the action focused on 30 ballots that 
were lacking a signature but included a block-
letter name, approximately 600 ballots that 
were lacking a block-letter name but included 
a signature, and an unknown number of ballots 
where both the block-letter name and signature 
had been included, but on the wrong form.46 
Two Stivers supporters filed a mandamus suit 
in the Ohio Supreme Court alleging that the 
Secretary of State had instructed the Boards 
of Election to determine whether to count 
these ballots using a standard that contradicted 
Ohio statutes and a previous Directive issued 
by the Secretary.47  Specifically, the plaintiffs 
alleged that Secretary Brunner had previously 
instructed Boards that in order to have their 
ballots counted voters must not only write their 
block-letter name on the appropriate blank 
on the provisional ballot application, but also 
include their signature in another designated 
blank.  The plaintiffs claimed that Brunner 
altered her position, however, after the race 
for the 15th Congressional District came down 
to a few hundred votes, by instructing boards 
that the block-letter name was not necessary 
and that, assuming it was otherwise valid, a 
provisional ballot that included only the voter’s 
signature should be counted.  
For her part, Secretary Brunner pointed to 
a portion of the relevant statute that gave 
instructions to be used in the event that a 
voter refused to fill out a provisional ballot 
application at all.  The governing statute had 
a provision that seemed to suggest that there 
were two types of provisional ballots lacking 
signature, and that they should be treated 
differently.48  It all depended on why the 
signature was lacking.  In the first category 
of ballots, the poll worker asks the voter to 
fill out a provisional ballot application and 
the voter agrees to do so.  However, the voter 
forgets or otherwise fails to place his or her 
signature in the appropriate blank on the form 
and thereby disqualifies the ballots from being 
counted.  The second category of ballots is 
different:  when the poll worker asks the voter 
to fill out the provisional ballot application, 
the voter declines.  At that point, the statute 
instructs the poll worker to record the voter’s 
name in the provisional ballot paperwork and 
permit the voter to cast a provisional ballot. 
Despite the fact that the voter never provides 
a signature, the statute nevertheless seems to 
suggest that the ballot is eligible to be counted. 
Thus, a ballot is counted when the signature is 
missing because the voter declined to provide 
a signature, but the ballot is discounted when 
the voter intended to provide a signature but 
failed to do so.  Brunner argued that the 30 
ballots that included a block letter name but 
no signature should be counted because, 
construing the facts and law in the voter’s favor, 
these ballots should be assumed to fall into the 
second category of ballots.
The Supreme Court of Ohio sided with the 
plaintiffs.  Although the court seemed to agree 
that ballots falling into the second category 
should be counted, it did not agree with 
Brunner’s contention that the 30 disputed 
ballots could be assumed to fall into this 
category.  Instead, the court said, it should 
be assumed that the ballots fell into the first 
category, and that the only reason why the 
signatures were missing was because the voters 
forgot or otherwise failed to include them 
despite an intention to do so.  This assumption 
should be made because of a policy whereby, in 
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, poll 
workers will be presumed to have performed 
their duties properly.49  This policy weighed 
against the Secretary’s presumption, because it 
assumed that poll workers, rather than voters, 
had made the error.  Therefore, these 30 ballots 
would not count.  
The court then briefly turned to the 
approximately 600 ballots that included 
signature but no block-letter name.  Brunner 
argued that the relevant statutes compelled 
that these ballots be counted, but the court 
rejected that argument:  Without reaching the 
question of whether Brunner’s interpretation 
of the statute with regard to these ballots was 
correct, the court decided that it would not 
be fair to count these ballots when ballots in 
other counties had been counted under the 
stricter standard that existed prior to Brunner’s 
articulation of these nuances.50  Finally, the 
court decided the fate of an unknown number 
of provisional ballots that had both block-letter 
name and signature, but on the wrong form: 
These ballots would not count, because the 
relevant statute required this information be 
entered on the provisional ballot application, 
and entering it on the identification affirmation 
was not good enough.51
As it turned out, this case did not decide the 
Kilroy-Stivers race for the 15th District because 
the 26,000 or so provisional ballots that were 
not disputed in the litigation went so heavily 
for Kilroy.  Nevertheless, the case has a number 
of implications for the future of Ohio election 
administration.  Most obviously, the court has 
shown that provisional voters should take great 
care to see that they complete all blanks on 
provisional ballot applications.  Failure to do so 
risks having the ballot not count.  It is notable 
that the court reached this result even though 
many if not all of the ballot applications, though 
imperfectly completed, seemed to have been 
sufficiently completed to allow the Boards 
of Election to make a determination that the 
voter was registered and eligible.  Second, 
the court is inclined to invalidate provisional 
counting standards articulated after an election 
when they differ from the standard articulated 
prior to the election, even if the new standard 
would be reasonable standing by itself and 
even where it can reasonably be characterized 
as a clarification or expansion upon, rather than 
a change to, the original standard.  Third, the 
particular aspects of the counting standard 
explored by this case are confusing because, 
like the aspects of the counting standard dealt 
with in prior cases, Ohio’s provisional ballot 
statutes are what the court called “not a model 
of clarity.”  House Bill 260, supported by 
Secretary Brunner, would have attempted to 
improve upon this lack of clarity by simplifying 
the relevant statutory language, but it did not 
become law.
Finally, although the November 2010 election 
is outside the focus of this work, two important 
provisional ballot lawsuits arising out of that 
election are worth brief mention.  In Painter 
v. Brunner,52 the Ohio Supreme Court 
determined that provisional ballots cast in the 
wrong precinct could not be counted even 
though poll worker error was what caused them 
to be cast in the wrong precinct.  In Hunter v. 
Hamilton County Board of Elections,53 a related 
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case, the Sixth Circuit determined there was a 
likelihood of success on the plaintiffs’ Bush v. 
Gore-style equal protection claim that a county 
board of elections violated plaintiffs’ rights 
when it considered extrinsic evidence of poll 
worker error in determining whether to count 
certain provisional ballots, but did not consider 
the same level of evidence when determining 
whether to count other provisional ballots that 
were cast under similar circumstances.  As of 
this writing, the case is ongoing.
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THE STRENGTHS THAT WE OBSERVED 
in Wisconsin’s election system in our previous 
study have mostly increased in the past couple 
of years.  The state has always been a leader 
in elections, and pioneered Election Day 
Registration (“EDR”) in 1976.   Wisconsin also 
benefits from a favorable political culture that 
has historically focused on practical problem-
solving rather than partisan gamesmanship, 
and its voters have more faith in their election 
system than do voters of most other states.1 
The state’s chief election authority has always 
had a good relationship with local officials, 
which creates an atmosphere of teamwork and 
avoids unnecessary conflict.
Building on this foundation, Wisconsin has 
improved in important respects since the 
publication of our previous book.  Its new 
state election authority, the Government 
Accountability Board (“GAB”), has proven 
itself to be a model of nonpartisan election 
administration that other states would do well 
to emulate.  Since our 2007 study the state has 
restructured this office, completed its statewide 
voter registration database, and improved the 
quality of election administration in Milwaukee. 
Furthermore, the GAB is working on ambitious 
plans to reshape the election system between 
now and 2014.
On the other hand, Wisconsin has also been a 
focal point for the politically polarized debate 
over illegal voting and voter identification. The 
state has witnessed an ongoing political conflict 
over whether the voting system is secure, a 
dispute that just prior to the 2008 election boiled 
over in an unsuccessful lawsuit concerning the 
voter registration database.   The Wisconsin 
GAB handled this dispute fairly, and the 
number of people documented to have voted 
illegally is extremely small.  Nevertheless, the 
state recently enacted a law requiring voters to 
show government-issued photo identification 
in order to have their votes counted.    While 
there is little evidence that ballots cast by 
ineligible voters are a serious problem, there 
is good reason for concern that this new law 
will make it more difficult for eligible citizens 
to participate in elections in 2012 and beyond. 
This law is particularly worrisome given the 
evidence, cited in our previous study, showing 
that racial minorities in Wisconsin are much 
less likely to have the required identification.2 
Meanwhile, Wisconsin’s process for recounts 
and post-election lawsuits could result in 
problems, in the event of a large-scale election 
contest like Minnesota’s 2008 U.S. Senate race. 
These problems are likely to be exacerbated 
by the new ID law, given the likely possibility 
that more voters will be compelled to cast 
provisional ballots.
What Wisconsin needs, as a politically 
competitive battleground state, is a stable set 
of rules for the casting and counting of ballots 
that are consistent with the legitimate electoral 
interests of both major political parties. 
These rules should not become a weapon by 
which either party attempts to achieve an 
unfair electoral advantage over its opposition. 
While it is possible that a well-crafted voter 
identification law could be part of a compromise 
that reflects the legitimate interests of both 
parties, it is troublesome when it appears (as in 
Wisconsin at the moment) that a new voter ID 
law is being imposed unilaterally by one side to 
secure a partisan edge in upcoming elections.
This chapter begins by examining a 
hypothetical in which facts comparable to 
those of Minnesota’s 2008 U.S. Senate race are 
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transplanted to Wisconsin.  It then discusses 
Wisconsin’s new Government Accountability 
Board, and concludes by addressing election 
administration improvements in Milwaukee.
HOW WOULD WISCONSIN HANDLE A HIGH-
PROFILE ELECTION CONTEST?
The recent recount and litigation in Minnesota 
over the U.S. Senate race between Norm 
Coleman and Al Franken provokes the important 
question of how such a close race would play 
out in Wisconsin.  This question is of additional 
interest because Wisconsin and Minnesota are 
similar in a number of key respects.  They both 
have Election Day registration, little or no 
provisional voting (thus far), and a reputation 
for clean, well-functioning elections systems. 
Both states are also known for having a public-
spirited culture that is conducive to resolving 
elections disputes with relatively little partisan 
rancor.  The chief election authorities of both 
states are well-respected and take the voting 
process seriously.  Because Wisconsin, like 
Minnesota, allows officials to count absentee 
ballots in a central location in each jurisdiction 
rather than counting them in each of those 
jurisdictions’ many polling places, the process 
is more easily observed by administrators and 
party observers and the state has better quality 
control and a better chance to eliminate ahead 
of time any potential disputes over absentee 
ballots.
Indeed, Wisconsin has just experienced a high-
profile, carefully watched recount of a close 
statewide election in the case of the April 2011 
special election between incumbent David 
Prosser and JoAnne Kloppenberg for Wisconsin 
Supreme Court.  Because this election occurred 
after we had completed the field research for 
this book, we have not studied it in detail, 
although we too watched it with interest.  The 
unofficial returns showed Prosser with a lead 
of about 7,000 votes, but not until Waukesha 
County had corrected its election eve numbers 
with the addition of approximately 14,000 votes 
that it had initially overlooked.  The recount, 
which had to be extended several weeks to 
ensure that Waukesha County could thoroughly 
document its recount process,3 narrowed the 
margin by only 300 votes and did not change 
the result.4   Despite some murmuring about 
anomalies in the recount, Kloppenberg 
ultimately did not seek to appeal these results, 
and so the process drew to a close much sooner 
than the Minnesota Senate contest of 2008.  It 
therefore remains to speculate how other high-
profile election contests with narrower margins 
might play out in Wisconsin if they were to 
reach the courts.
Despite their similarities, Wisconsin and 
Minnesota also differ in important ways. 
Wisconsin’s most important advantage is that 
it has a truly nonpartisan, appointed chief 
election authority while Minnesota has an 
elected Secretary of State with a potential 
conflict of interest in the event of a very close 
election involving a political ally.  In other ways, 
however, Wisconsin exhibits some “risk factors” 
that increase the likelihood that an election 
contest would lack a high degree of public 
acceptance.  Wisconsin, unlike Minnesota, 
is a place where “voter fraud” has become a 
highly charged political issue and is frequently 
debated by politicians and the media.  Because 
of this cultural trait, allegations of unlawful 
voting and vote suppression are likely to plague 
any high-profile election contest in Wisconsin, 
even if there is no specific reason to believe 
that anything unlawful has occurred.  The 
photo ID law recently enacted by the Wisconsin 
legislature will likely exacerbate problems – 
and the possibility of litigation – in the event 
of a contested election.  Although Wisconsin 
has had very few provisional ballots thanks 
to its Election Day registration system, the 
new voter ID law can be expected to result in 
more, thus raising the potential for legal fights 
over whether those ballots should be counted. 
Another difference between the states is that 
Wisconsin allows absentee voting without an 
excuse, producing a much greater number of 
these easily disputable ballots that could drag 
recounts and election contests on for months.5 
This too may threaten finality, one of the three 
fundamental values we believe are of greatest 
importance in maintaining a healthy elections 
system.  Wisconsin’s decentralized election 
system creates an additional complication.  With 
approximately 1,850 autonomous municipal-
based elections jurisdictions, compared with 
Minnesota’s 87 counties, the level of central 
control that can be exerted on the recount 
process to increase uniformity inevitably 
decreases.  
Controversy over unlawful voting and new 
voter ID rules.  One of the most remarkable 
aspects of the 2008 Minnesota race is that, 
despite the razor-thin margin of victory, no 
candidate suggested at any point that any 
fraud had occurred.  In contrast, despite the 
absence of any razor-thin margin like that seen 
in Minnesota, Wisconsin seems to have taken 
up the concept of “voter fraud” as a political 
football.  In 2006, there were allegations that 
the Bush administration was pressuring then-
Wisconsin U.S. Attorney Steve Biskupic to 
prioritize investigation and prosecution of 
illegal voting, and that he was “targeted” when 
he refused.6  Later, Wisconsin’s elected attorney 
general, J.B. Van Hollen, faced accusations that 
he used the issue for political gain.  Democrats 
accused him of bringing a 2008 lawsuit against 
the GAB for political purposes,7 and Van Hollen 
initially denied, though later admitted, that 
prior to filing the suit he had communicated 
“several times” with Republican leaders, 
and even alluded to the forthcoming suit in 
a speech he gave at the Republican National 
Convention.8  Although Van Hollen’s suit 
quickly failed, Republicans have continued to 
press the issue of fraud and voter registration 
database integrity, including calling for the 
Milwaukee Elections Commission—the 
primary local election authority—to remove 
the registrations of some 6,292 voters whose 
information they claim cannot be verified by 
checks against other databases.9  
Most recently, this focus on fraud was used to 
justify enactment of a new voter ID law in May 
2011. Because the ID law will not take effect 
until Spring 2012, we have not yet had the 
opportunity to see how it will work in practice. 
However, as written its strictures displace 
Ohio’s voter ID statute as the most stringent ID 
law in our five-state study.  Under the statute, 
voters must present a photo ID in the form of a 
driver’s license, state-issued photo ID, military 
ID, U.S. passport, certificate of naturalization, 
Wisconsin college ID that meets certain 
requirements, tribal ID, or temporary ID card 
for those who have recently moved from out of 
state.10  In contrast, Ohio’s ID law (as of this 
writing) allows utility bills, bank statements, 
government checks, and other informal types 
of ID.  Wisconsin’s new ID law also is stricter 
in that it applies not only to in-person voters 
but also to absentee voters, who must mail in 
a photocopy of their required ID.  In Ohio, 
absentee voters who are willing and able to 
provide their driver’s license or social security 
number are exempt from the ID requirement. 
Wisconsin’s new law also gives voters who 
must cast provisional ballots only until the 
Friday after the election to produce the ID 
they lacked at the polls, compared to Ohio’s 
relatively generous ten-day period.  Wisconsin 
voting rights groups are already making plans 
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to fight the voter ID law in court, so litigation 
can be expected in this area.  Litigation can also 
be expected as 2012 approaches and the system 
has to confront the intricacies of how the voter 
ID law meshes with other parts of the elections 
system, and particularly provisional balloting, 
an area in which Wisconsin has little previous 
experience.  This would inevitably complicate 
the resolution of a contest over a close election.
Claims of unlawful voting could also be 
expected in a Wisconsin election contest.  As 
in most states, if unlawful ballots were to make 
it into the election-night count, a candidate 
seeking to reverse the result would have to 
prove the number and content of the unlawful 
votes and show that the unlawful votes changed 
the result of the election (the “outcome test”).11 
Typically this is nearly impossible because the 
ballots have already been mixed in with lawfully 
cast ballots and can no longer be identified 
and segregated to determine their content. 
Wisconsin courts do permit a challenger to 
put those who have cast unlawful ballots on 
the stand to testify about the content of their 
ballots,12 but that testimony is inherently 
suspect because the voter now knows the 
impact of their testimony.  Furthermore, the 
unlawful voter may be able to avoid testifying 
by invoking the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination.13  For these reasons, it 
would be unusual for a court to determine that 
a candidate has satisfied the “outcome test” 
without the kind of speculation that courts 
generally try to avoid.  It is much easier for 
the court to decide merely that the contestant 
has failed to meet the burden of proof, and 
therefore that the original result should stand.
Another option, but one rarely used, would be 
for the court to throw out the original result 
and order a new election.  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court did use this option to 
invalidate the result of a small-town election 
in 1976 in which some voters were required 
to register prior to voting while others were 
not.14  The court concluded that the election 
was fundamentally unfair because “it is not 
clear that the correct standards for voting were 
applied with uniformity.”15  However, from a 
public image standpoint, the court has little 
to gain by invalidating an important election, 
which requires an affirmative decision that the 
result is unclear and therefore opens up the 
court to charges of bias from the contestee’s 
camp.  Furthermore, special elections may 
suffer from complications that can make them 
even more unfair than the original election.16 
It is much safer to make the more “passive” 
decision to leave the result undisturbed.
Accordingly, the key to dealing with the 
commingled ballots problem is to prevent 
unlawful ballots from making it into the 
count in the first place.  Wisconsin officials 
know this, and have taken action to reduce 
the potential for illegal voting.  The primary 
target of their efforts is unlawful balloting by 
disenfranchised felons, which, together with 
instances of double-voting, seem to make up 
most of the few allegations of unlawful voting 
in the state.  In the past, part of the problem 
was that some disenfranchised felons did not 
realize they were ineligible to vote.  But a 
new state law requires that judges sentencing 
convicted felons to prison must orally instruct 
them that they can no longer vote, and also 
make them sign a statement to that effect.17 
Furthermore, after each election, the state 
uses its improved statewide voter registration 
database to identify possible instances of felon 
and double-voting.  After the 2008 election, 
the database identified approximately 195 
cases of potential unlawful felon voting—out of 
2,996,869 votes cast statewide—and referred 
them to local authorities.18  But these referrals 
State Year Offi ce Margin Total Votes
Colorado 2000 State Ed. Board   90 1,535,032
Montana 2000 Super. Public Instruction   61      63,207
Vermont 2006 Auditor 102    223,438
Washington 2004 Governor 129 2,746,593
generated only a handful of prosecutions, and 
apparently only one that resulted in a felony 
conviction.19  These low numbers indicate that 
unlawful felon voting is rare in Wisconsin.
The standards of a criminal prosecution for 
election fraud are, of course, different from 
the question of whether the outcome of an 
election was tainted by ineligible ballots. 
But even assuming that all 195 suspected 
instances of unlawful voting by felons turned 
out to generate invalid ballots, that number 
is extremely low in the context of a statewide 
election of almost 3 million ballots cast.  To 
put it in context, consider a recent report that 
FairVote has issued on all statewide recounts 
between 2000 and 2010.20  That report showed 
that of the 2,884 statewide elections in the 
U.S. during that decade, only four races had 
a margin of victory of less than 200 votes, as 
shown in Table Five below.
Not even the 2008 U.S. Senate election in 
Minnesota produced a margin below 200, 
although it came close (225), and had the 
smallest margin in percentage terms (0.009%). 
Moreover, it must be remembered that 200 
invalid ballots, because they will not all be 
cast for the same candidate, cannot affect the 
outcome of an election with a 200-vote margin 
of victory.  Even if the 200 ballots favored 
one candidate 75%-25%, or 150-50—an 
extraordinarily lopsided result—the margin of 
victory would need to be 100, not 200, for the 
election to be undermined by these ineligible 
ballots.  Therefore, although it is prudent for 
states to remain watchful for signs of unusually 
large numbers of ineligible ballots—no state 
wants to be in the position that Washington was 
in 2004, where it had some 1,678 invalid ballots 
dwarfing its 127-vote gubernatorial margin of 
victory—the evidence from Wisconsin indicates 
that it remains far from that unfortunate 
situation.
Moreover, the legislature has examined the 
possibility of making it legal for paroled felons 
to vote, which would eliminate this particular 
type of ineligible ballot altogether.21  Although 
the proposal was rejected, it may reappear in the 
next legislative session.   The recently enacted 
photo identification law would do nothing 
about felons illegally voting, as the possession 
of ID tells nothing about whether one is an 
ineligible felon.  There is no evidence of any 
serious problem with voter impersonation 
fraud, the only form of illegal voting that a strict 
ID law could hope to address.  In fact, out of 
the twenty individuals prosecuted for crimes 
arising out of the November 2008 election, 
none of them were accused of impersonating 
another voter.22
If Minnesota is instructive, another area 
where allegations of ineligible ballots could 
be expected is absentee balloting.  Absentee 
ballots, compared to ballots cast on Election 
Day, are “low-hanging fruit” in an election 
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contest because they leave a paper trail that 
contestants can use to establish they were not 
eligible to be counted.  In Wisconsin, this is 
even more of a concern, because, going by 
2008 figures, Wisconsin casts 2.25 times more 
absentee ballots than Minnesota,23 a low-
absentee state.  Fortunately, Wisconsin is 
ahead of Minnesota on this point, and passed a 
law in 2005 that allows administrators to move 
absentee ballot-counting operations to a central 
facility where they can be easily observed 
by administrators and party representatives 
to ensure the rules are applied properly. 
Furthermore, like Minnesota,24 Wisconsin has 
ample precedent that impairs candidates’ ability 
to challenge absentee ballots that have made 
it into the count.  Although W.S.A. 6.84-6.89 
contain various requirements the voter must 
fulfill, including submitting a proper absentee 
ballot request and signing a certification, 
Wisconsin courts have historically construed 
many of these requirements as “directory,” at 
least where there is no suggestion of fraud.25  In 
other words, state law anticipates the problem 
of candidates alleging that flawed absentees 
have made it into the count, but looks more 
to substance than form and will not invalidate 
ballots cast by innocent, eligible voters just 
because those voters made some technical 
mistakes in filling out the paperwork.  Thus, 
in the absence of fraud, contestants are almost 
entirely deprived of any opportunity to make an 
issue out of already counted absentee ballots.
Unique process for resolving election 
contests.  If a high profile election contest 
occurred in Wisconsin, the fact that the state 
has an atypical set of post-election procedures 
would inevitably give rise to the question 
of whether these procedures are sound.  In 
most states, a losing candidate first asks local 
election officials for a recount, which results in 
a revised vote total but no written factual or 
legal conclusions.  The losing candidate then 
may file an election contest, which typically is 
handled like any other lawsuit and concludes 
with a trial and formal findings of fact and law.
In contrast, when a Wisconsin election enters 
the judicial contest phase, the circuit court must 
be highly deferential to the factual and legal 
conclusions of the recount authority,26 which 
is typically the county board of canvassers—
the county clerk and two voters appointed by 
the clerk, one from each party.  The recount 
authority acts as an administrative tribunal, 
and can subpoena records and take testimony. 
On appeal, the circuit court then will generally 
exclude evidence and argument not presented to 
the recount authority.27  In function, therefore, 
Wisconsin recount authorities, rather than 
trial courts, hear election contests.  Thus, the 
recount authority has more power and greater 
responsibility than recount authorities in 
most states, whose responsibilities are usually 
limited to overseeing the physical recounting of 
ballots.  In fact, the recount authority arguably 
has more practical political power than the 
courts because court review is limited in scope 
and deferential to the factual findings of the 
recount authority.
This arrangement may serve certain efficiency 
and finality purposes, but it also raises three 
concerns.  First, the recount authority is being 
asked to perform two different and potentially 
incompatible roles.  In its first role, it conducts 
the election and any recount, but in the second 
role it is expected to take a step back and 
evaluate its own work in determining whether 
the result of the election was accurate.  As 
part of that evaluation, the recount authority 
may be asked to decide whether the authority 
itself or those working under its supervision 
made critical errors that could have changed 
the result of an election.  No matter how fair 
recount officials may try to be, they also may 
become defensive if they feel that their job 
performance is under attack.
A second concern is training.  There is no 
requirement that county boards of canvassers 
possess any legal knowledge or training that 
would enable them to conduct fair and orderly 
quasi-legal proceedings.  Furthermore, the 
clerk and the other two members of the board 
of county canvassers will often have strong party 
ties that could present a conflict of interest or 
lead to accusations of partisanship.
A third concern is that the division of labor 
between the recount authority and the court 
system is not as clear as it seems.  Although 
state statutes essentially imply that the recount 
authorities function as the trial courts for 
election contests, in practice the issue of which 
government entity has jurisdiction may get 
blurred.  For instance, if during a recount a 
candidate felt that recount officials were not 
following the rules, the candidate might pursue 
a separate mandamus lawsuit in the local court 
to try to control the recount proceedings.  In 
the case of a statewide recount with county 
officials across the state involved, it would be 
possible to file constitutional claims arguing 
that recount officials were not applying the 
rules uniformly.  Then recount officials and 
the courts might get into a jurisdictional 
dispute over who was responsible for ensuring 
that the recount proceeded properly, leading 
to confusion and inefficiency.  It would not 
be surprising, for instance, if local recount 
authorities counted questionable ballots and 
inseparably mixed them in with other ballots 
only to have a court later say that the standards 
used were invalid and that the result of the 
recount was irrevocably tainted.  This blurring 
of the lines between recount and quasi-judicial 
functions was one of the difficulties that marred 
Minnesota’s generally pristine election (see our 
critique of the Minnesota contest in Chapter 
One).
 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD
In our earlier book, we noted that Wisconsin’s 
statewide election authority, the State Elections 
Board, was being eliminated and replaced by 
a new entity, the Government Accountability 
Board, which would have jurisdiction over both 
election administration and government ethics. 
Where the old board consisted of eight members 
each appointed by various designated leaders 
in state government, the new board consists of 
six retired state court judges appointed by the 
governor and confirmed by two thirds of the 
state legislature.  The staff of the new board 
is divided between two sections, the Ethics 
and Accountability Division and the Elections 
Division.  The main motive for the reform was 
not to improve the administration of elections, 
but to tighten enforcement of campaign finance 
and ethics rules.  Nevertheless, at the time of 
the change we predicted that the new structure 
would have some impact on the administration 
of elections, although it was too early to tell 
what that impact would be.
After extensive interviews with election 
administrators, knowledgeable observers, and 
the Director of the GAB itself, we believe that 
the new structure is an improvement upon the 
old State Elections Board, which itself already 
had a strong reputation for nonpartisanship, 
professionalism, and effectiveness.  In fact, 
this body achieves something that up until 
now has been a rarity in the United States: 
election administration that is independent of 
partisan politics.  The main advantage of the 
new structure is its additional insulation from 
the partisanship that can creep into election 
administration and lead to policies designed or 
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perceived to favor one candidate or party over 
another.  The new system requires two-thirds 
legislative confirmation of all appointees,28 
which should have a moderating influence on 
political makeup of the board, as either political 
party can reject nominees it finds particularly 
odious.  The other insulating factor not present 
under the old system is the requirement that 
all GAB members be retired judges.29  This 
obviously gives the GAB an advantage in 
understanding the kinds of legal questions 
that frequently arise in conducting elections, 
but it also means that the board is populated 
with individuals who have already finished 
long and successful careers and therefore can 
presumably afford to champion sound policy 
decisions even when those decisions might 
offend powerful political players.  
This likelihood of GAB members making 
decisions regardless of partisan considerations 
is increased by Wisconsin’s reputation for 
having a relatively non-partisan judiciary.  The 
non-partisanship of the new GAB is not just 
theoretical, but is confirmed by interviews 
with state administrators and representatives 
of non-profit organizations who glowed when 
describing the fairness and professionalism of 
the GAB members and staff.  
Indeed, the GAB proved its capacity for standing 
up to political coercion when in September 
of 2008 it was pressured and eventually sued 
by the state Republican Party and the state 
attorney general over its observation of federal 
laws governing statewide voter registration 
database procedures.  As discussed above, 
the complaint alleged that the GAB and other 
state actors, prior to August 6, 2008, failed to 
use a database matching procedure to verify 
the information contained on incoming voter 
registration applications in violation of the 
Help America Vote Act.30  The verification had 
not occurred prior to the August 6 date because 
the technology was not yet in place to make it 
possible.  The plaintiffs wanted administrators 
to go back and verify those registrations, and 
also suggested that non-matching voters, at least 
under some circumstances, might need to be 
flagged and required to provide identification 
at the polls.31
These arguments lacked merit.  The primary 
argument in the matching litigation—that 
HAVA requires officials to match information 
contained on incoming voter registration 
applications against Social Security and motor 
vehicle databases—is partially true32 (see this 
chapter’s discussion of the Wisconsin GAB, 
below, for a detailed explanation of the dispute 
over matching).  However, there is no legal 
basis for going further and requesting that 
voter registrations be cancelled or provisional 
ballots cast just because the information on the 
registration application does not match.  After 
all, there are several innocent explanations for 
a non-match—that the information in the SSA 
or MV database is incorrect or out of date (as 
in the example of a name-change), that the 
matching protocol is too sensitive and results 
in a non-match even when any reasonable 
person, looking at the same data, would say it 
was close enough, etc.—and Wisconsin law has 
long prohibited removing the registrations of 
individuals unless the evidence shows beyond 
a reasonable doubt that they are ineligible.33 
Under these circumstances, it is unreasonable, 
and even illegal, to remove the voter without 
at least some further evidence that there is 
something amiss.  Thus, the Eleventh Circuit,34 
the District Court for the Western District 
of Washington,35 and the state court in the 
Van Hollen suit36 all concluded it is illegal to 
precondition registration on a valid match, 
though in the Van Hollen suit this was ancillary 
to the court’s holding.37
During the lawsuit the GAB stood its ground 
and did so without hint of any internal friction, 
a stance that was eventually vindicated when 
the trial court ruled that there was no basis 
for forcing voters to present additional 
identification or conform to any other 
additional requirements simply because their 
registrations had not been verified.38  It is not 
clear that the previous incarnation of the state’s 
chief election authority would have been able 
to remain unified in its position when subjected 
to this kind of pressure, and it is doubtful that 
state election boards of some other states, such 
as Illinois, could have done so.
Aside from adhering to Wisconsin’s tradition of 
nonpartisanship in election administration, the 
GAB has also shown itself to be conscientious 
in constantly reexamining itself as well as 
election procedures in the state to find areas 
for improvement.  For instance, after the 
2008 election the GAB surveyed all election 
administrators in the state to solicit opinions 
about how it could do a better job.  The League 
of Women Voters of Wisconsin also reports that 
the GAB has been good about seeking input 
from non-profit organizations and everyday 
citizens.  In 2009, the GAB toured the state 
to discuss with citizens and clerks various 
proposals for bringing “true” early voting to 
Wisconsin, in contrast to the current system of 
in-person absentee voting (the GAB ultimately 
recommended against adopting true early 
voting at this time39).  After competing for a 
$2M grant from the United States Elections 
Assistance Commission, the GAB also recently 
completed development of a comprehensive 
electronic elections data collection system that 
will provide much-needed statistics and other 
information to help administrators develop 
better elections policies.  All the while, the 
GAB has continued to provide strong guidance 
to local administrators in the form of seminars 
and its regularly updated, comprehensive 
elections manuals, including manuals detailing 
Election Day40 and recount procedures.41
In fact, it is clear that the GAB is providing 
a level of guidance and leadership that is 
not possible in many other states, where the 
chief election authority has not developed 
sufficient credibility among administrators to 
be both trusted and taken seriously.  A good 
example is the five-year plan the GAB has 
developed together with administrators and 
others in the policy community to ensure that 
Wisconsin continues to be a leader in election 
administration.42  Proposals outlined in the plan 
include reducing the amount of paperwork 
involved in absentee balloting, allowing return 
of completed absentee ballots by fax and email, 
allowing voters to submit a single absentee 
ballot request that is effective indefinitely and 
eliminates the need for subsequent requests, 
allowing voters to check the status of their 
absentee and provisional ballots online, 
mitigating shortages of poll workers by allowing 
them to serve in municipalities other than those 
in which they live, putting electronic pollbooks 
in polling places to increase throughput and 
help prevent double-voting, developing an 
electronic device in the polling place to help 
poll workers with procedural questions, 
developing online voter registration, requiring 
every jurisdiction in the state to use the same 
brand of voting machines, upgrading current 
online training materials for poll workers and 
election administrators to include more video 
and even real-time interaction over the web, 
moving primary dates earlier to allow more 
time for auditing and recounts, instituting a 
pilot early voting program, and other proposals. 
The GAB and Wisconsin will deserve great 
accolades if they manage to accomplish even 
half of the goals outlined in this plan, and 
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Wisconsin would become a true pioneer of 21st 
Century voting.  It also speaks volumes as to 
how well-respected the GAB is in Wisconsin 
that it was able to obtain funding for such an 
ambitious plan in a time of financial crisis, 
when many states are not even willing to 
maintain previous levels of funding for many 
basic services.
MILWAUKEE
Our previous book included an in-depth 
discussion of administrative problems in 
Milwaukee, most of them occurring in the 
November 2004 general election.  Many of 
the problems concerned security issues and 
allegations of fraud, which ultimately led to 
the conviction of seven individuals for voting 
while ineligible due to felony conviction.43  But 
the most troubling problems stemmed from 
poor management.  For instance, on the day 
before the election the Executive Director 
of the Milwaukee Election Commission 
learned that her office had failed to enter 
approximately 20,000 registration cards into 
the registration lists, prompting a last-minute 
scramble to process that information and 
update pollbooks.44  Two-hundred thirty-eight 
absentee ballots were not timely delivered to 
the polls for counting and for that reason had 
to be counted late, after the Commission had 
received special permission to do so from the 
state.  An unknown number of people who had 
requested absentee ballots never received them 
at all.  About 5,000 more ballots were cast on 
Election Day than the number of people who 
signed in at the polls.45  A number of Election 
Day registrations were never entered into the 
statewide voter registration database because 
they lacked information determined to be 
essential for a valid registration, yet a number of 
other Election Day registrations were entered 
into the database despite omissions that were 
similar or even identical.  These problems and 
many others are detailed in a 2005 report46 by 
a special task force appointed to investigate 
these matters.
However, two federal elections have passed 
since 2004, with few documented problems.47 
Much of the credit goes to administrators who 
acknowledged their mistakes and worked hard 
to see that they would not occur again in the 
future.  For instance, to help prevent individuals 
from using EDR to vote without completely 
filling out their registration applications and 
showing proper identification, Milwaukee 
doubled the amount of training required for 
poll workers, made class sizes smaller, required 
additional training for lead poll workers, 
developed teams of quality control inspectors 
who go from poll to poll on Election Day, and 
developed a grading system for poll workers 
that can lead to them being suspended for poor 
performance.
To address past problems with absentee voting, 
a law passed in 2005 has allowed Milwaukee 
to take the absentee counting process out of 
the polling place, where it used to occur at the 
conclusion of election night, and move it to a 
centralized location.48  This not only eliminates 
the problem of getting the ballots securely to 
the polls, but also has given administrators 
a much greater degree of control over the 
counting process to make it fairer and more 
uniform.  Finally, it allows poll workers to 
concentrate on their primary job—counting 
traditional in-person ballots—and to finish 
earlier, so they can go home.
Furthermore, prior to the 2006 election, 
officials checked the registration database 
against U.S. Postal Service address records, 
developed a list of 2,900 addresses that did not 
match, and placed a notation in poll books to 
remind poll workers to question these voters 
regarding their true addresses.  Another 
check occurred in late 2008 and showed that 
the number of invalid addresses had been 
cut to 50% of the number that existed in 
2004.49  Finally, as part of a 2009 statewide 
effort to clean voter rolls, Milwaukee purged 
a large number of dead or otherwise ineligible 
voters.50  (This is a federally-mandated purge of 
voters who have not voted in two consecutive 
elections, and not the kind of mismatch purge 
that would be based on an inability to verify 
voter registration data against Social Security 
Administration and motor vehicle databases.)
Milwaukee has also shown its willingness not 
only to prevent problems before they occur, 
but also to improve systems for dealing with 
problems that are not prevented.  Prosecutorial 
authorities have an excellent record of 
aggressively investigating and prosecuting 
voting fraud, in the few instances where it 
does exist.  Just before the 2008 election, 
Milwaukee County’s Democratic district 
attorney and Wisconsin’s Republican attorney 
general created a joint bipartisan task force 
of law enforcement officials to identify and 
investigate any reports of fraud.51  The former 
director of the Milwaukee Election Commission 
who presided over the irregularities in 2004 
resigned shortly thereafter and was replaced by 
Sue Edman, a twenty-eight-year police veteran 
with extensive experience in managing criminal 
investigations.52   Both the attorney general 
and the district attorney of Milwaukee have 
praised her for her “aggressive response to 
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[election] fraud allegations.”53  The Commission 
also improved its record-keeping practices, and 
law enforcement authorities with whom we 
spoke reported that this has greatly facilitated 
investigations of possible ineligible and double 
voting, investigations that previously were 
thwarted by poor records.  For these reasons, 
Milwaukee elections today are much better 
managed and more secure than they were in 
2004.
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AS IN OUR ORIGINAL STUDY, we remain 
concerned about election administration in 
Illinois.  Were it a swing state, we fear it would 
have even more problems than Ohio.  Though 
Illinois has many excellent administrators at 
the local level, it lacks a strong and trusted 
chief election officer to help these local 
administrators work together and follow 
processes uniformly.  As pointed out in our 
original study, this defect almost ensures 
significant variation across jurisdictions in 
how laws are applied and election procedures 
followed.
On the positive side, Illinois is a leader in voting 
access and has the most widely-used in-person 
early voting program of our five states.  The 
state is also adopting no-excuse absentee voting 
to expand access further.  This has obvious 
advantages, but also presents new challenges 
as Illinois continues to experience absentee 
ballot fraud.  Illinois election administrators 
will have to be vigilant to ensure that expanded 
absentee voting procedures are not abused to 
perpetrate greater fraud.  The state will also 
have to examine other election processes, such 
as ballot security measures, to see that they still 
make sense in a system with increased absentee 
voting.
Given the lack of coordination and uniformity 
across the state, and because the specter of 
fraud has the potential to taint public perception 
of elections, Illinois likely would not fare well 
in a Minnesota-style election contest.  After 
exploring in more detail what would happen 
if the facts of the 2008 Minnesota Senate race 
were transplanted to Illinois, this chapter then 
discusses Illinois’ lack of a strong statewide 
chief elections officer, together with news of 
some improvements in this area.  It concludes 
with a discussion of early and absentee voting 
in Illinois.
HOW WOULD ILLINOIS HANDLE A HIGH-
PROFILE ELECTION CONTEST?
In our estimation, the Illinois election system 
would perform poorly in a statewide federal 
election contest analogous to Minnesota’s 2008 
experience, for three reasons.  First, the recount 
and election contest laws contain unnecessary 
procedural burdens and court decisions that 
seem impractical and almost tangibly unfair. 
Second, the current chief election authority, 
the State Elections Board, is not sufficiently 
trusted to keep adequate control over the 
process.  Third, credible allegations of absentee 
ballot fraud might taint the election.
One problematic feature of election law in 
Illinois is that, like Ohio, the state does not 
permit ordinary election contests for federal 
office.  In 1977, the Illinois Supreme Court 
determined that federal election contests 
cannot occur in Illinois because they are not 
explicitly authorized by state statute.1  The 
implication seems to be that while candidates 
for state office can challenge an election result, 
federal candidates have no remedy except 
perhaps a constitutional challenge, mandamus 
action, or other prerogative writ such as quo 
warranto.  And even this is not clear under 
state law.
But Illinois’ system is yet more flawed 
than Ohio’s, because Illinois does not allow 
federal candidates a full recount:  Illinois law 
generally permits only 25% of precincts to be 
recounted.2  Importantly, the results of this 
“discovery recount” are unofficial and only for 
informational purposes to set up an election 
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contest.3  A full recount can then occur in 
the election contest,4 except that federal 
election contests are not permitted in Illinois. 
Furthermore, even if federal contests were 
permitted, the full recount cannot occur unless 
the judge hearing the suit finds a reasonable 
likelihood that performing the full recount 
would change the result of the election.5  An 
added complication is that courts have not been 
able to agree on the test for measuring whether 
this standard has been met.  Some courts have 
said it is sufficient if the request for recount 
filed with the election contest petition alleges 
that a full recount would likely change the result 
of the election.  On the other hand, in 1983 
the Illinois Supreme Court determined under 
a prior but similar statutory standard that it is 
not sufficient to allege that a full recount would 
likely change the result, because the court can 
go “behind the pleadings” to look at whether 
the allegations in the pleadings are credible 
based on the 25% recount and dismiss the case 
if the allegations are not found credible.6  How 
this standard would actually play out in practice 
is not clear, but it could leave a court with wide 
discretion.7
These are the rules in Illinois, yet we have 
doubts about whether future courts would be 
comfortable reaching the harsh conclusion that 
aggrieved federal candidates have no remedy 
except a 25% recount that cannot change 
the official result.  Instead, a court might 
insist on finding some grounds for ordering 
and supervising a full recount in a federal 
race, even though it lacks clear authority or 
standards for doing so.  The result would likely 
not be a robust judicial decision invulnerable to 
partisan attack or other criticism.  Accordingly, 
the Illinois legislature should authorize federal 
election contests soon, before it is faced with 
something like the Minnesota 2008 U.S. Senate 
race.
In situations in which a full recount is ordered, 
Illinois may lack the administrative capacity to 
conduct the recount in a sufficiently organized 
and uniform manner.  Even in Minnesota, 
despite the fundamental spirit of trust and 
cooperation that administrators had in the 
process, and despite strong and respected 
central leadership from the Secretary of State’s 
office, the state still had significant difficulty 
in properly following procedures for counting 
absentee ballots.  Illinois does not enjoy the 
same public-spiritedness that Minnesota does, 
and the degree of coordination between many 
local administrators and the State Board of 
Elections is weak to non-existent.  In a high-
profile race scrutinized in microscopic detail, 
it would be difficult for Illinois to perform a 
statewide recount successfully.  While the 
Illinois Supreme Court might exercise some 
control over the recount, the court possesses 
neither the deep knowledge of elections nor 
the managerial expertise that the Minnesota 
Secretary of State’s office deployed so crucially 
in the 2008 election.  The absence of a similarly 
trusted statewide recount authority in Illinois 
would almost certainly ensure that different 
jurisdictions would understand recount 
procedures differently.  Furthermore, given 
that most Illinois election administrators are 
county clerks elected on a partisan ticket,8 
there is a risk that some of them would 
deliberately interpret grey areas in the law to 
benefit the candidate of their party.  Procedural 
differences across county lines could generate 
layers of complicating litigation occurring not 
only in the Illinois Supreme Court, but in the 
federal courts as well.
ABSENTEE VOTING ISSUES IN AN ILLINOIS 
ELECTION CONTEST
The Minnesota Senate race showed how 
absentee balloting is one of the most likely 
areas for dispute in an election contest.  In 
November 2008, only 2.6% of Illinois voters 
cast absentee ballots, a very low level compared 
to states like Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin 
(see Table Six above).9  The low level of 
absentee voting promotes finality by reducing 
the importance of thorny absentee voting 
issues.  However, in late 2009 the state adopted 
no-excuse absentee voting, and absentee voting 
increased significantly in some locations in 
2010, although in the absence of an Obama-
like candidacy it declined overall.10  As another 
Presidential election year rolls around and 
candidates incorporate the new mail-in voting 
into their campaigns, we expect the statewide 
level of mail-in voting to increase.
A contestant looking into absentee balloting 
issues in an election contest would examine 
chain-of-custody records, insofar as they exist, 
to see if ballots had disappeared or extra ballots 
had been added to the count; look for instances 
where the rules for distinguishing properly 
cast absentee ballots from improperly cast 
ballots were not applied properly or uniformly; 
and explore whether timely ballots had been 
mistakenly rejected as untimely.  The most 
likely area for a challenger to discover provable 
irregularities would involve whether absentee 
ballots were improperly accepted or rejected. 
In Illinois, absentee ballots must be counted 
unless one of several statutorily defined defects 
is present.11  
While this statutory guidance may appear clear 
on its face, post-election litigation concerning 
similar statutes in Minnesota and Ohio has 
shown that specific statutory language alone 
is not necessarily enough to ensure uniform 
application.  For example, in Minnesota’s 
2008 contest, some Minnesota counties were 
rejecting absentee ballots when records showed 
that the required witness to the ballot was not a 
registered voter, while other counties were not 
checking the registration status of witnesses 
at all.  Similarly, Ohio statutes were not 
clear enough to give adequate guidance as to 
whether provisional ballots should be counted 
when their accompanying paperwork included 
the voter’s name but was lacking signature, 
included the voter’s signature but was lacking 
the voter’s block-letter name, or included the 
voter’s name and signature but in the wrong 
location on the paperwork.  When the Secretary 
of State issued a last-minute directive to clarify 
these questions, it prompted litigation in the 
Ohio Supreme Court,12 which ultimately 
disagreed with the Secretary’s instructions on 
all three situations, confirming just how much 
room for interpretation there can be over what 
at first may appear to be simple issues.
A very different kind of allegation in an election 
contest would be that absentee ballots were 
cast fraudulently or that legally cast absentee 
ballots were deliberately tampered with after 
the fact in an effort to change the result. 
Absentee ballot fraud can be committed by 
intercepting and altering ballots, intercepting 
and destroying them, vote buying, casting 
ballots under old or fraudulent registrations, 
or by improperly influencing a voter in casting 
an absentee ballot, all of which are criminal 
offenses under the Illinois election code.13 
Although most of these methods have been 
used in Illinois in the past, today the most 
prevalent method appears to be improperly 
influencing voters who are casting absentee 
ballots.14  Typically, the perpetrator observes 
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the casting of the ballot and pressures the voter 
to vote for the desired candidate, or even asks 
the voter to surrender the unvoted ballot so 
that the perpetrator can cast it.
We continue to view it as unlikely that election 
administrators or others in Illinois would 
deliberately commit absentee ballot fraud 
with the specific intent of affecting a statewide 
election, if only because the magnitude of fraud 
necessary to affect the result would be so large 
and require so many conspirators that it would 
carry a huge risk of exposure.  As our original 
study noted, absentee ballot fraud with the 
intent of affecting local races with only a small 
number of ballots seems much more likely. 
Since that time additional small-scale election 
fraud schemes have been exposed in Chicago,15 
East St. Louis,16 and the surrounding county of 
St. Clair,17 including the town of Cahokia.18  
The effect of this kind of fraud on a statewide 
election might be only incidental to the intent, 
but nevertheless in the case of a razor-thin 
margin the result would be unacceptable, no 
matter how conscientiously the election contest 
court tried to determine the true winner.  Thus, 
instances of proven absentee ballot fraud could 
threaten the credibility of the entire election, 
even if the apparent margin of victory was 
greater than the number of known fraudulent 
ballots.  This would put tremendous pressure 
on the election contest court to throw out the 
entire election and order a new one, a remedy 
that is fraught with problems of its own.19 
There is some precedent for this remedy in 
Illinois, at least in the trial courts.20
The ideal remedy for absentee ballot fraud, 
or any other situation where invalid ballots 
have made it into the count, is exclusion of 
the problematic ballots from the vote count. 
However, in most cases the tainted ballots 
will already be inseparably mixed with valid 
ballots, making the content of the tainted 
votes unknowable.  Illinois courts have 
variously prescribed throwing out all absentee 
ballots in the affected precincts,21 subtracting 
(“apportioning”) the absentee ballots from 
the candidates’ totals in proportion to the 
percentage of voters in the affected precinct 
who belong to each political party,22 subtracting 
the absentee ballots from the candidates’ 
totals in proportion to an untainted ballot pool 
from the precinct,23 or even, when there is no 
untainted ballot pool to draw from, subtracting 
in proportion to a tainted ballot pool24—a 
particularly unsatisfying remedy.  The courts 
have not articulated any rule for choosing among 
these various remedies, and from reading their 
opinions, it often appears that they are not 
even aware that other courts within the state 
have taken different approaches.
The election contest court might have difficulty 
finding a way to reconcile all of these apparently 
conflicting precedents, and for that reason 
any result it reached could be called more 
easily into question.  The Minnesota contest 
could have confronted similar issues over the 
commingled ballots problem when Coleman 
alleged that an unspecified number of absentee 
ballots had been wrongfully counted and mixed 
in with others, but was saved by a state statute 
and Supreme Court precedent that clearly 
indicated Coleman had waived his right to 
complain of these ballots when his team did 
not object to them on election night, when they 
were counted.  But Illinois does not currently 
have such a precedent and would presumably 
have to deal with this issue head-on.   
CONTINUING LACK OF MEANINGFUL 
STATEWIDE SUPERVISION
Our original study noted that one of the 
fundamental characteristics of the Illinois 
election system was its lack of any central 
authority with real credibility or power.  The 
true power resided in local officials, who for the 
most part acted on their own and ignored the 
State Board of Elections (“SBE”), which was 
quite limited in its funding, personnel, access 
to ground-level information, and formal power. 
That situation remains largely unchanged, but 
continuing implementation of the statewide 
voter registration database has forced locals 
to work with the SBE on a regular basis, 
and there is hope that this could build more 
respect and trust between the various local 
offices and the SBE.  The statewide database 
also gives the SBE the ability to peer into some 
aspects of local administration, allowing it to 
catch errors or important variations in policies 
across jurisdictions.  This mitigates one of the 
primary obstacles to achieving more uniformity 
in procedures across the state—namely, the 
fact that historically the SBE has simply had 
no way of knowing what was going on locally in 
many counties.  The initial post-HAVA political 
battle between the SBE and local officials 
over what role these entities would play in the 
operation of the database also is receding into 
the past, providing further hope that a spirit of 
cooperation may grow.
Nevertheless, many aspects of the Illinois 
election system remain disorganized, 
fragmented, and subject to important 
jurisdictional variations in procedure. 
Although our original study addressed several 
procedures that administrators believe may 
vary across jurisdictions, the 2008 Minnesota 
Senate race suggests that the biggest issue 
likely is the variation across jurisdictions in 
the standards used to accept absentee ballots. 
Another potential problem is variation in the 
accuracy and transparency of the canvassing 
process, which we previously predicted would 
become an issue in the future.  The problem 
stems from a change in state law that gave 
county administrators sole responsibility for 
canvassing and certifying official vote totals, a 
process that previously required a bipartisan 
team that included the local administrator and 
leaders of the local political parties.25  While 
we are not aware of any deliberate fraud yet 
occurring, the SBE has subsequently identified 
several innocent errors in canvassing that 
might have been prevented in the old system. 
These errors included, but were not limited 
to, losing votes when “merging” results, failing 
to include certain absentee ballots in reported 
vote totals, double-counting absentee ballots, 
and failing to account for several hundred 
ballots that had been forgotten in the auxiliary 
bin of a voting machine and that had not made 
it into the initial count.  Once discovered, all 
of these errors were fixed, but the SBE worries 
that similar errors are going unnoticed and 
uncorrected in various offices across the state.
Another procedural variation concerns the 
time of tabulating absentee ballots.  Absentee 
ballots used to be sent to polling places and 
counted by poll workers on election night, 
but a 2006 law now permits counting to occur 
centrally.26  The actual counting cannot occur 
until the night of the election, but the law 
allows administrators to run the ballots through 
the machines earlier as long as they wait until 
election night to release the actual vote totals. 
Jurisdictions are making their own decisions 
about whether to run the ballots earlier.  While 
this procedure saves time, it also is less secure 
because the election observers who have a 
right to attend the central counting of absentee 
ballots do not witness the actual ballots being 
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run through the machine, and instead see only 
administrators pressing the button that prints 
out the vote totals.  The process thus is less 
transparent, and errors are less likely to be 
uncovered.
INCREASING ACCESS AND CONVENIENCE
Illinois saw impressive numbers of voters in the 
November 2008 election, presumably because 
of the historic candidacy of favorite son Barack 
Obama.  However, there were other factors that 
may have boosted turnout, including Illinois’ 
relatively new programs of early voting and 
“grace period” registration, both of which were 
used for the first time in a Presidential election 
in 2008.  Furthermore, in late 2009 the Illinois 
legislature passed a law that will allow voters in 
future elections to request and cast absentee 
ballots without an excuse.  This confluence of 
policies that lower procedural barriers to voting 
makes Illinois one of the more accessible states 
in our five-state study, despite the fact that it 
does not have Election Day Registration.  This 
increasing accessibility has many consequences 
for voters, both good and bad.
Early voting.  The state’s early voting program 
in particular has a number of positive benefits, 
beyond just the convenience to the voter, that 
improve the entire elections system.  Illinois 
administrators know this and for that reason 
promoted early voting heavily in 2008, causing 
an impressive 19.5% of all ballots in the state 
to be cast using the early voting system.27  The 
high early voting turnout decreased Election 
Day turnout, reducing the potential for long 
lines and other bottlenecks, but it also did much 
more.  Because the procedures used to conduct 
early voting in Illinois so closely resemble 
traditional polling-place voting procedures, 
early voting gives the community the chance to 
identify ahead of time procedural problems that 
might occur on Election Day.  Furthermore, by 
reducing Election Day turnout, early voting 
reduces the number of voting machines and 
poll workers that are necessary to maintain a 
satisfactory pace of voting on Election Day. 
Thus, on the same Election Day budget, early 
voting allows administrators to keep a surplus 
of machines and personnel in the polling place 
to add extra capacity or as backup.  It also 
allows them, if they so choose, to purchase 
and maintain fewer voting machines and hire 
fewer poll workers yet achieve the same level 
of throughput that they could achieve in a 
non-early-voting system.  Because of such 
efficiencies, the Kane County clerk estimates 
that early voting may save his office one million 
dollars over a ten-year period.  In 2008, Cook 
County was able to eliminate 10% of all polling 
places and deploy more machines per polling 
place.  
A final advantage of early voting is that it is 
considered more secure than absentee voting, 
which is more susceptible to fraud.28  In fact, 
absentee voting has decreased significantly 
since early voting has been available in the 
state.  None of the four other states in this study 
have achieved as much success in promoting an 
early voting program.  
One downside to early voting in Illinois in the 
2008 election was long lines at early voting 
locations.  The massive early voting turnout 
exceeded the expectations of administrators, 
and some voters had to wait up to four hours 
to cast their ballots.  Of course, while having to 
wait to vote early is bad, it is better than having 
to wait on Election Day, when it is not possible 
for voters who experience long lines to solve 
the problem by leaving and returning to vote at 
a later date.  Furthermore, Illinois’ early voting 
lines should be shorter in future elections 
because the advent of no-excuse absentee 
voting will draw some voters away from early 
voting.  Administrators are also refining their 
estimates of the number of workers and voting 
machines that must be present in each polling 
place in order to move early voting along at a 
brisk pace.
Grace period registration.  2008 was also 
the first Presidential election in which Illinois 
voters could register late using the state’s 
“grace period registration” program.  Grace 
period registration allows voters to register in 
person as late as seven days before the election, 
giving them an additional twenty-one days to 
register after the twenty-eight-day deadline for 
traditional registration.  Approximately 23,000 
individuals used grace period registration in 
Illinois for the 2008 election, up from about 
6,400 in 2006.  Grace period registrants are not 
permitted to cast traditional ballots on Election 
Day, but may cast only absentee ballots or 
“grace period ballots” that are cast in-person 
immediately after completing the grace period 
registration process (legally speaking, this 
is a separate procedure from early voting, 
though similar).  Thus, to the extent that it is 
used, grace period registration creates greater 
throughput by steering voters away from polling 
place voting, where bottlenecks are most likely 
to occur.  Except for the fact that it occurs 
before Election Day, this process is similar to 
the process that voters may use in Minnesota 
and Wisconsin to register on Election Day at 
the polls and cast a ballot then and there.  It 
is also similar to Ohio’s controversial “Golden 
Week” that began thirty-five days before the 
election and ended thirty days before, during 
which time voters in a one-stop transaction 
could register and cast an in-person absentee 
ballot without an excuse.  The ability of voters 
to register and vote in a single visit to the 
clerk’s office, in addition to being convenient, 
has been shown to increase voter turnout when 
conducted on Election Day.29  While it is not 
certain that this same increase occurs when the 
one-stop transaction is only available prior to 
Election Day, it seems reasonable to expect at 
least some increased turnout to occur.
No-excuse absentee voting.  2010 was the first 
year in which Illinois voters had the opportunity 
to cast absentee ballots in a federal election 
without having to provide an excuse, such as 
sickness or being out of town.  Only about 1.1% 
of voters statewide used the new procedure,30 
but we expect that percentage to rise in 2012 
as more voters learn of the procedure and 
as Obama’s reelection campaign renews the 
interest of Illinois voters.  This added yet 
another layer of convenience for busy voters 
and gave them the opportunity to cast a ballot 
without ever having to travel to a polling place. 
Other states with no-excuse absentee voting 
report usage rates between about 4% (New 
Jersey) and close to 25% (Ohio).31  If Illinois 
can achieve high participation in its no excuse 
program, it will take substantial pressure off 
both early voting sites and Election-Day polling 
places, helping to reduce wait times.  Thus, no 
excuse absentee voting will improve not only 
the experience of the absentee voter, but it will 
also have positive externalities for all voters 
and the elections system as a whole.
At the same time, however, no excuse absentee 
voting will subject the Illinois elections system 
to a greater risk of illegal ballots being cast 
and counted in the state.  This is because most 
elections scholars and others involved in the 
elections process believe that it is much more 
difficult and risky to go into a polling place 
and cast a ballot illegally by impersonating 
a voter than it is to cast an illegal ballot by 
mail.  No excuse absentee voting will increase 
the risk of such fraud going undetected in at 
least two ways.  First, it will expand the overall 
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universe of absentee ballots cast, making a 
larger haystack in which administrators must 
try to find the needle of voting fraud.  As an 
example, the anti-fraud systems traditionally 
used in Chicago and Cook County depend 
in part on identifying geographic “spikes” in 
ballot requests that suggest political operatives 
in specific neighborhoods are persuading 
individual voters to request absentee ballots for 
the purpose of committing fraud.  In a no-excuse 
world where anyone could request an absentee 
ballot, these spikes will be harder to detect, or 
may not stand out at all.  Furthermore, because 
it will no longer be necessary to provide an 
excuse, administrators will no longer be able 
to identify fraud by looking to see whether the 
reasons provided seem suspicious (e.g., 50% of 
people in one apartment building claiming they 
will be out of town on Election Day), as some 
administrators currently do.
The second way that no-excuse absentee voting 
could increase the risk of fraud is by actually 
increasing the number of fraudulent absentee 
ballots cast (as opposed to merely making it 
more difficult to detect whatever amount of 
fraud is committed today).  If criminals feel 
that administrators are less able to detect fraud 
because Illinois has moved to a no-excuse 
system, then they may increase their efforts 
accordingly.
Despite these concerns, most election officials 
with whom we spoke did not feel that moving to 
a no-excuse system carried with it an increased 
risk of fraud, although one office did admit that 
its systems for detecting fraud will have to be 
retooled to remain effective.  We do not mean 
to overstate the prevalence of voting fraud – 
which available evidence indicates is very rare, 
in Illinois and elsewhere – but wonder whether 
these administrators were too complacent 
about the potential problems that widespread 
absentee balloting might have in a state like 
Illinois.
Early voting 
period (stated in 
days prior to the 
election)
No excuse 
absentee
Last 
registration 
deadline 
(stated in days 
prior to the 
election)
“Golden week” 
period (stated in 
days prior to the 
election)
Illinois 22-5 Yes 14 22-14
Ohio 35-1 Yes 30 35-30
Michigan None No 30 N/A
Minnesota None No   0 N/A
Wisconsin ?-1* Yes   0 ?-1*
*  Wisconsin does not have an “early voting” program as such, but does allow voters to cast absentee ballots 
in-person at the offi ce of the election administrator without an excuse.  In function if not form, this amounts to 
an early voting program.  However, the law does not state the mandatory beginning time when these in-person 
absentee ballots must be furnished to voters upon request.
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CHAPTER FIVE: MICHIGAN
OUR ORIGINAL STUDY CONCLUDED 
that Michigan’s election system was essentially 
sound, and particularly benefited from strong 
and respected central leadership provided by 
the Elections Division of the Michigan Secretary 
of State.  At the same time, we worried that 
elections in some areas of Michigan, including 
Detroit, had a history of absentee ballot 
improprieties, and might remain vulnerable 
to corruption and mismanagement.  Three 
years later, these same two themes—strong 
statewide leadership but local vulnerabilities—
continue to apply, along with a third feature, 
the inability of the legislature to agree on 
election modernization proposals.  If that 
legislative paralysis persists, Michigan risks 
losing some of its status as a nationwide leader 
in election administration.  In the meantime, 
election officials throughout the state, led 
by the Secretary of State’s office, have been 
looking for ways to modernize administrative 
practice even without new legislation.
Still, Michigan’s election ecosystem is relatively 
stable at the moment and has not experienced 
the political controversies over election 
administration that Ohio, and to a lesser extent 
Wisconsin, have seen.  The 2008 election ran 
smoothly, and Michigan has generated no 
Ohio-style sweeping lawsuits alleging that 
the entire elections system is fundamentally 
unfair, nor any high-profile post-election suits 
seeking to influence the result of a particular 
election.  Michigan has also thus far avoided 
any conflicts over the “matching” or verification 
of information on incoming voter registration 
applications, and the Secretary of State’s office 
remains well respected and continues to build 
strong relationships with local officials based 
on mutual trust.  Whether this stability would 
survive a Minnesota-type election dispute 
remains to be seen.
Like the other chapters of this book, this 
chapter begins by analyzing a hypothetical 
scenario in which Michigan is faced with the 
kind of very close election that occurred in 
Minnesota’s 2008 U.S. Senate race.  It then 
considers the special problem of elections in 
Detroit and discusses current efforts at reform.
HOW WOULD MICHIGAN HANDLE A HIGH-
PROFILE ELECTION CONTEST?
If Michigan faced a statewide election contest 
comparable to the situation that Minnesota 
faced in its 2008 Senate race between Al 
Franken and Norm Coleman, it likely would 
come out looking better than Illinois and Ohio, 
but might suffer in comparison to Wisconsin. 
Michigan enjoys many advantages that reduce 
the ability of candidates to successfully call 
into question the true winner of an election, 
including a low number of provisional ballots1 
and a respected central elections authority that 
has the kind of credibility with local officials 
that promotes fairness and uniformity in a 
recount.  Michigan also has a comparatively 
modest voter ID requirement that would make 
it hard for a candidate to credibly claim that 
misapplication of voter ID rules affected a 
large number of ballots.  Further, the state’s all-
optical scan voting system minimizes concerns 
about hacking and provides better records (the 
ballots themselves) for recounts.  The optical 
scan system is governed by clear laws that 
define which kinds of marks on a ballot do and 
do not constitute a vote.2
However, we worry for several reasons that 
Michigan would not be able to resolve a 
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disputed statewide election as smoothly as 
Minnesota.  The current political climate in 
Michigan, though less heated than in Ohio 
and Illinois, probably would fail to produce 
the spirit of good faith that reduces reckless 
accusations of mismanagement and fraud. 
Unfortunately, the partisan divide extends all 
the way up to the Michigan Supreme Court, 
which has a reputation for engaging in bitter 
partisan squabbles, as we noted in our original 
study.3  In addition, few institutional checks 
and balances guard against the potential for 
partisanship at the administrative level.  Finally, 
a statewide recount might be incomplete and 
unsatisfactory if the state adheres to archaic 
recount rules that prohibit entire precincts of 
ballots from being recounted if certain security 
procedures are not followed in those precincts, 
as they too often are not.  
Institutional frailties.  While Michigan 
does not have the troubled political culture 
of Illinois, it seems more vulnerable to 
partisanship and corruption than Minnesota. 
Because the state does not have as many 
institutional checks against partisanship as it 
might, a Minnesota-type election contest could 
degenerate into a nasty political fight.  At the 
state level, Michigan’s Secretary of State is an 
elected official with a known partisan affiliation 
and an obvious conflict of interest in resolving 
a disputed election between a Democrat and a 
Republican.  The fact that the recent Secretaries 
of State of both parties have conducted 
themselves admirably and avoided accusations 
of partisanship to date does not alleviate this 
concern, nor mean that future Secretaries of 
State will always avoid the potential for abusing 
their power for partisan ends.  At the local level 
as well, most administrators hold partisan, 
elected offices, although a few jurisdictions 
use appointed administrators.4  No jurisdiction 
is run by a bipartisan board of the kind that 
is found throughout Ohio and in some parts 
of Wisconsin and Illinois.  A bipartisan local 
board of this kind might have prevented 
or mitigated the absentee balloting abuses 
exposed in the 2005 Detroit mayoral election, 
which were discussed in our original study and 
are explained further below.
Bipartisan teams do conduct the post-election 
processes of counting and recounting in 
Michigan.5  However, if a Coleman v. Franken 
analog reached the Michigan judiciary, 
Michigan would face perhaps its greatest 
challenge:  Resolving an election contest in a way 
that would be perceived as fair and impartial. 
The initial proceeding, likely in the form of quo 
warranto (Michigan’s version of an election 
contest),6 would be heard by the elected judges 
of the state court of appeals.7  Their decision 
then would likely be appealed to the state’s 
highest court.  Unfortunately, according to a 
2008 University of Chicago study of the quality 
of state high courts, the Michigan Supreme 
Court received the lowest rating of all the fifty 
states, in a combined measure of productivity, 
influence, and political independence.8  In the 
past, the justices have made personal attacks 
on one another, both in written opinions and 
in material leaked to the media.9  If a high 
stakes election dispute reached this court, we 
remain concerned that it might have difficulty 
inspiring the public confidence necessary to a 
credible determination of an election contest.
“Unexcused” absentee balloting.  One of the 
most obvious strategies to attack the result of an 
election, but one that did not arise in Minnesota 
(perhaps for strategic reasons), works only in 
states like Michigan where absentee voting 
requires an excuse:  hunt down absentee voters 
who had no valid excuse for using absentee 
ballots and attempt to disqualify their ballots. 
There are likely to be thousands of such voters 
in a statewide election, and there are particular 
reasons for concern in Michigan.
Partly because it believed that voters were 
increasingly “fibbing” by making up an 
excuse on their absentee ballot applications, 
Wisconsin moved to a no-excuse system in the 
year 2000.  Ohio and Illinois also have adopted 
the practice.  Michigan has not made such a 
move, yet the percentage of its voters who use 
absentee voting continues to increase, just as 
in Wisconsin.  Data for the 2000 presidential 
election are not available, but the number 
of absentee ballots cast and counted in the 
state (including both absentee ballots cast in-
person and by mail) increased approximately 
46% between 2004 and 2008.10  While part 
of this may be explained by an increasingly 
mobile population that is more likely to be 
out of town on Election Day, it probably also 
indicates a change in cultural attitudes towards 
convenience and away from the formality of 
appearing at the polls.  Michigan needs to 
investigate this trend to discover whether it is 
in fact due to unlawful voting.  If it is, the state 
either needs to start addressing the problem or 
move to a no-excuse system.
Until then, the problem is made worse by the 
fact that some parts of Michigan use absentee 
balloting much more heavily than others.  For 
instance, in 2004 absentee ballots accounted for 
approximately 30% of ballots cast in Detroit,11 
compared to about 18% in the rest of the state. 
Of course, demographic differences in urban 
populations may explain some of this, but to the 
extent that citizens of Detroit are neither sicker 
nor more frequently homebound or on the road 
than other Michigan voters, they could be more 
prone to abuse the absentee ballot process. 
Furthermore, because Detroit is heavily 
Democratic, the upshot is that a Republican 
candidate could attempt to challenge absentee 
ballots from that jurisdiction without much 
fear of disqualifying a larger proportion of his 
or her own voters.  Likewise, a Democratic 
candidate might attempt to disqualify absentee 
ballots in heavy Republican areas.
Of course, disqualifying absentee ballots 
that have already been counted is easier said 
than done.  At a late stage in the Minnesota 
proceedings, Coleman argued that a number of 
absentee ballots were ineligible and should be 
thrown out.  However, the ballots he attacked 
had already been counted and inseparably 
mixed in with other ballots, so that even if it 
was proven that the ballots were invalidly cast, 
it would be impossible to remove them from 
the count.  The Minnesota courts disposed of 
Coleman’s arguments by relying on a statute 
that required disputes over the eligibility of 
absentee ballots to occur at the time of counting 
or not at all.  Additionally, the courts said that, 
even assuming Coleman could prove that a 
number of invalid ballots had been accidentally 
counted sufficient to render the result unclear, 
the court had no power to invalidate the 
election, therefore no remedy was available.
Michigan law probably would not allow courts 
to dispose of such claims so easily.  Michigan 
does not have a statute precluding post-
election challenges to counted absentee ballots. 
Furthermore, on at least one occasion,12 the 
Michigan Supreme Court threw out the result 
of a small-town annexation ballot issue upon a 
finding that illegal balloting might have affected 
the outcome (although the court might be more 
reluctant to grant such an extraordinary remedy 
in a higher-profile, statewide election that is 
more complicated and expensive to re-hold). 
It also has approved proportionately reducing 
candidates’ vote totals when unlawful ballots 
have been inextricably mixed in to the count,13 
an approach that Michigan appellate courts 
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have followed as recently as 1989,14 though the 
approach has fallen out of favor elsewhere.15
Allegations of fraud.  Also of concern is 
whether a high-profile election dispute would 
lead to significant allegations of fraud or other 
impropriety.  Although Michigan seems to 
have avoided the kind of media attention given 
to states like Wisconsin,16 where allegations 
of “voter fraud” occasionally are leveled, 
in fact the 2005 Detroit city primary and 
general elections provide a recent example of 
significant, intentional misconduct occurring 
in the state (this story is discussed in more 
detail below).  Paradoxically, no significant, 
intentional impropriety has been uncovered 
in Wisconsin, although a small number of 
felons may have unintentionally violated the 
law by voting when they did not know they 
were disenfranchised under state law.17  Even 
Illinois, with its problematic reputation, has 
very few recent examples of election officials 
personally violating the law in order to change 
the result of an election.
However, even if fraud occurred, it could only 
change the result of the election if it was proven 
to have tainted enough ballots to affect the 
outcome or was so blatant and disturbing that 
the court felt it was appropriate to invalidate 
the entire election — something most courts 
would avoid in all but the most egregious 
cases.18  Establishing this level of misconduct 
could be quite difficult because the affected 
ballots would probably already be cast and 
counted, and proof would have to rely on oral 
testimony and documents such as poll books 
and absentee ballot paperwork that typically 
cannot be tied to any particular ballot.
Unrecountable precincts.  Unlike the other 
states in our study, Michigan law renders ballots 
“unrecountable” when post-election chain 
of custody procedures are not followed.  For 
instance, where ballot bags and boxes are not 
properly sealed after the precinct canvass or 
where the identification numbers of the seals 
are not properly recorded in the poll book, 
the ballots are not recountable.19  The purpose 
of the rule is obviously to prevent fraud and 
ensure that recounts include only those ballots 
that have been protected against tampering 
during the interval between Election Day and 
the recount.  However, a side-effect of the 
rule is that, even when everyone agrees there 
has been no tampering and a particular box of 
ballots is valid, nevertheless those valid ballots 
are excluded from the recount.  In that case, 
the original count from that precinct would 
be accepted in the recount, even if in fact it 
was inaccurate.20  This formalistic approach 
has the benefit of giving clear guidance to 
officials and courts considering the matter, 
but does not take context into account or 
accord with the principle of enfranchising as 
many voters as possible where there has been 
substantial, though imperfect, compliance with 
requirements.  In our opinion, this rule creates 
an unnecessary conflict between two of the 
three core values of this study—integrity and 
finality.  The practical import for a Minnesota-
type election contest where the whole nation 
was watching is that the tribunal would face a 
difficult choice: either find an exception to the 
rule and be accused of “judicial activism” or 
enforce the rule and reach a result that follows 
the letter of the law but that many would 
consider fundamentally unfair.
The concern about unrecountable precincts is 
hardly theoretical.  For instance, the November 
2009 Detroit mayoral election was marred by 
broken security seals that caused approximately 
50,000 ballots to be legally unrecountable, 
and resulted in a candidate request that the 
attorney general investigate whether fraud 
had occurred.21  The November 2008 election 
in Allegan County led to a recount in a county 
judicial race in which ballots in 25 out of 48 
precincts could not be recounted because of 
lax chain of custody procedures.22  The inability 
to recount more than half the precincts, in a 
race in which the margin of victory was only 
255 votes out of approximately 43,000 cast, is 
deeply concerning.  In 2007, failure to follow 
security procedures rendered unrecountable 
approximately 1/3 of all ballots cast in a race 
for Lansing city council.23  Similar problems 
occurred in Saginaw Township,24 Polkton 
Township,25 and the city of Zeeland in 2006.26 
In the recounts following the fraud-tarnished 
2005 Detroit city election, 88 out of 720 
precincts, or approximately 12% of precincts, 
were not recountable.27
DETROIT
Our original study identified serious problems 
in Detroit’s 2005 primary and general 
elections, including a variety of absentee ballot 
improprieties.28  As we described there, the 
elected city clerk, Jackie Currie, sent teams 
of government-paid “ambassadors” to assist 
voters casting absentee ballots in the primary 
election, but some of these ambassadors were 
found attempting to influence those they were 
assisting.  In addition, Currie later admitted 
to the press that her office had sent out some 
absentee ballots pre-marked with votes for 
herself, city councilman Kwame Kenyatta, 
and former mayor Kwame Kilpatrick (who 
years later resigned in the face of unrelated 
ethics charges).29 Security seals on some of the 
boxes containing cast absentee ballots were 
broken, suggesting further impropriety.  In 
response to these problems, a court appointed 
overseers for the November general election 
and, when those overseers reported that Currie 
continued to engage in illegal activity, the court 
ordered the extraordinary remedy of having 
the county clerk take over Currie’s absentee 
ballot responsibilities.  The election ended 
with a newly elected clerk, Janice Winfrey, 
having ousted Currie.  Disturbingly, the FBI 
investigated Currie’s management of the 
election for almost three years, then concluded 
the investigation without taking any action 
except to say that the state attorney general 
should have investigated it.30
Was that the end of problems in Detroit? 
Many knowledgeable observers around the 
state approve of Winfrey’s performance and 
describe the situation as much improved.  The 
new clerk has run all but one of her elections 
without notable glitches and was reelected 
with the endorsement of most Detroit-area 
newspapers.31  News accounts concerning 
her performance report that she has made 
important improvements by removing the 
names of some 128,000 ineligible voters from 
the rolls, reporting election results faster 
(which reduces opportunities for “cooking” 
election results), and modernizing the office by 
digitizing records.32  Winfrey also eliminated 
the controversial ambassador program, put 
greater controls over third-party delivery of 
ballots, enhanced requirements concerning 
the return of voting machine memory cards 
after the election, and mandated uniforms and 
fifteen hours of training for all poll workers.33 
We therefore agree that election administration 
in Detroit has improved significantly.
Nevertheless, a new city clerk alone may not 
resolve all of Detroit’s underlying election 
administration problems.  Deeper, systemic 
issues perhaps remain, as most recently 
suggested by the security problems, described 
above, that rendered approximately 50,000 
ballots unrecountable in the November 2009 
election.34  Our continuing study of both the 
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theory and practical application of election law 
in many jurisdictions over many elections has 
repeatedly shown how the political culture of 
an area can be more important than the law on 
the books in determining how well elections 
are run.  Unfortunately, Detroit has seen a 
repeated pattern of disregard for election laws, 
from Jackie Currie to former mayor Kwame 
Kilpatrick and former city council President 
Monica Conyers.35  This pattern may reflect an 
underlying tolerance within the city’s political 
culture for some degree of abuse of the election 
administration process.  We therefore remain 
cautious about the extent to which the current 
city clerk’s successes reflect a permanent 
solution to the city’s history of corruption.
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS
As we described in our original study, 
Michigan has long been a leader in election 
administration.  It pioneered the concept that 
became known as motor voter registration, and 
later created one of the nation’s first statewide 
voter registration databases.  In the past 
several years, however, legislative deadlock has 
stymied the efforts of election administrators to 
continue to improve the system.  Unsuccessful 
reform efforts have included proposals to 
(1) allow no-excuse absentee voting, (2) 
prohibit candidates from collecting completed 
absentee ballot applications, (3) require ID 
when submitting an absentee ballot, (4) allow 
absentee ballot submission by fax and email, 
(5) permit clerks to send absentee ballot 
applications by mail to every voter, (6) “pre-
register” sixteen-year-olds to vote, (7) expand 
registration for college students who are away 
from home by allowing them to register with 
any clerk, rather than requiring them to return 
to their voting jurisdiction to register, and (8) 
increase the amount of time that absentee 
ballots are available for request by overseas 
and military voters, and to allow these ballots 
to be transmitted to the voters via email.  While 
many of these proposals made it through the 
Michigan House of Representatives, all of 
them except the last died in the Senate.
With the failure of the legislative reform 
efforts, election officials are looking for purely 
administrative ways to improve the system.  For 
instance, the Bureau of Elections has explored 
whether Michigan could implement early 
voting without further amendments to state 
statutes.  For decades, Michigan statutes have 
authorized absentee voters to cast their ballots 
early if they do so in-person and on a “voting 
machine.”36  Although the statutes do not 
define the phrase “voting machine,” some have 
construed the wording to contemplate the old 
lever-type voting machines.37  When Michigan 
moved to an all optical scan system in 2004, 
election officials conservatively decided to treat 
optical scanners as not “voting machines,” and 
therefore to discontinue early voting.  Now that 
early voting is becoming a nationwide trend, 
however, officials have reconsidered whether 
their initial interpretation was textually 
required, and have contemplated resuming an 
early voting program within existing law.
Statutory interpretation, however, is not the 
only barrier to Michigan achieving a true early 
voting program.  Like Wisconsin (but unlike 
Illinois, Ohio and Minnesota, which give 
primary authority over elections to county-level 
officials), Michigan gives primary authority 
over elections to municipal-level officials. 
While this has its advantages, one disadvantage 
is that many municipal-level clerks work part-
time on their own, with no employees to help 
them.  Some of them also work out of their 
homes.  These officials cannot reasonably be 
expected to allow voters into their homes for 
early voting in the days leading up to Election 
Day, when they are already busy.  For that 
reason early voting may not work as smoothly 
in Michigan as in states with greater election 
centralization.  The Bureau of Elections has 
considered using Illinois-type vote centers as 
a way to eliminate this problem, but because 
of the tight state budget and general lack of 
legislative enthusiasm for reform, it could be 
some time before Michigan begins to offer 
universal early voting.
In addition to considering early voting, 
the Michigan Secretary of State created a 
“modernization committee” to look for other 
non-legislative ways to improve elections. 
Among other initiatives, the committee worked 
with the Bureau of Elections to bring electronic 
poll books into polling places.  The committee 
developed software that is compatible with 
ordinary laptop computers and can be 
combined with bar code scanners or magnetic 
strip scanners to check in voters electronically 
at the polls.  In a voluntary pilot program in 
2010, the new electronic poll books were in use 
in more than one third of Michigan’s precincts, 
providing speedier operations and greater 
accuracy.  By 2012, Michigan expects at least 
60% of precincts will be using electronic poll 
books.38  
The modernization committee also has made 
recommendations to clerks regarding the 
number of voting machines that are necessary 
in each polling place, and has developed other 
ideas to increase voting efficiency, including 
having poll workers greet voters immediately 
upon arrival at the polling place in order to 
determine whether they are in the correct 
location.  The committee is implementing 
faster and cheaper routines for testing the 
accuracy of voting machines prior to each 
election, and has showed clerks how to save 
money on ballot printing costs by moving to a 
system in which absentee ballots are identical 
to the ballots used in the polling place.  The 
committee also is studying how best to conduct 
post-election audits, and developing a tracking 
system for absentee ballots that will help ensure 
that proper security and chain of custody rules 
are followed.  It is looking into how no-excuse 
absentee voting might be implemented and 
whether officials in one municipality may be 
deputized to register college students who 
are away from their true residence to allow 
those students to cast absentee ballots in the 
municipality of their true residence.39  The 
committee is also generally developing best 
practice guidelines for local clerks, as well as 
recommending that certain historical practices 
that have become duplicative or anachronistic 
be discontinued.
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CHAPTER SIX: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
THE PRIMARY RECOMMENDATION OF 
OUR ORIGINAL STUDY was for states to 
structure the institutional arrangements of 
their elections systems to combat partisan 
bias, both real and perceived, and to promote 
transparency and impartiality at all levels of 
election administration.  This recommendation 
extends not only to the office of the chief 
election authority of every state, but also to 
the offices of local administrators, canvassing 
boards, provisional and absentee ballot 
counting operations, and to the tribunals set up 
to handle contested elections cases.  We stand 
by this recommendation, believing it to be even 
more salient now than it was four years ago. 
While we reaffirm the importance of 
independent electoral institutions, this 
follow-up study – informed as it is by the 
Coleman-Franken contest – makes a new 
recommendation:  that post-election processes 
must be fair, unambiguous, and managed in a 
professional and organized way so as to ensure 
a swift and definitive conclusion.  Minnesota’s 
experience confirms the importance of having 
electoral disputes resolved by institutions 
that are perceived to be, and that are in fact, 
free from partisan bias.1  In addition, states 
need to closely examine their post-election 
processes to identify those that are out of 
date or governed by state statutes and case 
law only in insufficient detail.  In performing 
this analysis, states can now study the the 
2000 Florida presidential contest, the 2004 
gubernatorial contest in Washington state, 
the 2008 Minnesota Senate contest, and 2010 
post-election litigation in Ohio, to see what 
they can learn from the experiences of others. 
The hypothetical election contest scenarios 
that began each of the five state chapters of 
this study are a beginning to such analysis, 
but can be taken further.  Post-election cases 
have shown time and again that laws and 
procedures that may seem clear at first become 
less clear when they are tested by recounts 
and litigation, when multiple interpretations 
often present themselves.  Furthermore, some 
of the governing laws are written in ways that 
can, strictly construed and under certain facts, 
lead to results that are manifestly unjust and 
almost certainly not intended when the rules 
were written.  Rather than waiting for electoral 
disaster to strike, states need to think ahead 
and “war game” their systems against a broad 
range of potential scenarios.2
These recommendations, as well as some further 
recommendations concerning voter databases 
and convenience voting, are discussed below.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
1. States should structure election 
laws to check the partisanship of the 
administrative entities and should develop 
impartial electoral institutions, including 
a political culture, that promote fair 
partisan competition. 
This study draws the distinction between “hard” 
institutions, such as the administrative entities 
and procedures authorized by black-letter 
law, and “soft” institutions, such as a tradition 
of fair electoral competition residing among 
election administrators, candidates, or even 
the public at large.  The best election system 
has high-quality institutions in both categories, 
allowing cooperative players to work together 
within well-defined, thoughtful procedures to 
reach results that are quick, transparent, and 
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fair.  Other election systems may have high-
quality hard institutions but suffer from a 
political culture that does everything it can to 
circumvent those institutions or treat them as 
nothing more than systems to be gamed.  A third 
category of election systems might have poorly 
designed laws but nevertheless overcome 
that disadvantage because of a high degree of 
public-spiritedness in its administration and 
the outside public.
The power of soft institutions should not 
be underestimated.  As discussed in the 
Minnesota chapter, at first glance an objective 
observer might have thought Minnesota 
had only a middling chance of concluding 
the Coleman-Franken contest as well as it 
did.  The Minnesota Secretary of State is an 
elected partisan, the State Canvassing Board 
was appointed by the Secretary with no formal 
check on partisan affiliations, the three-judge 
election contest court was appointed by the 
state Supreme Court with no constraints as to 
its partisan composition, and the Minnesota 
Supreme Court is itself an elected body that 
may be as partisan as the voting public allows. 
However, because of its healthy political 
culture, Minnesota did not need strong formal 
checks on partisanship to prevent its election 
officials from indulging in partisan games.
But soft institutions are slow to develop, and 
states looking for an immediate benefit will 
have to turn to hard institutions for support. 
Policymakers need to analyze every aspect 
of the elections process, as well as each legal 
entity participating in it, and ask themselves 
at every point, “Is there a way to improve the 
impartial fairness of the electoral competition 
and add transparency to this process?”  We 
think Wisconsin set a good example here by 
making some improvements in its thoughtfully 
planned chief elections board, and Illinois 
long ago moved to a bipartisan board.  On 
the other hand, Ohio seems to have invited 
trouble by choosing to have as its chief election 
officer an elected Secretary of State of openly 
declared political party affiliation.  Minnesota 
and Michigan, two other states with elected 
Secretaries of State, have not experienced the 
same degree of politicization of the elections 
process that Ohio has experienced, but if they 
want to continue to enjoy that privilege they 
should consider whether a board structured 
along the Wisconsin model might better protect 
their elections system from politicization.
Policymakers also need to analyze the court 
system.  The courts involved in any election 
contest must be not only competent and 
trustworthy but also perceived to be competent 
and trustworthy.  As observed above, the 
Minnesota trial court and Supreme Court 
achieved this,3 and without any formal checks 
on partisanship.  However, if the political 
culture in Minnesota deteriorates and the state 
becomes sharply polarized in the way that other 
states (and national politics), are then there 
is a risk that in a future Minnesota election 
contest, the Chief Justice of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court could try to appoint the 
statutory 3-member contest court with judges 
who favored one candidate over another.
We believe a better model can be found 
in Minnesota’s past.4  In its disputed 1962 
gubernatorial election, the candidates by 
voluntary agreement through the court invented 
their own procedure, a 3-member panel in 
which each candidate chose one member and 
then those two members worked together to 
choose a third who was agreeable to both and 
therefore presumably fair.  But that sensible 
approach has not been repeated, and we are 
aware of no state in which such a procedure is 
prescribed by law.5
Other institutions that need to be analyzed in 
this way include, but are not limited to, polling 
place staff, the offices of local administrators, 
canvassing boards, provisional and absentee 
ballot counting operations, and others.
POST-ELECTION PROCESSES
2.  Each state must guarantee all candidates 
reasonable access to recounts and election 
contest proceedings.
While the need for full recounts and election 
contests may seem obvious, neither Illinois 
nor Ohio appears to allow election contests for 
federal candidates.  In Illinois, this limitation 
derives from case law that strictly interprets 
the state election contest statutes to exclude 
federal contests, because they are not explicitly 
authorized.6  In Ohio, a state statute passed in 
2006 explicitly denies state courts jurisdiction 
over Presidential and other federal election 
contests.7
A similar situation applies to recounts.  Illinois 
does not permit full recounts except with 
approval of the election contest court, yet 
candidates for federal office are not permitted 
to file these contests.  Even candidates for 
state office cannot obtain a full recount without 
court permission, something that is often 
denied.  Michigan, in contrast, generally allows 
full recounts except where post-election ballot 
security measures have not been followed. 
Unfortunately, this sometimes results in only 
partial recounts, and may actually give bad 
actors an incentive to deliberately violate 
security measures in order to prevent recounts 
in desired precincts.  
It is hard to identify a good policy reason that 
would justify prohibiting these recounts and 
contests.  The U.S. Constitution does provide 
that the ultimate decision on whom to admit 
into the House and Senate rests with the 
members of those bodies, so perhaps the idea is 
that the recount officials and the courts should 
avoid getting involved and just leave things to 
Congress.  However, this ignores the fact that, 
left to its own devices, Congress is not well-
positioned to discover the facts of the election, 
especially in modern times when determining 
the true winner requires not only counting 
of physical ballots but also interacting with 
complicated technology that most legislators 
simply are not equipped to comprehend 
without assistance.  Since it is not a court, the 
legislature cannot provide any authoritative 
interpretation of the election laws, especially 
state election laws it had no hand in drafting.
More importantly, leaving the resolution 
of federal election disputes to Congress 
undermines the effort to ensure the legitimacy 
of the election: the winner of an election should 
be determined in a fair, nonpartisan way, free 
from political considerations.  Depriving 
Congress of a full judicial contest of an election 
to guide them in making their decision leaves 
the whole process in the realm of pure politics 
and greatly increases the risk that the ultimate 
result will be viewed as illegitimate.
3.  Adopt a clear state law that tells courts 
exactly what to do when confronted with 
the commingled ballots dilemma.
Throughout this book, we have examined the 
difficult situation sometimes facing election 
contest courts when ballots that were not 
eligible to be counted have nevertheless 
made it into the count and can no longer be 
identified and removed.  Courts have taken 
many different approaches to this situation, 
including randomly throwing out some ballots, 
throwing out all ballots in the affected precincts, 
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taking testimony from unlawful voters to try 
to determine how they cast their ballots and 
adjusting vote totals accordingly, and ordering 
a new election.  Prior to Coleman v. Franken 
itself, which presented this problem acutely, 
the highest profile case involving commingled 
ballots was the 2004 Washington gubernatorial 
election, in which the election contest court 
determined that 1,678 unlawful ballots had 
been counted.8  For a remedy the court simply 
chose to do nothing, however, because there 
was no practicable way of determining whether 
or how those ballots had affected the outcome.
As the Washington experience suggested, 
commingled ballots present a situation for which 
there is no satisfactory remedy.  The true result 
usually is unknowable, and for that reason it is 
difficult to say that any one of the approaches 
outlined above is better than the others.  The 
lack of any clear solution may leave the election 
contest court to choose any approach it desires 
from among various bad solutions, perhaps one 
that will install its preferred candidate into 
office.  In Coleman v. Franken, the Minnesota 
judiciary chose to handle this problem by 
invoking a waiver doctrine that prevented 
consideration of the issue on its merits.  (The 
waiver doctrine, however, was of questionable 
applicability, as the Minnesota Supreme Court 
itself acknowledged in a footnote, because the 
challenge to the commingled absentee ballots 
was deemed waived even though Coleman 
actually had never had a chance to challenge 
the absentee ballots before commingling.9) 
 In the future, the legislature should spell out 
clearly what should happen when there is a 
dispute over the eligibility of commingled 
ballots, including the circumstances in which 
a waiver doctrine appropriately applies.  In 
our judgment, there is merit to the notion 
that a candidate should not be permitted to 
challenge the validity of commingled ballots if 
that candidate had an adequate opportunity to 
challenge them before commingling.  We are 
more dubious, however, about the invocation 
of a waiver doctrine when the candidate had 
no opportunity to challenge the ballots in 
the first place (and we do not think that the 
legislature would want a candidate to have no 
opportunity whatsoever to challenge ballots 
believed ineligible under state law—for 
example, absentee ballots cast by unregistered 
voters).  In any event, whatever position a court 
ultimately adopts with respect to the thorny 
problem of ineligible but commingled ballots, 
it is far preferable if that position merely 
implements an explicit statutory directive on 
the point, rather than being an exercise of 
judicial discretion.
4.  Ensure state statutes create a clear 
division of labor between recount officials 
and the courts.
The 2008 Minnesota contest exposed 
considerable confusion on the part of election 
officials and the courts about whether and 
under what circumstances the State Canvassing 
Board could, as part of the recount, reconsider 
decisions made on election night to discount 
certain absentee ballots.  This is one area where, 
again, the election code seemed clear enough 
in the abstract, but when confronted with 
unanticipated facts, decisions were not so easy. 
Although this problem did not undermine the 
legitimacy of the final outcome in Minnesota, 
it did contribute to the excessive delay of that 
outcome (eight months after voting was over). 
Moreover, under different circumstances, or 
in a different state, this lack of clarity could 
inject serious problems into the post-election 
process.
Of our five states, Wisconsin is of particular 
concern. It has an unusual election contest 
procedure in which the county board of 
canvassers, serving as the recount authority, 
effectively functions as the initial election 
contest court, before the contest moves to 
a regular court as an appeal of the recount. 
This could invite candidates to file mandamus 
actions or other lawsuits in the regular courts as 
a backdoor way to try to control the outcome of 
the recount phase of the election contest.  A turf 
war of this kind would cause great disruption in 
the proceedings and lead to conflicting orders 
and general confusion.
Similar jurisdictional battles could occur in 
Illinois and Ohio, given existing law in each 
state that deprives state courts of jurisdiction 
over election contests for federal offices. 
Though in theory these laws might appear 
to leave the resolution of federal elections 
entirely to Congress or the federal courts, our 
fear is that they could complicate the picture as 
litigants seek alternative grounds for state court 
involvement in election outcomes.  (Ohio has 
already seen forum-shopping in disputes over 
provisional ballots in both 2008 and 2010, with 
Democrats running to federal court hoping 
for a favorable result, while Republicans ran 
to the Ohio Supreme Court.  In 2008, the 
Republicans prevailed, with the Ohio Supreme 
Court having the last word, but not so in 2010. 
There is a risk of continued jurisdictional turf-
fighting and confusion, with its concomitant 
delays, in 2012.)
Illinois also might suffer some confusion 
or mismanagement in a statewide election 
because of another feature:  the election 
contest court, at its discretion, can essentially 
outsource the taking of testimony, hearing of 
evidence, and other traditional judicial tasks 
to the State Board of Elections.10  If properly 
used, this power might aid, rather than impair, 
proper judicial resolution of the dispute, but 
if used poorly it might lead to the same kind 
of confusion and blurring of functions that we 
fear in Wisconsin.
There are no such obvious “blurring” problems 
in Ohio and Michigan, but that does not mean 
that a future election contest in those states 
would not expose significant ambiguities or 
other problems in defining the scope of recounts 
compared to the scope of election contests.  In 
general, candidates who expect (or need) to 
make gains in the recount have an incentive 
to try to expand the scope of the recount to 
make it as broad as possible.  Furthermore, 
by expanding the scope of questions that may 
be considered in a recount, a contestant can 
potentially get two bites at the apple—a chance 
to win the issue at the recount level, and then 
again in the election contest.  Thus Al Franken, 
initially behind in the 2008 Minnesota contest, 
pushed to have previously rejected absentee 
ballots reconsidered during the recount, and 
got his way with respect to some, though not 
all, of those ballots.  If he had lost on any of 
these ballots, nothing was sacrificed because 
he could make the same arguments again in the 
subsequent election contest.  Norm Coleman, 
on the other hand, initially tried to limit the 
scope of the recount so that it did not include 
reconsidering whether individual absentee 
ballots had been properly rejected.  Rather 
than having candidates argue over the scope of 
such proceedings, the legislature should step 
in and explicitly define the exact scope of each 
procedure and what types of considerations 
may or may not be part of each of them.11
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5.  Administrators should try to anticipate 
very close contests, and take special care 
in close contests for statewide and other 
high-profile races.
The Minnesota Secretary of State and some 
other Minnesota elections officials pointed out 
during our interviews with them that part of 
the reason why the 2008 recount and contest 
went so smoothly was that they believed from 
the beginning that the Senate race could 
easily require a recount, and so they were 
prepared for that possibility.  Partly because 
of a statewide recount in the 2008 primary 
(over a judicial seat), they had created special 
online training tools, including video tutorials 
on various recount procedures, and had them 
updated and easily available to all county clerks 
to prepare them for the Senate recount.
Trying to anticipate close races is a good 
practice.  Obviously, all elections are important 
and deserve adequate attention, but when 
margins are expected to be close the significance 
of each part of the process is magnified.  Tiny 
errors and inconsistencies, even when they do 
not affect the true result of an election, can 
consume months and months of time.  These 
errors and inconsistencies also generate bad 
public relations for the elections system, and 
might undermine faith in it or give ammunition 
to those who want to undermine faith in it.
6.  Each state should have a “finality 
plan” or set of laws designed to conclude 
elections disputes by a firm deadline, or 
otherwise install a provisional winner.
Despite its general excellence, the 2008 
Minnesota contest failed to conclude within 
a reasonable time, leaving Minnesota 
underrepresented in the Senate for a full six 
months.  Some of that lost time was inevitable, 
but the process could have gone faster without 
sacrificing fairness and accuracy.  In the 
alternative, if Minnesota had allowed issuance 
of a provisional certificate of election while the 
contest proceeded, then Minnesota would at 
least have had an interim Senator in Washington 
looking out for the state’s interests.
As Table Eight below shows, none of our five 
Midwestern states have a firm deadline by 
which election contests must be completed. 
This suggests that post-election litigation in all 
five states could drag on and on for months, 
as is common in most types of litigation. 
Fortunately, outside of Minnesota, the other 
four states in our study all issue an official 
certificate of election to the apparent winner 
of each race even if an election contest is 
subsequently filed.  While this may incorrectly 
presume the election contest is not going to be 
successful, it does ensure that these states have 
full representation while election contests are 
resolved.  Still, speedy resolution of any ongoing 
election contest remains important, in case the 
preliminarily certified winner is later found not 
to have won.  Furthermore, allowing someone 
other than the true winner to stay in office 
for too long conveys upon them an unearned 
aura of legitimacy that can be unfairly used to 
suggest the election contestant is a “sore loser” 
who cannot accept the people’s will.
For these reasons, legislatures in each state 
need to require election contest courts to 
conclude election contests by a firm deadline. 
The mandatory deadline can be different 
depending on the state and the type of office at 
stake, but there needs to be a deadline.  It may 
even be that the requirement could include an 
exception for the court to extend the deadline in 
unusual circumstances.  In legislative or judicial 
races, the legislature might decide speedy 
resolution is less important and the deadline 
can be later, while most executive offices would 
be important to resolve as quickly as possible. 
It would be very difficult for the business of 
the state to proceed without a governor or 
other important executive officer.  Likewise, 
it would be highly undesirable if a candidate 
came temporarily into a governorship, pushed 
through a sweeping set of reforms, and then 
was revealed not to have been the true winner.50
7.  Post-election litigation will continue to 
focus on absentee and provisional ballots.
Post-election litigation in Minnesota and Ohio 
has shown that absentee and provisional ballots 
are the “low-hanging fruit,” where contestants 
can expect to find the easiest gains.  This is not 
only because the absentee and provisional ballot 
processes are more complex than traditional 
polling-place voting and therefore more prone 
to error, but also because these processes are 
much better documented.  That documentation 
makes proving a case for or against a particular 
absentee ballot much easier than trying to 
prove a case for or against a traditional ballot 
that has no paperwork associated with it except 
the voter’s signature at the polls.
One area of both absentee and provisional 
balloting that may be ripe for litigation is how 
to determine whether elections workers, rather 
than voters themselves, are responsible for 
irregularities in ballot paperwork and, if so, 
how that affects the validity of the ballot.  In 
Ohio, this problem surfaced in the provisional 
ballot litigation when Secretary Brunner 
ordered Ohio counties to construe certain 
types of paperwork irregularities as poll worker 
error, and for that reason to overlook those 
irregularities and count ballots that otherwise 
might not have counted.  The Ohio Supreme 
Court halted that directive by concluding 
that there was no specific evidence that the 
irregularities were poll worker error and 
forbade local election officials from presuming 
poll worker error in the absence of better 
evidence.  In a more recent case flowing from 
the 2010 election, the Ohio Supreme Court 
held that provisional ballots cast in the wrong 
precinct cannot be counted, even when it was 
poll worker error that caused them to be cast 
in the wrong precinct.51  It is unclear whether 
this holding would apply to provisional ballots 
that were cast in the proper precinct but 
suffered from other flaws attributable to poll 
worker error.  In yet another case—and one 
that is ongoing—the Sixth Circuit held that, 
for purposes of considering a preliminary 
injunction motion, a county board of elections 
likely violated Bush v. Gore-style equal 
protection rights by considering evidence of 
poll worker error in determining whether to 
count certain provisional ballots, but not others 
that were cast under similar though slightly 
different circumstances.52  
A similar problem occurred in Minnesota 
regarding several categories of absentee 
ballots that had initially been rejected by 
election officials, but were reconsidered 
during the election contest.  For example, 
under Minnesota law voters are required to 
provide a valid signature on their absentee 
ballot return paperwork for the ballot count. 
Unfortunately, officials in one county, as part 
of an internal administrative measure, had 
placed stickers on the return paperwork that 
inadvertently covered up the blank where 
the voter’s signature was supposed to go. The 
election contest court suggested this clear 
official error could not excuse voters who had 
not supplied their signatures:  “A sticker placed 
on an absentee ballot return envelope does not 
excuse the voter from complying with the law
and signing the envelope.”53  (The Minnesota 
Supreme Court, however, seemed to take the
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Minnesota Ohio Wisconsin Michigan Illinois
County 
canvassing 
begin
On or before 
7th day after 
election.12
15th day after the 
election.13
Thursday after 
the election.14
The day after 
the election.15
Within 21 
days of the 
election.16
County
canvassing 
end
Upon 
completion of 
the canvass.17
21st day after 
the election, or 
earlier.18
14 days after 
election.19
14 days after 
election.20
Upon 
completion.21
State 
canvassing 
begin
3rd Tuesday after 
election.22
Not later than 
10 days after 
receipt of county 
returns.23
None stated.24 20th day after 
the election, at 
the latest.25
Within 31 
days of the 
election.26
State 
certifi cation
date
Seven days after 
canvas result, 
unless recount 
or contest 
occurs.27
Not later than 10 
days after receipt 
of county returns, 
or at conclusion of 
any recount.28
1st day of 
December.29
40th day after 
the election.30
Upon 
completion.
Recount 
fi ling 
deadline
Seven days after 
certifi cation.31
Five days after 
announcement of 
results.32
3rd business 
day following 
receipt of all 
county-level 
returns.33
2 days 
after state 
certifi cation.34
Five days after 
certifi cation.35*
Recount 
certifi cation 
date
None stated.36 None stated.37 1st day of 
December.38
None stated. None stated.*
Contest 
fi ling 
deadline
Seven days 
after canvass/
recount.39
15 days after 
announcement 
of result, or 10 
days after recount 
result.40*
N/A41 30 days after 
the election.42
None stated43*
Contest 
completion 
deadline
None stated. None stated, but 
trial begins 15 
to 30 days after 
petition fi ling.44*
N/A None stated. None stated.*
Election 
contest 
court
Special 3-judge 
panel assigned 
by chief justice 
of Supreme 
Court.45
Chief Justice of 
Supreme Court 
or SC Justice 
appointed by 
chief.46*
Governmental 
Accountability 
Board47
Intermediate 
appellate court 
(elected).48
State Supreme 
Court 
(elected).49*
Note:  The above information applies to U.S. Senate elections only.  Different rules may apply in elections for state offi ces, 
federal offi ces that are not statewide, and Presidential elections.
*As discussed in the Ohio and Illinois chapters, it is not clear that either of these states would permit election contests for U.S. 
Senate or any other federal offi ce.  Furthermore, Illinois does not permit full recounts except as part of an election contest.
TABLE EIGHT:  POST-ELECTION TIMELINES ACROSS THE FIVE STATES
opposite position on this issue from the trial 
court, although this difference did not matter in 
light of Coleman’s failure to introduce enough 
evidence to validate ballots affected with this 
kind of official error.54)
Other absentee and provisional ballot issues 
likely to be further explored in litigation, as 
discussed both in our original study and at length 
in the Ohio chapter above, include whether 
absentee ballots are sufficiently completed to 
count, the intersection of absentee balloting 
and HAVA ID and database “matching” issues, 
whether voters are being improperly asked to 
cast provisional ballots when they are eligible 
to cast regular ballots, and the details of the 
processes used to determine whether voters are 
registered and eligible and have met any other 
requirements necessary for their provisional 
ballots to count. 
DATABASES AND MATCHING
8.  Each state should clarify the 
consequences of a HAVA non-match and 
specify precisely how mismatch data can 
be used.
As discussed in the Ohio and Wisconsin 
chapters of this study, in 2008 both of those 
states faced litigation concerning how election 
officials match data on incoming voter 
registration applications against social security 
and state motor vehicle databases.  These 
suits echoed similar suits in Washington55 and 
Florida,56 and together they provide important 
information about the matching issue.  First, 
the decisions in all four suits suggest that HAVA 
does not require matching as a precondition 
to voter registration and that a failed match, 
in the absence of an explicit state law to the 
contrary, cannot alone be used as a basis to 
disenfranchise the voter.57  On the other hand, 
the decisions do suggest that officials must 
diligently perform these matching operations, 
to the extent necessary to verify accuracy,58 and 
should share the results with other election 
officials in a way that allows officials to conduct 
further inquiry concerning mismatches.
The most important aspect of these suits, 
however, may be what they do not tell us. 
Specifically, they do not explain sufficiently 
what officials are supposed to do when 
confronted with a non-match.  The Sixth 
Circuit, considering an appeal in the Ohio 
case, indicated that the Secretary of State 
must share non-match data with local officials 
in a way that is “usable,”59 but gave no clues 
as to what consequences non-matches might 
have when they cannot be explained.  One 
use that is required by HAVA is to use positive 
matches to relieve first-time voters of HAVA’s 
ID requirement:  matched voters do not have 
to comply with this requirement.  However, 
other uses for the data are possible, such 
as identifying data entry errors in the voter 
registration database.  In the event that voter 
registration applications are submitted with 
incorrect information, non-match data can 
be, and often is, used to contact voters for 
corrections.
But the plaintiffs in the lawsuits had another 
use in mind for mismatch data:  as evidence to 
attempt to disqualify at least some non-matched 
voters from the registered voter database 
altogether.  No court has prohibited using 
a mismatch to trigger a chain of events that 
could eventually result in disenfranchisement 
of the voter.  The Sixth Circuit, in particular, 
seemed somewhat open to the idea that a non-
match could be used as a basis for launching an 
investigation into a voter’s qualifications that, 
in some undefined procedure, could result in 
the voter having to cast a provisional ballot.60  
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The plaintiffs in these suits might have hoped 
that, by combining the non-match data together 
with other indicia of problematic registrations, 
they could mount systemic challenges against 
certain voters.  For instance, the non-match 
data could be cross-referenced against lists 
of sheriff ’s sales, evictions, imprisoned 
felons, residents of group homes, or the voter 
registration databases of other states.  In 
Michigan, it could be cross-referenced against 
existing databases that flag registrations tied 
to non-residential addresses.  If sufficient 
resources were at hand, the process could 
even conclude with a physical canvass of a list 
of addresses believed to be problematic.  By 
piling on layers and layers of data and focusing 
on only those registrations that seem the most 
problematic, it might be possible to use HAVA 
non-match data as one part of a challenge to 
the voter registrations of individual voters.  For 
instance, a political party could launch a series 
of highly individuated challenges calculated to 
target only those voters who seem most likely 
to be disqualified.  Because voters generally 
lose the challenges automatically if they do 
not appear at the challenge hearing, these 
challenges might be effective even when the 
voter was properly registered and eligible.
However, the data could be used not only to 
disenfranchise voters, but could also be used to 
enfranchise them.  As noted, positive matches 
are required to relieve first-time voters of 
HAVA’s ID requirement.  But in a state that 
is not performing matches or is not sharing 
match data with local administrators in a way 
that is usable, local administrators have no 
way of knowing which first-time voters must 
provide this ID and could be requiring ID of 
every first-time voter in violation of federal 
law.  States therefore may want to ensure that 
election administrators are aware of their 
duties to perform these matches and are not 
requiring ID of those who are exempt.
The matching issue is a very complex one, 
not only because it involves fragmentary state 
laws and “clumsy” HAVA language,61 but also 
because it involves technology that is difficult 
to understand.  Rather than waiting for this 
confusion to be resolved in a piecemeal way 
through a series of lawsuits, state legislatures 
need to step in and specify detailed rules that 
define the purpose of the matching program 
and the ways that the data may and may not 
be used.
9.  Each state should analyze its HAVA 
matching program in conjunction with its 
absentee balloting programs.
HAVA matching also has important consequences 
for absentee balloting procedures.  Under 
HAVA’s ID requirement, a non-matched voter 
needs to present a form of acceptable ID before 
voting, even if voting by absentee ballot.  This 
means that a non-matched absentee voter must 
photocopy the voter’s driver’s license, utility 
State Consequence of Mismatch
Illinois None
Michigan Voter must show ID at polls or cast provisional ballot
Minnesota Voter not registered (but can cast a regular ballot using EDR)
Ohio None
Wisconsin None
TABLE NINE:  CONSEQUENCES OF HAVA MISMATCHES ACROSS THE FIVE STATES
bill, bank statement, paycheck, government 
check, or other government document showing 
name and address, and include this photocopy 
with the absentee ballot materials.  However, 
the absentee ballot request forms and return 
envelopes used by voters might not give 
adequate instructions, or instruct voters at 
all, about whether they need to fulfill this 
requirement.  As a result, some voters may 
fail to comply when they need to, while others 
may forego voting because they believe they 
need to present ID when they actually do not. 
Furthermore, in states where absentee ballots 
are sometimes submitted together with EDR 
registration applications,62 such as Minnesota, 
the intersection of HAVA’s ID rules, absentee 
balloting rules, and the special ID required 
for EDR lead to even greater complexity when 
analyzed in conjunction with the matching 
issue.
Although these issues only affect first-time 
voters and may seem quite small, the Ohio 
matching litigation suggests that a primary 
reason for the suit was to call into question 
Ohio’s “Golden Week” of one-stop registration 
and in-person absentee voting.  However, the 
same concern potentially applies not only to 
one-stop voting, but also to mail-in absentee 
voting and voting at the polls.  A full analysis of 
these issues is outside the scope of this study, 
but needs to be conducted.
CONVENIENCE VOTING
10.  States should reexamine increasingly 
antiquated rules and practices that 
presume traditional in-person voting is the 
only option for most voters.
The implications of the rise of absentee and 
early voting are significant.  Mail-in absentee 
voting can save money, ease lines at polls, 
spread voting over time, document the voting 
process better, and enhance voter convenience. 
But it also has downsides.  For instance, mail-
in balloting, unlike in-person balloting, does 
not give the user the benefit of new voting 
machines that check the ballot to make sure 
it has been filled out correctly.  This lack of 
error correction could increase the percentage 
of over-votes in mail-in ballots.  The risk of 
fraud and other impropriety also is elevated 
in absentee balloting, because votes are cast 
outside the secrecy of the voting place, opening 
the door for bad actors to intimidate voters or 
otherwise attempt to improperly influence 
their votes.
An additional problem is that mail-in absentee 
voting increases the number of ways that a 
voter’s ballot can be invalidated.  The voter 
not only must be registered properly, but 
also must submit a proper and timely ballot 
request, provide a matching signature, and 
return the completed ballot, together with 
some accompanying paperwork, in time for 
it to be counted.  In the 2008 election, Ohio 
disregarded approximately 27,500 mostly mail-
in absentee ballots,63 approximately 1.6% of all 
absentee ballots cast statewide.  The relative 
complexity of the absentee voting process 
not only means that more voters might be 
disenfranchised by minor irregularities in 
their paperwork, but also heightens the risk 
of litigation to clarify or control the way that 
complexity is interpreted by officials and the 
courts.  The increase in documentation makes 
elections more “disputable” after the fact than 
they have been ever before.
The lack of any history of mail-in voting at 
the levels now being seen means that there 
is a dearth of case law interpreting mail-
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in voting provisions and giving guidance to 
administrators and future courts.  In Ohio and 
Minnesota, some of the ambiguities in the law 
have been resolved through recent litigation, 
but Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin have not 
had the benefit of learning from such conflicts.
The rise in mail-in voting may also mean that 
ballot counting practices need to change. 
Under the Minnesota law in place in 2008, 
some counties had mail-in ballots counted by 
poll workers in their precincts, while other 
counties counted mail-in ballots centrally by 
a board.  Procedures differed between the 
two different systems in small but potentially 
significant ways.  The increasing emphasis on 
procedural uniformity in matters of election 
administration makes it important to consider 
a centralized system for counting absentee 
ballots that gives administrators more control 
over the process.
The rise of in-person early voting has many of 
the advantages of mail-in absentee voting, with 
fewer drawbacks.  In-person early voting still 
increases voter convenience, but it also gives 
voters access to poll workers who can help 
them and to voting machines that check to 
see whether their ballots are marked properly. 
Casting a ballot in person is also more secure, 
as there is little probability of interception, and 
there is less risk of violations to voter privacy 
in a controlled environment.  Permitting early 
voting for all voters also takes stress off the 
regular mail-in absentee system and makes it 
less likely that voters will misrepresent their 
eligibility to cast a mail-in absentee ballot by 
saying they meet whatever qualifications might 
be required for mail-in voting.  Unlike mail-in 
ballots, early voting ballots get commingled in 
the election-night count and face little risk they 
will be retroactively uncounted in subsequent 
elections litigation.  They therefore work to 
discourage post-election litigation, while mail-
in balloting encourages it.
One unexpected implication of early voting, 
however, may be that the touchscreen machines 
that have recently become disfavored in some 
quarters may remain an important vote-
casting option.  That is because early voting 
often occurs not in precinct polling places 
but in voting centers that will service multiple 
precincts.  This means that the voting center 
must be prepared to issue hundreds or even 
thousands of ballot styles to voters, which 
is more difficult using a paper ballot system. 
Touchscreen machines can be programmed to 
carry most of the ballot styles, thereby reducing 
the logistical challenges of this voting system.
We are troubled that legislative efforts 
concerning convenience voting since 2010 
seem motivated, not by a desire to improve 
the electoral process from a perspective of 
evenhanded impartiality towards both major 
political parties, but instead by the desire of 
the political party temporarily in legislative 
power to adopt rules that would advantage its 
candidates in the next electoral cycle.  While it 
would be naïve to find such partisan motivations 
surprising, it is nonetheless unfortunate.  It 
fails to respect the distinction in a healthy 
democracy between legitimate partisan 
competition under the constraints of impartial 
rules, on the one hand, and inappropriate 
efforts to undermine the impartial rules that 
make the partisan competition fair. 
 *  *  *
Throughout the United States, administering 
elections remains a complex, underfunded, 
time-pressured responsibility for the thousands 
of election officials and countless additional 
Election Day volunteers.  States should reduce 
the burdens on these dedicated personnel 
and decrease the pressure on their election 
ecosystems by developing greater clarity in 
how the key processes should be conducted, 
and by continuing to professionalize election 
administration duties.  The 2008 Minnesota 
U.S. Senate race makes clear that even well-
functioning systems are not immune from 
serious difficulties, and invites all states to 
reflect now on how to minimize comparable 
difficulties in their own elections. 
Because lawmakers are both partisan 
candidates, who are entitled to be motivated by 
a partisan desire to win reelection, and public 
servants who are obligated to act impartially 
when adopting the rules for electoral 
competition, a healthy democracy breaks down 
when lawmakers let their partisan motives 
spill over into their actions for amending the 
rules for electoral competition.  If lawmakers 
are unable to restrain their partisan motives in 
this respect, it becomes necessary to consider 
whether constitutional measures are necessary 
to impose new constraints concerning 
legislation that determines the rules of 
electoral competition.  Although historically 
the laws that regulate what is commonly called 
“election administration”—what we call “from 
registration to recounts” regarding the casting 
and counting of ballots—have been thought to 
be the province of ordinary legislation, rather 
than constitutional law, recent experience 
suggests that this assumption may need 
reconsideration.  It is too soon after 2010 for 
a definitive judgment on this point, but it is an 
issue to watch in the future.
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James P. Allen, Communications Director, 
Chicago Board of Election Commissioners
Jay Bennett, Jr., Chief Deputy Clerk, Kane 
County
Cindi Canary, Director, Illinois Campaign for 
Political Reform
Cristina Cray, Legislative Liaison, State Board 
of Elections
John Cunningham, Clerk, Kane County
Lance Gough, Executive Director, Chicago 
Board of Election Commissioners
Daniel Madden, Legal Advisor, Cook County 
Clerk’s Office
Peter McLennon, Policy Analyst, Cook County 
Clerk’s Office
Mark Mossman, Director of Election 
Information, State Board of Elections
David Orr, Clerk, Cook County Clerk
Kyle Thomas, Database Coordinator, State 
Board of Elections
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Todd Blake, City Clerk, City of Freemont
Jocelyn Benson, Associate Professor of 
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Michigan Secretary of State, 2010
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Timothy Hanson, Director of Program 
Development, Bureau of Elections, Office of the 
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Bureau of Elections, Office of the Secretary of 
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Ann Ulrich, Clerk, Hartland Township
Bradley S. Wittman, Director, Elections 
Liaison Division, Bureau of Elections, Office of 
the Secretary of State
As with our 2007 study, a number of individuals in each of the fi ve studied states graciously shared their 
time and expertise with us as we continued to examine election administration in their states.  Many of 
these were individuals with whom we had consulted in preparing the original study, whose willingness 
to speak with us again provided critical continuity and consistency as we assessed the changes that 
were occurring in their states.  We also benefi tted from the perspectives and assistance of many new 
individuals consulted specifi cally for this follow-up study.  We are grateful to all of these people.
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Eric Black, Journalist, MinnPost.com
Mike Dean, Executive Director, Minnesota 
Common Cause
Jim Gelbmann, Deputy Secretary of State
Joseph Mansky, Elections Manager, Ramsey 
County
Patty O’Connor, Director of Taxpayer Services, 
Blue Earth County
Gary Poser, Director of Elections, Office of the 
Secretary of State
Cindi Reichert, Clerk, Anoka County
Mark Ritchie, Secretary of State
Rachel Smith, Program Director, Excellence in 
Election Administration, University of Minnesota
Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Capitol Bureau 
Reporter, St. Paul Pioneer Press
Laura Wang, Interim Director, League of 
Women Voters of Minnesota
Jay Weiner, Journalist, MinnPost.com
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Jennifer Brunner, Secretary of State
Bryan Clark, Policy Director, Office of the 
Secretary of State
Matthew Damschroeder, Deputy Director, 
Franklin County Board of Elections
David M. Farrell, Director of Elections, Office 
of the Secretary of State
Caroline Gentry, Partner, Porter Wright 
Morris & Arthur, LLP
Lawrence Norden, Deputy Director, 
Democracy Program, Brennan Center for Justice 
Brian Shin, Chief Elections Counsel, Office of 
the Secretary of State
Michael Stinziano, Director, Franklin County 
Board of Elections
Katherine Thomsen, Field Representative, 
Office of the Secretary of State
Catherine Turcer, Director, Money in Politics 
Project, Ohio Citizen Action
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Neal V. Albrecht, Assistant Director, City of 
Milwaukee Election Commission
Jay Heck, Executive Director, Common Cause 
Wisconsin
Andrea Kaminski, Executive Director, League of 
Women Voters of Wisconsin
Kevin J. Kennedy, Executive Director, 
Government Accountability Board
Bruce Landgraf, Assistant District Attorney, 
Milwaukee County
Mike McCabe, Executive Director, Wisconsin 
Democracy Campaign
Robert Ohlsen, County Clerk, Dane County
Sandra L. Wesolowski, City Clerk, City of 
Franklin
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